Rachel Frank

This criminal trial concerned two defendants, Osman Aim and Ramone Thomas, charged with firearm offences after two handguns were found in a vehicle during a traffic stop.

The driver fled and was not apprehended.

The central issue was whether the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that either defendant had knowledge and control (constructive possession) of the firearms.

The court found that while the Crown's inferences were reasonable, they were not the only reasonable inferences, particularly considering alternative explanations for the movement of one firearm and the flight of one defendant, including the context of anti-Black racism in policing.

Both defendants were found not guilty on all counts.

The accused were passengers in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation.

During the stop, police observed a cannabis grinder and suspected a firearm was under the passenger seat, leading to a search that uncovered two loaded handguns.

The accused brought a Charter motion arguing violations of their ss. 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) rights, including complaints about police muting their body-worn cameras and delays in providing the right to counsel.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) due to delays in the informational and implementational components of the right to counsel, but dismissed the other Charter claims.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the firearms should not be excluded under s. 24(2), as the evidence was highly reliable, the offences were serious, and exclusion would damage public confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant, a real estate salesperson, sought to invalidate a commission split agreement he entered into with a managing partner of his former brokerage.

He argued the agreement was an unreasonable restraint of trade and lacked consideration, seeking higher commissions on two specific property sales.

The court dismissed the application, finding the agreement was supported by consideration and did not restrict the applicant's ability to compete or solicit after leaving the brokerage.

The court also held that the applicant's claims were based on an incorrect interpretation of the contracts.

The Plaintiff sought costs incurred for preparing a summary judgment motion, which became unnecessary after the Defendant, initially self-represented, retained counsel and filed an Amended Statement of Defense.

The Plaintiff requested costs on a full or substantial indemnity basis.

The court, exercising its discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, awarded the Plaintiff a reduced amount of $1,000 in costs thrown away, considering the Defendant's initial lack of legal representation and the potential future utility of the Plaintiff's motion preparation.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to an alleged infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)).

The total delay was 22 months, exceeding the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The court found that 5.5 months of the delay were attributable to the defence's passive inaction in scheduling pre-trials and active resistance to setting trial dates while insisting on non-essential disclosure.

Deducting this period brought the net delay to 16.5 months, below the Jordan threshold.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The third party, Eaton Industries (Canada) Company, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the third party claim of the London Transit Commission (LTC) on the basis that it was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The LTC's third party claim alleged environmental contamination caused by Eaton's predecessors.

The court found that the LTC had actual or ought to have had knowledge of its claim against Eaton by May 22, 2013, when it was served with the plaintiff's statement of claim, and failed to rebut the presumptive limitation period.

The court dismissed the LTC's arguments for a separate limitation period for other damages, concluding all claims were statute-barred.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision that refused to strike out several paragraphs of the defendant's statement of defence.

The underlying action involved the recognition and enforcement of a $9.5 billion Ecuadorian judgment.

The defendant pleaded defences of fraud, public policy, and lack of natural justice, alleging the foreign judgment was ghostwritten and obtained through bribery.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, as the pleaded defences were recognized in law and not plainly and obviously bound to fail.

Following a prior decision staying the action on terms, the court determined the issue of costs arising from interlocutory motions on the Commercial List concerning enforcement of a foreign judgment and jurisdiction over the defendants.

The moving party defendants sought substantial partial indemnity costs after obtaining a stay.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the proportionality principle, as well as appellate guidance that costs should be fair and reasonable rather than a full indemnity of actual expenses.

Although the defendants obtained a stay, the court held that the substantive success on the motion was mixed, as the plaintiffs succeeded on the jurisdiction issue while failing on the asset‑exigibility argument.

Given the mixed success and the novelty of the jurisdiction and service ex juris issues, the court ordered that no costs be payable by any party.