K. Walker

The offender was found guilty of sexual interference for touching the buttocks and kissing a 14-year-old victim on multiple occasions.

The Crown sought a two-year sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence.

The court considered the offender's Indigenous background under Gladue but emphasized denunciation and deterrence as mandated by Friesen.

Finding that the offender was not in a position of trust but noting the profound impact on the victim and the offender's lack of empathy, the court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed nine months of incarceration followed by two years of probation.

The court considered a Crown application to admit similar fact evidence in a sexual assault prosecution involving two complainants, H.M. and E.C. The court found that the probative value of the evidence, including the similarity of the alleged conduct, the relationship of the complainants to the accused, and the timing and location of the events, outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The court also addressed the issue of possible collusion between the complainants and found that, on a balance of probabilities, the evidence was not tainted by collusion.

The application to admit the similar fact evidence was granted.

Joseph Pauze was found guilty of possession of crystal methamphetamine and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused was stopped for a traffic violation, and a subsequent search incident to arrest revealed the narcotics.

Pauze admitted to possessing crystal methamphetamine for personal use but denied knowledge of the fentanyl, claiming it belonged to the car's owner, a known drug dealer.

The court rejected Pauze's testimony as illogical and untrustworthy, finding that he was in actual possession of the fentanyl.

Given the significant value of the fentanyl and the presence of drug paraphernalia, the court inferred that the possession was for the purpose of trafficking, leading to a conviction on all counts.

This is a sentencing decision for a defendant who pleaded guilty to failing to remain at the scene of an accident causing death.

The defendant struck and killed a pedestrian, then fled the scene, concealed vehicle damage, and lied to avoid detection.

The court considered the principles of denunciation and deterrence, emphasizing the seriousness of the offence and the defendant's reprehensible conduct.

Despite the Crown seeking a nine-month jail sentence, the court imposed a 15-month conditional sentence of imprisonment, including strict house arrest and curfew, citing the defendant's remorse, lack of prior criminal record, and positive pre-sentence report, and noting recent legislative changes (Bill C5) widening the availability of conditional sentences.

Additional penalties included a driving prohibition, firearms prohibition, and DNA order.

The accused was charged with mischief, theft under $5,000, break and entry and theft, and breach of a recognizance of bail.

The trial examined whether the accused unlawfully entered the home of his former partner and removed items without permission.

The court found the accused guilty of breach of bail and break and entry with theft, but acquitted him of mischief due to insufficient evidence regarding the broken basement window.

The theft charge was stayed as subsumed by the break and entry conviction.

The accused was charged with driving while over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples obtained following an approved instrument demand.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the initial approved screening device (ASD) demand, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that the accused had alcohol in his body.

The court found the officer's testimony regarding the grounds for the ASD demand was contradicted by video evidence.

The officer had decided to demand an ASD before obtaining information about when the accused consumed alcohol or observing signs of impairment.

The court concluded the officer lacked an objectively reasonable basis for the ASD demand and excluded the breath evidence under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, resulting in acquittal.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a single-vehicle accident.

The Crown's case was overwhelming except for one issue: whether the accused consumed the majority of the alcohol either shortly before driving or after the accident.

The toxicologist testified that assuming driving occurred at 3:45 p.m., the accused's BAC would have been between 350 and 405 milligrams.

The Crown conceded it could not prove the accused drove within two hours of the breath test.

The trial judge found that the issue of bolus drinking (consuming large amounts of alcohol shortly before driving) or post-accident drinking was a live issue on the record.

Given the presence of an open vodka bottle in the accused's purse, the amount of vodka missing from the bottle, the accused's attempt to prevent police from finding the bottle, and the minimal signs of impairment observed by officers at the scene, the trial judge concluded there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused had consumed 7.5 ounces or more of vodka at the relevant time.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant sought an order to exclude evidence seized under a search warrant, alleging a breach of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant argued that the information to obtain the search warrant lacked reasonable grounds, specifically regarding the presence of drugs at the residence and an inadequate temporal nexus between the alleged offences and the warrant's issuance.

The court reviewed the information to obtain based on the principles set out in R. v. Garofoli and found that it contained sufficient and credible information to establish reasonable grounds for the search warrant.

The court also determined that there was a sufficient connection in time given the ongoing nature of the investigation.

As no Charter breach was found under section 8, the court did not need to consider the exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The application was dismissed.

The offender was sentenced following convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, making sexually explicit material available to a person under 16, and exposing genitals to a person under 16 involving a child known to him through a familial relationship.

The abuse occurred repeatedly over many months while the child was being babysat by the offender’s spouse.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence under ss. 718 and 718.01 of the Criminal Code, noting the offender’s lengthy historical record for sexual offences involving children and his failure to accept responsibility.

Although the offender relied on age, health issues, and family dependency as mitigating factors, the court found the aggravating circumstances—including breach of trust, grooming behaviour, and severe psychological harm to the victim—required a significant penitentiary term.

A sentence of six years’ imprisonment was imposed along with lifetime prohibitions and sex offender registration.

The accused was tried on multiple child sexual offence counts arising from alleged misconduct toward a child during a babysitting arrangement in the family home.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court accepted the complainant's evidence, as supported by the mother's narrative and significant corroboration from forensic computer evidence showing deleted pornographic folders matching the complainant's description.

The court rejected the accused's and spouse's evidence as concocted, implausible, and unreliable.

The court further held that the accused showed sexually explicit material for the subjective purpose of facilitating the sexual offences, amounting to grooming within the meaning of the facilitation language discussed in Legare.

Guilty verdicts were entered on all five counts.

The accused was convicted of uttering threats against the mayor of Sault Ste.

Marie under section 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and breach of recognizance for failing to report to a bail program.

The accused spent 160 days in pre-trial detention.

The court imposed a sentence of six months imprisonment on the threatening charge and one month consecutive on the breach charge, but credited seven months of pre-trial detention, resulting in time served.

The court imposed a three-year probation order with conditions including staying away from the mayor and City Hall, and a ten-year weapons prohibition.

The appellant was acquitted of assaulting his wife following a brief trial where he represented himself.

After the acquittal, the trial judge, acting proprio motu and without inviting submissions, ordered the appellant to enter into a common law peace bond.

When the appellant attempted to speak, the trial judge refused to let him.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice quashed the peace bond, holding that the failure to afford an individual an opportunity to make submissions before a liberty-depriving order is made constitutes a breach of the rules of natural justice and likely section 7 of the Charter.