Rachel Lichtman

The accused and a co-accused were jointly charged with firearms offences.

The trial was delayed beyond the 18-month Jordan ceiling, partly due to the unavailability of the co-accused's counsel.

The case management judge granted a stay of proceedings, finding the delay presumptively unreasonable and refusing to attribute the co-accused's delay to the accused.

The Court of Appeal affirmed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that delay caused by a co-accused in a joint trial can amount to a discrete exceptional circumstance.

Applying the four criteria from R. v. Tran, the Court found the joint trial was in the interests of justice, the delay arose from the joint trial, the delay was reasonably unavoidable, and the Crown could not have reasonably ameliorated it.

The delay was deducted, bringing the net delay under the ceiling, and the stay was set aside.

The offender pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood and thereby causing the death of another person.

The collision occurred on April 18, 2023, when the offender, driving at over 110 km/h in a 50 km/h zone with an expired driver's licence and a blood alcohol level of 210-214 mg/100ml, struck a vehicle from behind, fatally injuring the victim.

The court imposed a four-year prison sentence, an eight-year driving prohibition, and a DNA order, balancing the serious aggravating circumstances against the offender's previously unblemished character and strong rehabilitative potential.

Richard Samuels and Tafari Minott pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the shooting death of Osman Bangura.

The Crown sought eight-year sentences, while defence counsel requested six years.

The court considered aggravating factors, such as the use and disposal of illegal firearms and Samuels' youth record, and mitigating factors, including early guilty pleas, self-defence concerns (though disproportionate force was used), and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a six-year sentence on both offenders, with credit for time served, resulting in remaining sentences of approximately 2 years 9.5 months for Samuels and 3 years 8.5 months for Minott.

Both were also subject to a lifetime firearms prohibition and a mandatory DNA order.

The applicant, P.L., charged with sexual assault, brought two applications: one under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to admit evidence of prior sexual activity to explain his detailed recollection of the alleged incident, and another under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code to admit communications (emails, texts, 911 report) to support a motive-to-fabricate defence by the complainant.

The s. 276 application was dismissed as its minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by prejudice to the complainant's dignity and privacy, especially since the Crown would not challenge the applicant's ability to recall.

The s. 278.92 application was granted in part; some communications were deemed "records" and admitted for their probative value regarding the alleged motive to fabricate, while others were excluded.

The court also ordered a publication ban for the daughter (S.L.) and considered a sealing order for related exhibits.

The applicant, charged with dangerous operation causing death, sought to exclude his utterances, a statement, and observations of alcohol odour, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the applicant was psychologically detained from the moment police took his documents and questioned him, and that his section 10 rights were breached.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the seriousness of the state conduct and the significant impact on the applicant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in the evidence's admission.

Consequently, the court ordered the exclusion of the impugned evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

This criminal trial concerned two defendants, Osman Aim and Ramone Thomas, charged with firearm offences after two handguns were found in a vehicle during a traffic stop.

The driver fled and was not apprehended.

The central issue was whether the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that either defendant had knowledge and control (constructive possession) of the firearms.

The court found that while the Crown's inferences were reasonable, they were not the only reasonable inferences, particularly considering alternative explanations for the movement of one firearm and the flight of one defendant, including the context of anti-Black racism in policing.

Both defendants were found not guilty on all counts.

The accused were passengers in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation.

During the stop, police observed a cannabis grinder and suspected a firearm was under the passenger seat, leading to a search that uncovered two loaded handguns.

The accused brought a Charter motion arguing violations of their ss. 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) rights, including complaints about police muting their body-worn cameras and delays in providing the right to counsel.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) due to delays in the informational and implementational components of the right to counsel, but dismissed the other Charter claims.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the firearms should not be excluded under s. 24(2), as the evidence was highly reliable, the offences were serious, and exclusion would damage public confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant, Elijah Jacques-Taylor, sought a stay of serious firearms charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the information being sworn (November 18, 2021) to the anticipated trial date (October 2-4, 2023) was 22 months and 2 weeks.

The court deducted one month for defence counsel's unavailability and three months for the ongoing impact of the COVID-19 backlog, resulting in a net delay of 18 months and 2 weeks.

This period exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice established in R. v. Jordan.

As the Crown conceded there were no exceptional circumstances to justify the delay, the court concluded that a stay of proceedings was the necessary remedy.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay, arguing their trial, scheduled for May 2023, exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found a 5-day period of defence delay but noted the total delay still exceeded the ceiling by at least two months.

The Crown argued the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance, and they had taken reasonable steps to mitigate the delay, including offering earlier trial dates through a "Jordan court." The court agreed that the pandemic was an unforeseen and unavoidable discrete event causing delay and that the Crown and court administration had made reasonable mitigation efforts.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The defendants were found guilty of exercising control over the movements of a complainant to provide sexual services, receiving a material benefit, and advertising sexual services.

One defendant was also found guilty of trafficking MDMA.

The court found that while the defendants did not coerce the complainant into the sex trade, they exploited her serious drug dependency for financial gain.

The court sentenced A.M. to a global term of 24 months and M.P. to a global term of 18 months, ordered forfeiture of their cellphones as offence-related property, and granted pre-trial custody credit including for house arrest but not for curfews.

On a pre-trial Charter application in a multi-accused organized crime prosecution, the applicants sought to prevent disclosure of residential address information in the common disclosure brief.

The court held that immediate disclosure of one applicant’s home address engaged and would arbitrarily infringe his s. 7 rights because there was credible evidence of a prior attempt on his life, disclosure would materially increase the danger to him and his family, and the record did not establish any real present need for co-accused to know the precise address to make full answer and defence.

The court rejected arguments grounded in Stinchcombe, parity among accused, and avoidance of future disclosure litigation.

Relief was denied respecting the father’s address because the evidence did not establish danger to him or a sufficient causal connection.

The Crown was directed to work with defence counsel on redactions, and interim sealing orders were granted.

Three young persons, aged 15 at the time of offences, pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon and sexual assault with a weapon arising from locker room incidents at an elite private school in fall 2018.

One of the three also pleaded guilty to making child pornography.

The court imposed community-based sentences of two years probation with conditions, 30 hours community service, and weapons prohibitions.

The sentencing decision extensively examined the school's bullying and hazing culture as contextual factors, the diminished moral culpability of youth, and the rehabilitative potential of the offenders.

The court rejected the Crown's request for custody, finding that community dispositions with targeted therapeutic interventions were appropriate.

The defendants, charged with human trafficking and related offences, brought a pre-trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant on her history in the sex trade.

The Crown alleged the defendants used drugs to coerce the complainant into sex work.

The court applied the two-stage s. 276 framework, ruling that evidence of the complainant's prior sex work and subsequent sex work was inadmissible as it engaged the twin myths.

However, the court permitted cross-examination regarding the complainant's initial meeting with a third party and her independent sex work during the time of the allegations, finding this evidence relevant to the issue of coercion and not barred by s. 276.

Siobhan O’Shea, suffering from mental illness, was arrested for impaired driving and refusing a breath sample.

The trial judge acquitted her, finding Charter breaches (s. 10(b)) for police failing to facilitate counsel contact.

The Crown appealed.

The Superior Court found the police erred in not advising O'Shea of her right to contact another lawyer after her chosen counsel was unreachable, especially given her vulnerable mental state.

This constituted a s. 10(b) breach.

The court excluded the evidence of refusal under s. 24(2) but found roadside observations were not obtained in a manner infringing the Charter.

The appeal for impaired driving was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appeal for refusing a breath sample was dismissed.

The applicants sought an order in the nature of certiorari quashing their committal to stand trial on charges of trafficking in persons and receiving a financial benefit.

They argued the preliminary inquiry justice erred in law by committing them despite an absence of evidence that they exploited the complainant.

The court dismissed the application, finding there was sufficient evidence that the applicants abused their position of trust or power as the complainant's drug suppliers to induce her to provide sexual services, which could reasonably be expected to cause her to fear for her safety if she stopped.

The defendant, an unregistered individual, organized and promoted vacation cruise packages to the Bahamas and Hawaii for members of a local Legion and the public.

Purchasers experienced significant issues, including cancelled cruises, unprovided amenities, and unrefunded payments.

The Travel Industry Council of Ontario charged the defendant with acting as a travel agent without registration under the Travel Industry Act.

The court found that the defendant sold travel services provided by another person to consumers, thereby acting as a travel agent.

The defendant failed to establish a due diligence defence and was found guilty on both counts.

Two young persons were tried for kidnapping for ransom using a firearm.

One of the accused was also charged with drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The victim, who was uncooperative at trial, had provided a detailed video-taped statement to police shortly after his release.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay and admitted portions of the victim's statement for its truth, finding substantial corroborative evidence of the kidnapping, the use of firearms, and the first accused's identity as a perpetrator.

The first accused was found guilty of kidnapping, firearms offences, drug trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The second accused was acquitted, as the fingerprint evidence and the victim's description were insufficient to prove his identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an encounter with his employee at his home.

The complainant testified that she repeatedly said no and disassociated during the assault, while the accused claimed it was a consensual encounter for money.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, noting his prior lies to police and logical inconsistencies in his testimony.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence, finding that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no consent and that the accused was reckless or willfully blind to the lack of consent.

The accused was found guilty.