Allison Cormie-Bowins

The applicant, Kamal Ford, brought a Charter application challenging the validity of search warrants executed at his residence and on his vehicle, and alleging a breach of his s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained misleading statements that required excision.

After excision, the court held there were reasonable grounds to search the residence for clothing and phones, but not for a firearm, and no reasonable grounds to search the vehicle.

The court found no breach of the right to counsel, as a 20-minute delay in facilitating a call was reasonable due to transport logistics.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the evidence seized from the vehicle but admitted the evidence seized from the residence and during the lawful search incident to arrest.

Tenzin Youngdue pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown and defence submitted a joint recommendation for a global sentence of 5.5 years imprisonment, with credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The court accepted the joint submission, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for fentanyl trafficking while acknowledging mitigating factors such as the offender's youth, guilty plea, remorse, and rehabilitative efforts.

Ancillary orders for forfeiture and DNA sample were also made.

The accused was tried before a judge alone on two counts of first degree murder and one count of attempted murder arising from three closely timed shootings in northwest Toronto.

The Crown’s case depended primarily on circumstantial evidence linking the accused to a specific SIM card and phone number through cell site records, surveillance images, post-offence travel under a false identity, and attendance at a funeral of a known participant.

Applying the reasonable doubt standard, the D.W. framework, and Villaroman, the court held that the user of the relevant phone was one of the shooters and that the accused was that user.

The court further held that transferred intent under s. 229(b) supported liability for the death of an accomplice accidentally shot during the planned and deliberate murder of the intended victim.

Guilty verdicts were entered on all three counts.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of 500 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of three years, less credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail.

The court considered the six years the accused spent on strict bail conditions as a significant mitigating factor, reducing the fit sentence to two years less a day.

Finding the accused posed no danger to the community and had demonstrated significant rehabilitation, the court imposed a 17-month conditional sentence after deducting credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

He argued that a delayed trial date and a new diagnosis of bipolar disorder constituted material changes in circumstances.

The Crown conceded the material changes but opposed release on the secondary ground due to the applicant's history of multiple charges and breaches.

The court found that the proposed surety plan, combined with the fact that the applicant's pre-trial custody would soon exceed the likely sentence for his initial charges, sufficiently mitigated the secondary ground risks.

The applicant was released on strict conditions.

The appellant appealed from a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

Prior to the determination of the appeal, the court was advised that the appellant had passed away.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abated.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a single-vehicle accident.

The Crown's case was overwhelming except for one issue: whether the accused consumed the majority of the alcohol either shortly before driving or after the accident.

The toxicologist testified that assuming driving occurred at 3:45 p.m., the accused's BAC would have been between 350 and 405 milligrams.

The Crown conceded it could not prove the accused drove within two hours of the breath test.

The trial judge found that the issue of bolus drinking (consuming large amounts of alcohol shortly before driving) or post-accident drinking was a live issue on the record.

Given the presence of an open vodka bottle in the accused's purse, the amount of vodka missing from the bottle, the accused's attempt to prevent police from finding the bottle, and the minimal signs of impairment observed by officers at the scene, the trial judge concluded there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused had consumed 7.5 ounces or more of vodka at the relevant time.

The accused was acquitted.