Nicole Jillian Louise DeBellefeuille

This decision addresses the interpretation of "pursuit" under section 320.17 of the Criminal Code concerning flight from police.

The accused, Samuel Dumfeh, was charged after fleeing from police following a sobriety check.

The defence argued no pursuit occurred as police did not engage in a formal chase.

The court relied on recent Ontario Court of Justice authority to hold that pursuit is a continuous act beginning when emergency lights are activated and continuing until the driver is free to leave, including the obligation to remain stopped.

The court rejected the defence’s narrow interpretation and dismissed the directed verdict motion, finding sufficient evidence of flight from police.

Denrick Rose pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm, and breaching a release order curfew.

The offence involved driving at speeds exceeding 200 km/h on Highway 400 and King Road, with five passengers, two of whom urged him to slow down.

The vehicle crashed into a light standard, killing passenger Amelia Bal and seriously injuring others.

The Crown sought a 5-year sentence plus a 7-year driving prohibition; the defence sought 2 years plus 5 years prohibition.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4.5 years with a 10-year driving prohibition, considering aggravating factors including deliberate prolonged dangerous driving, breach of bail, and victim impact, balanced against mitigating factors such as the offender’s youth, remorse, strong rehabilitative prospects, and harsh presentence custody conditions.

The decision also addresses the impact of systemic anti-Black racism on sentencing.

The Crown brought an application under s. 9(1) of the Canada Evidence Act seeking leave to cross-examine its own witness, Keima Davis-Baynes, due to significant inconsistencies between her trial evidence and prior statements to police and at a preliminary inquiry.

The defence opposed the application.

The court found the witness to be adverse to the Crown's position and, after considering the probative value and potential prejudicial effect, granted the Crown leave to cross-examine the witness on the inconsistencies, subject to specific restrictions to prevent the jury from misusing the evidence to infer the accused's credibility or guilt.

The Crown brought an application to admit a police interview of a recanting witness, Ms. Keima Davis-Baynes, for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The accused did not oppose the application.

The court found that the criteria of necessity (due to the witness's recantation) and threshold reliability (established by procedural reliability, including a video-recorded, sworn statement, and the witness's availability for cross-examination at trial, and substantive reliability through corroborating independent evidence) were met.

The court also determined that the prejudicial effect of the statement did not outweigh its probative value.

The Crown's application was granted.

The defence applied under s. 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code for an order permitting specific challenge for cause questions, arguing a reasonable possibility of juror partiality.

The issues not on consent were the need for a question regarding partiality towards police (a Barnes question) and who would ask the questions.

The court allowed the police partiality question, finding that evidence of systemic racism within the Peel Regional Police Service and related media coverage created a realistic potential for partiality among prospective jurors.

The court also ruled that the trial judge, rather than counsel, would ask all challenge for cause questions to emphasize the court's impartiality and the importance of a fair trial.

The accused, Shanice Wynter, brought an application for an order allowing her counsel to make an opening address immediately after the Crown’s opening address in a joint criminal trial for first-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The Crown opposed, and the co-accused did not join the application.

The court, exercising judicial discretion, determined that an early defence opening is only permissible in special or exceptional circumstances.

Considering factors such as the trial's length and complexity, but also the "all or none" approach for co-accused in joint trials, the court dismissed the application.

It concluded that special or exceptional circumstances were not present and that following the procedure outlined in s. 651 of the Criminal Code was the fairest course of action.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, brought an application to exclude evidence (text messages) seized from a third party's phone without a warrant, arguing the search was unlawful and exceeded permissible scope.

The applicant also challenged the lawfulness of their arrest, alleging excessive force, and the subsequent strip search.

The court dismissed the application, finding the phone search was properly incident to a lawful arrest and tailored to its purpose.

It further held that the force used during the arrest was reasonable given the circumstances, and the strip search was justified by reasonable and probable grounds, thus no Charter breaches occurred.

This ruling addresses an application by an accused, Ms. Wynter, to be off-screen during pre-trial motions in a first-degree murder trial, specifically during motions where she conceded she lacked standing.

The request was based on a misunderstanding of attendance requirements and employment obligations.

The court dismissed the application, emphasizing the fundamental right and duty of an accused to be present throughout their trial, even in ancillary proceedings where their interests may be affected, and that economic hardship must be substantial to justify absence.

The applicant, Terry Hull, sought to exclude a firearm from his trial, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 8 (unreasonable search or seizure) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that the warrantless entry into the applicant's residence was justified under the common law doctrine of exigent circumstances due to a credible threat to public safety involving a firearm.

The unannounced entry was also deemed reasonable.

However, the subsequent warrantless search of the room after the applicant was detained was found to be a breach of section 8, as exigent circumstances had largely ceased.

Additionally, the police breached section 10(b) by continuing to ask investigative questions after the applicant asserted his right to counsel.

Despite these breaches, the court applied the Grant analysis under section 24(2) of the Charter and declined to exclude the firearm.

The seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct was considered low, the impact on the applicant's rights was attenuated (especially given the independent discoverability of the evidence), and society's interest in adjudicating serious criminal charges on their merits weighed heavily in favour of admission.

The accused, Danik Ballabey, applied for a review of a detention order made by a Justice of the Peace, who had found his detention necessary on tertiary grounds.

The Crown conceded a material change in circumstances due to the accused's lengthy pretrial custody (over 15 months), which had reached a "time served" position relative to a potential resolution proposal.

Despite the seriousness of the charges (drug trafficking and possession of a modified, prohibited firearm), the court concluded that the continued detention of a presumptively innocent individual to a "time served" disposition erodes public confidence in the judicial interim release regime.

The bail review was granted, and the accused was released on a recognizance with conditions, including house arrest supervised by five sureties.