Bryan Pillon

The court considered the admissibility of two statements made by Lovepreet Singh, charged with dangerous driving causing death.

The first was a roadside statement to police while Singh was being treated for burns; the second was an audio-recorded statement at the hospital.

The Crown sought to admit only the hospital statement.

The court found that the Crown had not proven voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, citing concerns about an unrecorded pre-statement conversation, a partial caution, and potential inducement.

The hospital statement was excluded as involuntary.

During a trial for first degree murder and attempted murder, a Crown witness recanted her previous statements and testified in chief that a third party named 'George' was with her at the time of the shooting, rather than the accused.

The Crown requested a ruling that the defence must bring a formal third party suspect application before cross-examining the witness on this issue.

The court ruled that no application was required, as the evidence was direct evidence of a third party suspect that had already been elicited by the Crown, establishing its own logical relevance without the need for a formal application.

The Crown brought an application under s. 9(1) of the Canada Evidence Act seeking leave to cross-examine its own witness, Keima Davis-Baynes, due to significant inconsistencies between her trial evidence and prior statements to police and at a preliminary inquiry.

The defence opposed the application.

The court found the witness to be adverse to the Crown's position and, after considering the probative value and potential prejudicial effect, granted the Crown leave to cross-examine the witness on the inconsistencies, subject to specific restrictions to prevent the jury from misusing the evidence to infer the accused's credibility or guilt.

The Crown brought an application to admit a police interview of a recanting witness, Ms. Keima Davis-Baynes, for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The accused did not oppose the application.

The court found that the criteria of necessity (due to the witness's recantation) and threshold reliability (established by procedural reliability, including a video-recorded, sworn statement, and the witness's availability for cross-examination at trial, and substantive reliability through corroborating independent evidence) were met.

The court also determined that the prejudicial effect of the statement did not outweigh its probative value.

The Crown's application was granted.

The accused, Kahli Johnson-Phillips and Shanice Wynter, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of charges for first-degree murder and other offences due to unreasonable delay.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, calculating total delay, subtracting defence delay, and considering exceptional circumstances, particularly the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that after deducting defence-attributable delays and pandemic-related delays, the net delay for both accused was below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court also determined the case to be particularly complex, which would justify a delay above the ceiling if necessary.

Consequently, the s. 11(b) applications were dismissed.

The defence applied under s. 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code for an order permitting specific challenge for cause questions, arguing a reasonable possibility of juror partiality.

The issues not on consent were the need for a question regarding partiality towards police (a Barnes question) and who would ask the questions.

The court allowed the police partiality question, finding that evidence of systemic racism within the Peel Regional Police Service and related media coverage created a realistic potential for partiality among prospective jurors.

The court also ruled that the trial judge, rather than counsel, would ask all challenge for cause questions to emphasize the court's impartiality and the importance of a fair trial.

The accused, Shanice Wynter, brought an application for an order allowing her counsel to make an opening address immediately after the Crown’s opening address in a joint criminal trial for first-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The Crown opposed, and the co-accused did not join the application.

The court, exercising judicial discretion, determined that an early defence opening is only permissible in special or exceptional circumstances.

Considering factors such as the trial's length and complexity, but also the "all or none" approach for co-accused in joint trials, the court dismissed the application.

It concluded that special or exceptional circumstances were not present and that following the procedure outlined in s. 651 of the Criminal Code was the fairest course of action.

This ruling addresses an application by an accused, Ms. Wynter, to be off-screen during pre-trial motions in a first-degree murder trial, specifically during motions where she conceded she lacked standing.

The request was based on a misunderstanding of attendance requirements and employment obligations.

The court dismissed the application, emphasizing the fundamental right and duty of an accused to be present throughout their trial, even in ancillary proceedings where their interests may be affected, and that economic hardship must be substantial to justify absence.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter after shooting a victim five times at a house party.

The Crown sought 10-12 years and delayed parole, while the defence sought 6-8 years.

The court sentenced the offender to 10 years, finding the use of a firearm and the offender's drug dealing to be significant aggravating factors.

The court granted enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody due to partial lockdowns caused by staff shortages, reducing the sentence by six months beyond the standard 1.5:1 credit.

The court declined to order delayed parole eligibility.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood alcohol concentration, arguing that the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown an adjournment to call a toxicologist in reply to defence evidence of bolus drinking, thereby improperly splitting its case.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly permitted the Crown to call reply evidence.

The court found that the Crown was legitimately surprised by the defence's bolus drinking evidence, which was not anticipated from the initial alcohol influence report.

This evidence was deemed proper reply, not case-splitting, and the appellant suffered no prejudice as he was afforded an opportunity for surrebuttal.

The accused was charged with common assault on July 1, 2014, following an altercation with a co-worker.

The trial proceeded over multiple dates spanning from January 2016 to June 2016, with the decision rendered in September 2016.

The Crown established that the accused assaulted her former co-worker outside their place of employment on June 30, 2014.

However, the accused brought an application alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay from charge to decision was 25 months and 8 days, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness based on exceptional circumstances.

Although the case was transitional under Jordan, the court determined that the degree of complacency in the prosecution could not be justified, even allowing for inherent time requirements and limited institutional delay.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to Section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act following a motor vehicle collision with a pedestrian on September 4, 2012, at the intersection of King Street and Hickory Street in Waterloo, Ontario.

The collision resulted in the death of the pedestrian.

The defendant operated a commercial delivery truck and was making a left-hand turn from Hickory Street onto King Street when the collision occurred.

The Crown alleged the defendant operated the vehicle without due care and attention.

The defendant testified he did not see the pedestrian and was unaware of any collision.

The court found the defendant guilty based on extensive eyewitness testimony, collision reconstruction evidence, and forensic evidence demonstrating the pedestrian was lawfully crossing the crosswalk and was visible to a reasonably prudent driver exercising due care and attention.

The accused was charged with driving while disqualified.

A Charter application was brought alleging violations of section 9 (arbitrary detention) and section 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found no section 9 breach, as the initial stop was justified by reasonable suspicion based on the officer's observation of evasive driving and information about a prohibited driver.

However, a clear section 10(b) breach was established and conceded by the Crown, as the accused was detained and questioned for approximately 30 minutes without being advised of his rights to counsel.

The court found the evidence obtained prior to the breach was not tainted by the subsequent violation, as the connection was too tenuous.

The accused was convicted of driving while disqualified.

A sentence reduction was imposed as a remedy for the Charter violation.

A corporate defendant, JF Industrial Systems (Windsor) Inc., was charged with two offences under the Electricity Act: failing to apply for inspection of electrical work and operating an electrical contracting business without a licence.

The trial proceeded with evidence from an injured apprentice worker and the company's manager.

The defendant changed its plea to guilty on count two, and the prosecution withdrew count one.

The court found the defendant guilty of operating as an unlicensed electrical contractor.

The defendant was sentenced to a fine of $25,000, payable within 30 days.

The case involved a serious workplace injury to an apprentice who was electrocuted while working on electrical installations at an industrial facility.