A. Miller

The accused was charged with second-degree murder after stabbing and killing his husband.

He proceeded to trial before a judge alone.

The defence argued the accused should be found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, relying on two forensic psychiatrists who opined he was experiencing psychosis at the time of the killing.

The court found the accused was suffering from a mental disorder at the time but held that the defence had not established on a balance of probabilities that he was incapable of appreciating the moral wrongfulness of his actions, as the expert opinions relied heavily on inadmissible hearsay.

The court further found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the requisite intent for murder, finding him guilty of second-degree murder.

The plaintiffs, John Snow and Sherry Snow, brought motions to consolidate two related actions and to validate service of the statement of claim and motion materials on the defendants.

The court granted both motions, finding that service by email should be validated given the defendants' actual notice of the claim, and that consolidation was appropriate as both actions arose from the same share purchase agreement and related promissory note.

The court also set a timetable for the consolidated action and addressed the process for amending pleadings and exchanging costs submissions.

The plaintiff, Lukey Capital Corp., brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants for failure to pay a promissory note.

The defendants admitted signing the note and making some interest payments but failed to repay the principal.

They raised various defences, including lack of clear default definition, alleged amendment of terms, lack of demand, prejudice to other creditors, and concerns about the note's execution and legal representation.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that the defendants understood their obligations and failed to meet them.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for the principal, outstanding interest, and fixed costs.

This criminal trial concerned two defendants, Osman Aim and Ramone Thomas, charged with firearm offences after two handguns were found in a vehicle during a traffic stop.

The driver fled and was not apprehended.

The central issue was whether the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that either defendant had knowledge and control (constructive possession) of the firearms.

The court found that while the Crown's inferences were reasonable, they were not the only reasonable inferences, particularly considering alternative explanations for the movement of one firearm and the flight of one defendant, including the context of anti-Black racism in policing.

Both defendants were found not guilty on all counts.

The accused were passengers in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation.

During the stop, police observed a cannabis grinder and suspected a firearm was under the passenger seat, leading to a search that uncovered two loaded handguns.

The accused brought a Charter motion arguing violations of their ss. 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) rights, including complaints about police muting their body-worn cameras and delays in providing the right to counsel.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) due to delays in the informational and implementational components of the right to counsel, but dismissed the other Charter claims.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the firearms should not be excluded under s. 24(2), as the evidence was highly reliable, the offences were serious, and exclusion would damage public confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant, Terry Hull, sought to exclude a firearm from his trial, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 8 (unreasonable search or seizure) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that the warrantless entry into the applicant's residence was justified under the common law doctrine of exigent circumstances due to a credible threat to public safety involving a firearm.

The unannounced entry was also deemed reasonable.

However, the subsequent warrantless search of the room after the applicant was detained was found to be a breach of section 8, as exigent circumstances had largely ceased.

Additionally, the police breached section 10(b) by continuing to ask investigative questions after the applicant asserted his right to counsel.

Despite these breaches, the court applied the Grant analysis under section 24(2) of the Charter and declined to exclude the firearm.

The seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct was considered low, the impact on the applicant's rights was attenuated (especially given the independent discoverability of the evidence), and society's interest in adjudicating serious criminal charges on their merits weighed heavily in favour of admission.