Rachel Lichtman

The offender pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood and thereby causing the death of another person.

The collision occurred on April 18, 2023, when the offender, driving at over 110 km/h in a 50 km/h zone with an expired driver's licence and a blood alcohol level of 210-214 mg/100ml, struck a vehicle from behind, fatally injuring the victim.

The court imposed a four-year prison sentence, an eight-year driving prohibition, and a DNA order, balancing the serious aggravating circumstances against the offender's previously unblemished character and strong rehabilitative potential.

Richard Samuels and Tafari Minott pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the shooting death of Osman Bangura.

The Crown sought eight-year sentences, while defence counsel requested six years.

The court considered aggravating factors, such as the use and disposal of illegal firearms and Samuels' youth record, and mitigating factors, including early guilty pleas, self-defence concerns (though disproportionate force was used), and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a six-year sentence on both offenders, with credit for time served, resulting in remaining sentences of approximately 2 years 9.5 months for Samuels and 3 years 8.5 months for Minott.

Both were also subject to a lifetime firearms prohibition and a mandatory DNA order.

The applicant, P.L., charged with sexual assault, brought two applications: one under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to admit evidence of prior sexual activity to explain his detailed recollection of the alleged incident, and another under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code to admit communications (emails, texts, 911 report) to support a motive-to-fabricate defence by the complainant.

The s. 276 application was dismissed as its minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by prejudice to the complainant's dignity and privacy, especially since the Crown would not challenge the applicant's ability to recall.

The s. 278.92 application was granted in part; some communications were deemed "records" and admitted for their probative value regarding the alleged motive to fabricate, while others were excluded.

The court also ordered a publication ban for the daughter (S.L.) and considered a sealing order for related exhibits.

The applicant, charged with dangerous operation causing death, sought to exclude his utterances, a statement, and observations of alcohol odour, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the applicant was psychologically detained from the moment police took his documents and questioned him, and that his section 10 rights were breached.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the seriousness of the state conduct and the significant impact on the applicant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in the evidence's admission.

Consequently, the court ordered the exclusion of the impugned evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

This criminal trial concerned two defendants, Osman Aim and Ramone Thomas, charged with firearm offences after two handguns were found in a vehicle during a traffic stop.

The driver fled and was not apprehended.

The central issue was whether the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that either defendant had knowledge and control (constructive possession) of the firearms.

The court found that while the Crown's inferences were reasonable, they were not the only reasonable inferences, particularly considering alternative explanations for the movement of one firearm and the flight of one defendant, including the context of anti-Black racism in policing.

Both defendants were found not guilty on all counts.

The applicant, Elijah Jacques-Taylor, sought a stay of serious firearms charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the information being sworn (November 18, 2021) to the anticipated trial date (October 2-4, 2023) was 22 months and 2 weeks.

The court deducted one month for defence counsel's unavailability and three months for the ongoing impact of the COVID-19 backlog, resulting in a net delay of 18 months and 2 weeks.

This period exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice established in R. v. Jordan.

As the Crown conceded there were no exceptional circumstances to justify the delay, the court concluded that a stay of proceedings was the necessary remedy.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay, arguing their trial, scheduled for May 2023, exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found a 5-day period of defence delay but noted the total delay still exceeded the ceiling by at least two months.

The Crown argued the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance, and they had taken reasonable steps to mitigate the delay, including offering earlier trial dates through a "Jordan court." The court agreed that the pandemic was an unforeseen and unavoidable discrete event causing delay and that the Crown and court administration had made reasonable mitigation efforts.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

Three young persons, aged 15 at the time of offences, pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon and sexual assault with a weapon arising from locker room incidents at an elite private school in fall 2018.

One of the three also pleaded guilty to making child pornography.

The court imposed community-based sentences of two years probation with conditions, 30 hours community service, and weapons prohibitions.

The sentencing decision extensively examined the school's bullying and hazing culture as contextual factors, the diminished moral culpability of youth, and the rehabilitative potential of the offenders.

The court rejected the Crown's request for custody, finding that community dispositions with targeted therapeutic interventions were appropriate.

Siobhan O’Shea, suffering from mental illness, was arrested for impaired driving and refusing a breath sample.

The trial judge acquitted her, finding Charter breaches (s. 10(b)) for police failing to facilitate counsel contact.

The Crown appealed.

The Superior Court found the police erred in not advising O'Shea of her right to contact another lawyer after her chosen counsel was unreachable, especially given her vulnerable mental state.

This constituted a s. 10(b) breach.

The court excluded the evidence of refusal under s. 24(2) but found roadside observations were not obtained in a manner infringing the Charter.

The appeal for impaired driving was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appeal for refusing a breath sample was dismissed.

The applicants sought an order in the nature of certiorari quashing their committal to stand trial on charges of trafficking in persons and receiving a financial benefit.

They argued the preliminary inquiry justice erred in law by committing them despite an absence of evidence that they exploited the complainant.

The court dismissed the application, finding there was sufficient evidence that the applicants abused their position of trust or power as the complainant's drug suppliers to induce her to provide sexual services, which could reasonably be expected to cause her to fear for her safety if she stopped.

Two young persons were tried for kidnapping for ransom using a firearm.

One of the accused was also charged with drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The victim, who was uncooperative at trial, had provided a detailed video-taped statement to police shortly after his release.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay and admitted portions of the victim's statement for its truth, finding substantial corroborative evidence of the kidnapping, the use of firearms, and the first accused's identity as a perpetrator.

The first accused was found guilty of kidnapping, firearms offences, drug trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The second accused was acquitted, as the fingerprint evidence and the victim's description were insufficient to prove his identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an encounter with his employee at his home.

The complainant testified that she repeatedly said no and disassociated during the assault, while the accused claimed it was a consensual encounter for money.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, noting his prior lies to police and logical inconsistencies in his testimony.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence, finding that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no consent and that the accused was reckless or willfully blind to the lack of consent.

The accused was found guilty.