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The accused was convicted of sexual assault after the court rejected his consent defence.
The Ontario Court of Justice convicted Jananan Sri of sexual assault based on the complainant I.C.'s testimony and DNA evidence.
The accused and complainant gave conflicting accounts of the sexual activity, with the accused claiming consensual sex in exchange for crack cocaine, and the complainant denying consent and describing coercion and fear.
The judge carefully assessed credibility and reliability, considering intoxication, memory gaps, and corroborating surveillance footage.
The court rejected the accused's version due to inconsistencies and accepted the complainant's account as credible and reliable, finding the Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
A first offender who pleaded guilty to voyeurism and criminal harassment received a suspended sentence.
Lorne Hytman pleaded guilty to one count of voyeurism and four counts of criminal harassment involving multiple young female victims.
The court considered aggravating factors, including the persistent nature of the behaviour and the vulnerability and significant impact on the young victims.
Mitigating factors included the offender's genuine remorse, guilty plea, first offender status for the current charges, public embarrassment, and a delay in his bail hearing.
The Crown sought a 6-month conditional sentence, while the defence argued for a suspended sentence with probation.
The court determined that a sentence of imprisonment was not required and imposed a suspended sentence with a three-year probation order, including conditions for mandatory counselling, adherence to medical advice, non-contact orders with victims, and 150 hours of community service, along with a DNA order.
The court dismissed the accused's section 11(b) application after deducting 65 days of defence delay for counsel's inaction in scheduling trial dates.
Mario Rodriguez brought an application under Charter section 11(b) for a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to a trial within a reasonable time was infringed.
The total delay exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling by 56 days.
The Crown argued for three periods of defence delay to be deducted.
The court found 65 days of delay attributable to defence counsel's inefficiency in setting trial dates, reducing the net delay below the 18-month ceiling.
The application for a stay of proceedings was denied.
The court dismissed the s. 11(b) application, finding that Legal Aid Ontario processing delays constituted an exceptional circumstance.
The applicant, Noah Hart, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to a trial without unreasonable delay.
The total delay was 22 months and 21 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice established by R. v. Jordan.
The court analyzed periods of delay, particularly focusing on the time taken for Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) to process the applicant's certificate.
The court found that the LAO processing time, with the Crown's reasonable mitigation efforts, constituted an exceptional circumstance.
Additionally, the court noted defence delay due to the failure to proactively raise delay concerns.
After deductions for defence delay and exceptional circumstances, the net delay was calculated to be 15 months and 1 week (464 days), which fell below the Jordan threshold.
The s. 11(b) application was dismissed.
Defendant acquitted of assault due to reasonable doubt but convicted of breaching an undertaking.
Noah Hart was charged with assault, uttering a death threat, and two counts of failing to comply with an undertaking.
The Crown conceded the death threat charge, and the defence conceded the two undertaking breaches.
The central issue for the assault charge was credibility and whether the Crown proved intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court found the complainant credible with reservations and the defendant also downplayed aspects of his evidence.
Ultimately, the court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant assaulted the complainant with the requisite intention, finding a reasonable possibility that the fall was accidental.
The assault and death threat charges were dismissed, and convictions were entered for the two counts of failing to comply with an undertaking.
The court granted a stay of proceedings on a sexual assault charge due to unreasonable delay caused by late disclosure.
The applicant, charged with sexual assault, sought a stay of proceedings on the grounds of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated end of trial was 18.5 months.
After subtracting 17 days of defence delay, the net delay was 17.85 months, just shy of the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.
The court found that significant disclosure delays, particularly concerning the complainant's video-taped statement, were not attributable to the defence.
The applicant demonstrated sustained efforts to expedite proceedings once crucial disclosure was received.
The court concluded that the trial had been unreasonably delayed and granted a stay of the charge.
The court granted a stay of proceedings for sexual assault charges due to unreasonable delay exceeding the 18-month Jordan ceiling.
The accused, charged with sexual assault and assault, sought a judicial stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay.
The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was 760 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R v Jordan.
The court analyzed periods of delay, finding that a 23-day period attributed to rescheduling a Crown Pre-Trial was due to late disclosure by the Crown, not solely the defence.
The court also attributed 60 days of delay to the "cascading systemic impact" of the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.
Finally, the court apportioned the delay caused by an inaccurate trial time estimate (113 days) between the defence (56 days) and the Crown/State (57 days).
After deducting these periods, the net delay remained 644 days (21.17 months), still exceeding the Jordan ceiling.
Consequently, the court granted the s. 11(b) application and stayed all charges.
The court stayed the charges under section 11(b) due to unreasonable Crown disclosure delay.
The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.
The total delay was calculated at 20 months and 1 day.
After subtracting 45 days of defence delay, the net delay was 18.55 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases established by R. v. Jordan.
The court found the Crown failed to provide essential first-party disclosure in a timely manner, which impeded the defence's ability to prepare for judicial pre-trials and set trial dates.
The Crown did not establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.
Consequently, the application was granted, and the charges were stayed.
The court dismissed the section 11(b) Charter application, finding the net delay fell below the Jordan ceiling after deducting defence-attributable delay.
The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to an alleged infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)).
The total delay was 22 months, exceeding the 18-month Jordan ceiling.
The court found that 5.5 months of the delay were attributable to the defence's passive inaction in scheduling pre-trials and active resistance to setting trial dates while insisting on non-essential disclosure.
Deducting this period brought the net delay to 16.5 months, below the Jordan threshold.
The application for a stay was dismissed.
Bail review granted and applicant released where pre-trial custody approached likely sentence and surety plan mitigated risks.
The applicant sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.
He argued that a delayed trial date and a new diagnosis of bipolar disorder constituted material changes in circumstances.
The Crown conceded the material changes but opposed release on the secondary ground due to the applicant's history of multiple charges and breaches.
The court found that the proposed surety plan, combined with the fact that the applicant's pre-trial custody would soon exceed the likely sentence for his initial charges, sufficiently mitigated the secondary ground risks.
The applicant was released on strict conditions.
Bail review denied; COVID-19 is a material change but detention remains necessary on secondary and tertiary grounds.
The applicant, charged with first-degree murder and robbery, sought a bail review under s. 522 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.
The court agreed that the pandemic was a material change, granting jurisdiction to review the detention order.
However, the court found that the applicant's detention remained necessary on both the secondary and tertiary grounds.
Despite a strict proposed release plan involving house arrest and electronic monitoring, the court concluded there was a substantial likelihood the applicant would commit further offences and that his release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity and circumstances of the alleged offences.