R. v. T.D., 2026 ONSC 1489

CITATION: R. v. T.D., 2026 ONSC 1489

COURT FILE NO.: 8147/19

DATE: 2026-03-13

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

K. Pritchard, Counsel for the Crown

• and -

K. Walker, Counsel for the Accused

T.D.

Accused

HEARD: December 12, 2025 & November 14, 2025

varpio j.

reasons for SENTENCE

1On May 28, 2025, I found Mr. T.D. guilty of multiple sexual offences. At sentencing, the Crown stayed the sexual assault count and proceeded on the sexual interference count.

2As is outlined in these reasons, I hereby sentence the accused to nine months incarceration to be followed by two years of probation, plus ancillary orders.

THE FACTS

3I need not repeat the facts of this case as they are fully described in my trial reasons found at 2025 ONSC 2573. Nonetheless, and to be clear, Mr. T.D. was found guilty of touching the victim’s buttocks on four occasions, and kissing her on two occasions, all of which occurred while the victim was 14 years old.

THE VICTIM

4In her Victim Impact Statement (“VIS”), the victim stated that she is studying “women’s rights” at school (presumably post-secondary education). As regards the offence, she stated that T.D.’s actions caused her to “dissociate”. She pushed her parents away because she did not want to confide in them. She would not attend “sleepovers”, and she treated her friends “interchangeably, never letting anyone in unless it gave me ways to escape or control”.

5The victim also stated that she had profound anger as a result of the incidents and that the offences “shattered much of [her] faith in men and in the systems meant to protect me”.

6She indicated that she had nightmares and the “shakes” as a result of the incidents and that, since reporting the incident to the police, she feels “an overwhelming weight of guilt, grief and sadness”. She continues to suffer from ongoing chronic anxiety and chronic depression.

7These incidents have also caused her to question whether she wishes to be a mother.

8The victim’s older sister and her mother filed VIS’s wherein they corroborated the victim’s statements about the impact that the incidents had upon her. These people also corroborated the fact that the family suffered as the victim withdrew from their normal familial life.

THE OFFENDER

9I received two Pre-Sentence Reports (“PSR’s”) and one Gladue Report outlining the accused’s experiences.

The Gladue Report

10The Gladue Report described T.D. as someone who was born in Sault Ste. Marie. He has no relationship with his father. His maternal great-grandparents were Indigenous, belonging to the Mississaugi First Nation. T.D.’s other parentage was not Indigenous.

11T.D. told the Gladue Report writer that he was not exposed to his culture growing up. Despite that statement, he also advised the Gladue Report writer that he attended the Indian Friendship Centre frequently, learned about the Medicine Wheel, and learned to drum. He attended Pow Wows at the Rankin Arena which was “literally my second home away from home”.

12T.D. told the Gladue Report writer that there was significant spousal abuse in his home growing up and that physical violence and alcohol played a part in this toxic environment.

The PSR’s

13The PSR’s indicate that T.D. has had involvement with the criminal justice system:

a. In 2011, he received a conditional discharge for uttering a threat;

b. In 2023, he received an absolute discharge for a failure to comply with an undertaking; and

c. In 2024, he received a 60-day conditional sentence followed by a 12-month probation order for the offence of assault causing bodily harm.¹

14The PSR’s indicated that T.D. came from a broken home where his father abused his mother. Alcohol was a factor, and the CAS was often involved with the family.

15Today, T.D.’s mother relies upon T.D. as her primary source of support. The mother has lung cancer and is required to go back and forth between Sudbury and Sault Ste. Marie. Although she lives with T.D.’s brother, this son is of little help as he does not drive.

16T.D. is currently employed at the City of Sault Ste. Marie as a labourer and is the President of Local 3 CUPE 3 Union for Labourers and Operations.

17The PSR’s also state that T.D. has had multiple concussions from playing hockey as a youth and from fighting in MMA. He gets regular headaches. T.D. believes he may also have ADHD as well as OCD, but he advised the PSR writer that he has never been formally diagnosed.

ALLOCUTION

18T.D. was given the opportunity to address the court and describe his personal circumstances. He took responsibility for many of the picadilloes in his life but did not show contrition or display any empathy towards the victim. He was steadfast that he did not commit the offences for which he was found guilty.

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

19The Crown submits that I ought to impose a two-year sentence plus three years of probation. This sentence reflects the need to deter and denounce T.D.’s conduct.

20T.D., though counsel, submits that I ought to impose a conditional sentence since the need for deterrence and denunciation can be met through such a sentence. Such a sentence also reflects the principle of proportionality, the principles in Gladue, as well as the fact that T.D.’s mother is reliant upon him for medical assistance.

ANALYSIS

Sexual Offences Against Children

21In R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2019] S.C.J. No. 100, the Supreme Court of Canada recalibrated the principles of sentencing as regards sexual offences committed against children. At para. 5 of its decision, the court set out the overriding considerations:

[W]e send a strong message that sexual offences against children are violent crimes that wrongfully exploit children's vulnerability and cause profound harm to children, families, and communities. Sentences for these crimes must increase. Courts must impose sentences that are proportional to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of the offender, as informed by Parliament's sentencing initiatives and by society's deepened understanding of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children. Sentences must accurately reflect the wrongfulness of sexual violence against children and the far-reaching and ongoing harm that it causes to children, families, and society at large.

22As regards the harm that can befall children who suffer from sexual violence, the court noted that the “prime interests that the legislative scheme of sexual offences against children protect are the personal autonomy, bodily integrity, dignity and equality of children” (Friesen at para 51). In this regard, therefore, the court must look at not only the physical harm caused to children who are victims of these activities, but also at the psychological and emotional harm inflicted upon them (paras 58 to 64). The court cautioned against considering dated sentencing precedents as the old sentencing ranges did not adequately reflect modern understandings (paras. 100, 105, 108 -110).

23At para. 114, the Supreme Court set a framework for sentencing sexual offences committed against children:

D. (D.), Woodward, S. (J.), and this Court's own decisions in M. (C.A.) and L.M. make clear that imposing proportionate sentences that respond to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of offenders will frequently require substantial sentences. Parliament's statutory amendments have strengthened that message. It is not the role of this Court to establish a range or to outline in which circumstances such substantial sentences should be imposed. Nor would it be appropriate for any court to set out binding or inflexible quantitative guidance -- as Moldaver J.A. wrote in D. (D.)"judges must retain the flexibility needed to do justice in individual cases" and to individualize the sentence to the offender who is before them (at para. 33). Nonetheless, it is incumbent on us to provide an overall message that is clear (D. (D.), at paras. 34 and 45). That message is that mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal and that upper-single digit and double-digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances. We would add that substantial sentences can be imposed where there was only a single instance of sexual violence and/or a single victim, as in this case, Woodward, and L.M. In addition, as this Court recognized in L.M., maximum sentences should not be reserved for the "abstract case of the worst crime committed in the worst circumstances" (para. 22). Instead, a maximum sentence should be imposed whenever the circumstances warrant it (para. 20).

24At para. 136 of Friesen, the Supreme Court cautioned lower courts against mitigating sentences because a victim is an adolescent (as opposed to a young child) since sexual violence against adolescents often causes serious psychological and physical harm.

25In considering sexual offences that do not involve physical harm, intercourse or other more intrusive behaviour, the court also cautioned against minimizing the impact that such sexual offences have upon victims (para 144):

Fourth, it is an error to understand the degree of physical interference factor in terms of a type of hierarchy of physical acts. The type of physical act can be a relevant factor to determine the degree of physical interference. However, courts have at times spoken of the degree of physical interference as a type of ladder of physical acts with touching and masturbation at the least wrongful end of the scale, fellatio and cunnilingus in the mid-range, and penile penetration at the most wrongful end of the scale (see R. v. R.W.V., 2012 BCCA 290, 323 B.C.A.C. 285, at paras. 19 and 33). This is an error -- there is no type of hierarchy of physical acts for the purposes of determining the degree of physical interference. As the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized in Stuckless (2019), physical acts such as digital penetration and fellatio can be just as serious a violation of the victim's bodily integrity as penile penetration (paras. 68-69 and 124-25). Similarly, it is an error to assume that an assault that involves touching is inherently less physically intrusive than an assault that involves fellatio, cunnilingus, or penetration. For instance, depending on the circumstances of the case, touching that is both extensive and intrusive can be equally or even more physically intrusive than an act of fellatio, cunnilingus, or penetration.

26In keeping with these principles, the Court of Appeal for Ontario has upheld a number of sentences where sexual touching has led to consequential jail time. In R. v. Lavergne, 2023 ONCA 592, the court considered a case where Mr. Lavergne had been a popular high school teacher and was found to have sexually abused two students, one who was approximately 18 years old (D.R.), and the other who was between 16 and 17 (L.G.). The teacher slapped D.R.’s buttocks during class when she was bent over and called her a “dirty girl”. Mr. Lavergne abused the other victim, L.G., over an 18-month period. This latter abuse largely involved sexual touching of the buttocks, hugs, and the touching of a breast under her bra. There was one incident where the offender “flipped [the victim] upside down while she was wearing a skirt and pressed on her inner thigh, purportedly while demonstrating a pressure point”. The trial judge imposed a 14-month sentence for sexual exploitation and a three-month consecutive sentence for the assault on D.R. At para. 23 of its reasons, the Court of Appeal stated:

With respect to children, even relatively unobtrusive touching can cause extensive psychological and emotional harm, notwithstanding that the harm to bodily integrity is at the lower end of the scale. This is particularly so where the conduct is repeated: Friesen, at para. 131 (citations omitted). Here, in L.G.'s case, the touching was repeated on numerous occasions, over a long period of time, and it occurred in public, which increased the risk of her shame, and embarrassment. The trial judge accepted the descriptions of the psychological and emotional harm which, in L.G.'s case in particular, was profound, a factor to be given emphasis in sentencing sexual offences against young persons: Friesen, at paras. 74-76. The actual harm a child victim experiences is to be a "key determinant" in assessing the gravity of the offence: Friesen, at para. 85. It is also material that L.G. was an adolescent. This made her particularly vulnerable based on her age alone: Friesen, at para. 136. The appellant not only exploited her immaturity but in the case of both L.G. and D.R. he abused his elevated power as their teacher to treat them as sexual objects, a highly morally culpable engagement in wrongful conduct in breach of trust: Friesen, at para. 129. To make matters worse, he did this in a context where the trial judge found him to have groomed L.G. In these circumstances, the sentences were not demonstrably unfit.

Conditional Sentences

27Section 742.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada describes situations where conditional sentences can be imposed:

Imposing of conditional sentence

742.1 If a person is convicted of an offence and the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, the court may, for the purpose of supervising the offender’s behaviour in the community, order that the offender serve the sentence in the community, subject to the conditions imposed under section 742.3, if

(a) the court is satisfied that the service of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2;

(b) the offence is not an offence punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment;

(c) the offence is not an offence under any of the following provisions:

(d) the offence is not a terrorism offence, or a criminal organization offence, prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years or more.

28In the seminal case of R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, the court enunciated the principle that holds a conditional sentence is a punitive sanction. When imposing a conditional sentence, a judge must consider the likelihood of the offender to re-offend, and the fact that a conditional sentence reflects denunciation and deterrence particularly where onerous conditions are imposed.

29As regards the availability of conditional sentences for cases involving sexual offences committed against children, the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated at paras. 15 and 16 of R. v. M.M. 2022 ONCA 441:

The Supreme Court's instructions from Friesen could not be clearer: sentences for sexual offences against children must increase. There are no qualifications here. Sentences have been too low for too long. Denunciation and deterrence are of primary importance: R. v. Inksetter, 2018 ONCA 474, 141 O.R. (3d) 161, at para 3. Those who commit sexual offences against children must understand that carceral sentences will ordinarily follow.

Conditional sentences for sexual offences against children will only rarely be appropriate. Their availability must be limited to exceptional circumstances that render incarceration inappropriate - for example, where it gives rise to a medical hardship that could not adequately be addressed within the correctional facility. It would not be appropriate to enumerate exceptional circumstances here and we make no attempt to do so. Suffice it to say that no exceptional circumstances are present in this case. A sentence of imprisonment should have been imposed.

30The Court of Appeal for Ontario clarified its position regarding the availability of conditional sentences for sexual offences as against young people in R. v. Pike, (2024) 2024 ONCA 608, 173 O.R. (3d) 241 at paras 180 to 182:

I must reconcile the "exceptional circumstances" term that M. (M.) used to express this point with the Supreme Court's decisions in R. v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, [2000] S.C.J. No. 6, 2000 SCC 5, and Parranto. At first glance, M. (M.)'s use of this term might seem contrary to these cases, which respectively hold that appellate courts can neither create presumptions that conditional sentences are inappropriate for specific offences (Proulx, at paras. 80-83), nor require exceptional circumstances to depart from a range (Parranto, at para. 40).

But in my respectful view, M. (M.) did not and could not have intended to depart from Proulx by creating an offence- specific presumption against conditional sentences. Rather, it used the "exceptional circumstances" term to convey that, since Proulx, Parliament has increased maximum sentences and prioritized denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children and, further, that the courts' understanding of the harmfulness and wrongfulness of these offences has deepened: Friesen, at paras. 109-110; see M. (M.), at paras. 13-15. Thus, while there is no presumption against conditional sentences, these post- Proulx changes require more compelling personal circumstances, mitigating factors, and/or the absence of aggravating factors, to justify a conditional sentence than might have been the case when Proulx was decided more than two decades ago.

Nor, in my view, did M. (M.) intend to depart from Parranto by requiring exceptional circumstances to impose a conditional sentence. Rather, M. (M.) used "exceptional circumstances" as shorthand for personal circumstances and mitigating factors that are sufficiently compelling to make a conditional sentence proportionate, as in R. v. Padda, [2019] B.C.J. No. 1951, 2019 BCCA 351, at para. 36. Not only is there no closed list of such circumstances and factors (M. (M.), at para. 16), but multiple seemingly non-exceptional factors taken together, such as being a young first offender with family support who poses little risk and takes responsibility for his actions, can collectively render a conditional sentence proportionate: R. v. Faroughi (2024), 171 O.R. (3d) 81, [2024] O.J. No. 1102, 2024 ONCA 178, at para. 99. This is consistent with Parranto's holding that sentencing must focus on proportionality, not pigeonholing cases into ill-defined exceptional circumstance categories: at para. 40; see R. v. Ellis, [2022] B.C.J. No. 1509, 2022 BCCA 278, at para. 118.

31The Court of Appeal for Ontario expanded on this statement in R. v. A.L. 2025 ONCA 9 at paras 19 to 21:

This court addressed the exceptionality of conditional sentences for sexual offences against children in R. v. M. (M.), [2022] O.J. No. 2527, 2022 ONCA 441. In M. (M.), at para. 16, this court noted that, given the Supreme Court's instructions in Friesen"[c]onditional sentences for sexual offences against children will only rarely be appropriate" and "[t]heir availability must be limited to exceptional circumstances that render incarceration inappropriate". As an illustration of an exceptional circumstance, this court gave the example of medical hardship that could not be adequately addressed within a correctional facility, expressly stating that exceptional circumstances were not limited to that example.

Chief Justice Tulloch made a similar point in R. v. Pike (2024), 173 O.R. (3d) 241, [2024] O.J. No. 3530, 2024 ONCA 608, at para. 182, where he explained this court's use of the term "exceptional circumstances" in M. (M.). He stated that M. (M.) used "exceptional circumstances" as shorthand for personal circumstances and mitigating factors that are sufficiently compelling to make a conditional sentence proportionate. He also noted that this interpretation is consistent with the principle that "sentencing must focus on proportionality, not pigeonholing cases into ill-defined exceptional circumstance categories" [citation omitted].

While exceptional, there is no rigid rule that conditional sentences can never be imposed in the appropriate case: see, for example, R. v. Faroughi (2024), 171 O.R. (3d) 81, [2024] O.J. No. 1102, 2024 ONCA 178. Reflecting the individualized nature of sentencing, conditional sentences for sexual offences against children have been upheld in exceptional cases where the court is satisfied that the sentencing judge adverted to the relevant governing principles and there was no basis to interfere with the factual findings of exceptionality: see, for example: R. v. Singaqti, [2024] Nu.J. No. 37, 2024 NUCA 10, at para. 15; R. v. H. (T.J.), [2023] Y.J. No. 21, 2023 YKCA 2, at para. 27; R. v. Germain, [2022] A.J. 913, 2022 ABCA 257, at paras. 84, 85; R. v. B. (R.B.), [2024] N.S.J. No. 61, 2024 NSCA 17, at paras. 41, 45. That is the case here.

32In A.L., the court upheld a conditional sentence as a result of the trial judge’s consideration of proportionality as it related to the offender’s limited mental abilities. Similar logic was applied in R. v. Trudeau, 2025 ONSC 982.

Recent Sentences

33In R. v. Lloyd, [2021] O.J. No. 5163 (OCJ), a 53-year-old was given a 15-month sentence for touching a 10-year old’s vagina over her clothes, while lying next to her in the bed of a trailer.

34In R. v. R.A., 2022 ONSC 1161, the offender was given a two-year penitentiary sentence for digital penetration of an 11-year-old girl, and 6-months concurrent for kissing the victim.

35In R. v. I.C., [2024] O.J. No. 1118 (ONSC), the court imposed a 10-month sentence as against an offender who, between 2008 and 2010 (when the victim was between eight and 10-year-old), made her grind on top of him while he was lying on his back in what the sentencing judge referred to as the “horsey” incident (see also 2024 ONSC 156).

36In R. v. Culibete-Pereyra, 2022 ONSC 1823, the court heard an appeal from a trial where the offender was found guilty and sentenced to a conditional discharge. He was 28 at the time of the offence and worked at a janitor at a nursing home. He kissed a 15-year-old co-op student on the mouth and grabbed her buttocks. The sentence was upheld.

37In R. v. Krikke (Halton – 998 24 12101953, released May 14, 2025, ONCJ), the offender pleaded guilty to sexual assault on a that involved the sexual touching of an adolescent’s buttocks and kissing her on multiple occasions, hard enough to give a “hickey”. A conditional sentence was imposed.

Remorse

38A lack of remorse is not generally an aggravating factor in sentencing. In R. v. Shah, 2017 ONCA 872, the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated at para. 8:

Lack of remorse is not ordinarily a relevant aggravating factor on sentencing: R. v. Valentini 1999 1885 (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 251 (C.A.), at para. 82. It cannot be used to punish the accused for failing to plead guilty or for having mounted a defence: Valentini, at para. 83; R. v. J.F., 2011 ONCA 220, at para. 84, 105 O.R. (3d) 161; aff'd on other grounds in 2013 SCC 12, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 565. Absence of remorse is a relevant factor in sentencing, however, with respect to the issues of rehabilitation and specific deterrence, in that an accused's absence of remorse may indicate a lack of insight into and a failure to accept responsibility for the crimes committed and demonstrate a substantial likelihood of future dangerousness: Valentini, at para. 82; R. v. B.P. (2004), 2004 33468 (ON CA), 190 O.A.C. 354 (C.A.), at para. 2.

Good Character

39In R. v. B.R., 2024 ONCA 424, an 18-month sentence was upheld in a situation where a high school teacher was convicted of touching the victim’s thighs for 15 or 20 minutes, massaging her neck, and then kissing her neck. At para. 19 of its reasons, the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated:

As this court has recognized on several occasions: prior good character evidence has limited significance when sentencing someone for a sexual offence because their background, and reputation, often "helps enable" its commission: R. v. M.V., 2023 ONCA 724, at para. 69; and, albeit in another context, an "offender's prior good character and standing in the community are to some extent the tools by which they commit" their offences: R. v. Drabinsky, 2011 ONCA 582, 107 O.R. (3d) 595, at para. 167.

Person in Authority

40At paras. 125 and 126 of Friesen, the Supreme Court of Canada described the “spectrum” of trust relationships that can exist, and the impact that such relationships have upon sentencing:

We also wish to offer some comments on the factor of the abuse of a position of trust (Criminal Code, s. 718.2(a)(iii)). Trust relationships arise in varied circumstances and should not all be treated alike (see R. v. Aird, 2013 ONCA 447, 307 O.A.C. 183, at para. 27). Instead, it makes sense to refer to a "spectrum" of positions of trust (see R. v. R.B., 2017 ONCA 74, at para. 21). An offender may simultaneously occupy multiple positions on the spectrum and a trust relationship can progress along the spectrum over time (see R. v. Vigon, 2016 ABCA 75, 612 A.R. 292, at para. 17). In some cases, an offender's grooming can build a new relationship of trust, a regular occurrence in child luring cases where children are groomed by complete strangers over the Internet, or move an existing trust relationship along the spectrum. Even where grooming does not exploit an existing relationship of trust or build a new one, it is still aggravating in its own right.

Any breach of trust is likely to increase the harm to the victim and thus the gravity of the offence. As Saunders J.A. reasoned in D.R.W., the focus in such cases should be on "the extent to which [the] relationship [of trust] was violated" (para. 41). The spectrum of relationships of trust is relevant to determining the degree of harm. A child will likely suffer more harm from sexual violence where there is a closer relationship and a higher degree of trust between the child and the offender (see R. v. J.R. (1997), 1997 14665 (NL CA), 157 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 246 (N.L.C.A.), at paras. 14 and 18). This is likely to be the case in what might be described as classic breach of trust situations, such as those involving family members, caregivers, teachers, and doctors, to mention a few.

41Accordingly, I must determine whether T.D. fits within this spectrum of trust as regards E.C. As was noted by the Crown, E.C. stated in her video that T.D. was “like another dad to me”. At para. 213 of my reasons for judgment, I stated that “[H]er video was a clear recitation of events from the perspective of a 14- or 15-year-old girl describing sexual advances from an older male who stood in a quasi-parental role – that is, she was occasionally upset but she was not shaken on the substance of her evidence.”

42With that being said, any finding that T.D. is in a position of trust must be made on a beyond a reasonable doubt basis: see R. v. Gardiner, 1982 30 (SCC), [1982] 2 SCR 368. With that in mind, the statement at para. 213 of my reasons for judgment should not be taken to be a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that T.D. was in a position of trust as regards E.C. While I accept E.C.’s evidence, and while her comportment in her video is consistent with T.D. being in a position of trust, my statement at para. 213 is not an explicit finding made on a beyond a reasonable doubt basis.

43I am concerned about E.C.’s evidence that T.D. was “like another dad to me” because this statement can be misleading. Is someone “like another dad” because they give moral guidance? Is someone “like another dad” because they give money to wanting teenagers? Or is someone “like another dad” merely because they drive a teenager around even though that adult does not have any moral authority over said teenager? In this latter situation, surely no position of trust would exist.

44In this case, I have little evidence as regards the specific nature of the role occupied by T.D. vis a vis E.C. Unlike the jurisprudence described earlier in these reasons, there is nothing inherent in T.D.’s function that would demand that he was in a position of trust (i.e. T.D. was not E.C.’s teacher or parent). Neither is there evidence of the kinds of influence that T.D. had over E.C. (i.e.. there is no evidence that he mentored her, gave her guidance, etc.). For example, the Crown asked E.C. about how T.D. would act when E.C. was in the house. E.C. responded that T.D. was like a “good stepdad”. When the Crown explored this statement, E.C. explained how T.D. appeared to be a “good stepdad” to the other complainant in this case. E.C. did not explain her own relationship with T.D. In cross-examination, defence counsel (in an attempt to impeach E.C.), suggested to E.C. that she regarded T.D. as a “cool father figure”. E.C. did not answer the assertion that T.D. was a “cool father figure” to E.C. (as opposed to being a “cool father figure” to the other complainant). Rather, E.C. answered the question by emphasizing that T.D. was an adult: “He was a grown man”. There was no follow up on this point. As a result, I do not have meaningful evidence that describes E.C.’s relationship with T.D. in a significant fashion.

45The concern regarding this equivocal evidence is exacerbated by the fact that E.C.’s recollection of matters in her statement to police was, on at least one occasion, exaggerated. In her video, E.C. stated that she was at T.D.’s house “every day” over the course of the summer in question. In examination-in-chief, the Crown quite rightly took E.C. to that statement, and E.C. qualified that statement as being “dramaticized”. Rather, E.C. stated that she attended the house the majority of days over the summer. ²

46Accordingly, I accept on a balance of probabilities that E.C. thought of T.D. as being like “another dad” but the following factors leave me in a position where I do not know what that means:

a. The verbiage used by E.C. is somewhat opaque in that it does not specify how T.D. acted in any quasi-paternal role;

b. I do not have sufficient evidence regarding the nature of the relationship as between T.D. and E.C.; and

c. E.C. indicated that at least one portion of her video evidence was somewhat overstated and was “dramaticized”.

47Thus, while I accept on a balance of probabilities that T.D. “was like another dad” to E.C., I am not willing to find beyond a reasonable doubt that T.D. was a person in authority to E.C. because I do not know what E.C. meant by “like another dad”.

Gladue

48As an Indigenous person, T.D.’s background must be considered in the sentencing process: R. v. Gladue, 1999 679 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688; R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433. The jurisprudence demands that a different analytical construct be engaged when sentencing Indigenous offenders.

49The judge sentencing an Indigenous offender must consider:

(a) The unique systemic or background factors which may have brought the offender before the courts; and

(b) Any culturally specific sentencing processes or programming available to the offender that may address those concerns: see Ipeelee.

50The aforementioned rubric suggests that an Indigenous accused may effectively be less morally culpable than would non-Indigenous offenders and that sentences may reflect this concern.

51The Gladue analytical construct can thus lead to greater weight being placed upon rehabilitation and restorative justice than would be the case for non-Indigenous offenders, even in cases involving violence: R. v. Jacko (2010), 2010 ONCA 452, 256 C.C.C. (3d) 113 (Ont. C.A.). Despite that reality, however, the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Macintyre-Syrette, 2018 ONCA 706 reaffirmed prior jurisprudence that made clear that deterrence and denunciation can remain primary sentencing principles for Indigenous offenders:

However, as LaForme J.A. noted in R. v. Kakekagamick (2006), 2006 28549 (ON CA), 81 O.R. (3d) 664, leave to appeal refused [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 34, at para. 42, there is no general rule that in sentencing an Aboriginal offender the court must give the most weight to the principle of restorative justice, as compared to other legitimate principles of sentencing. The relative weight to be assigned to the goals of restorative justice as against the principles of denunciation or deterrence will be connected to the severity of the offence: Wells, at para. 39. The principles of denunciation and deterrence may predominate where the offence is sufficiently serious: Kakekagamick, at para. 42.

52Ergo, as per Gladue, I must consider the degree to which T.D.’s Indigeneity should affect the sentence imposed.

53T.D. has a number of relevant indicia that might suggest that rehabilitation and restorative justice should play a pronounced role in his sentencing:³

a. Alleged dissociation from his culture (although T.D.’s statements appear to contradict that position);

b. Violence within his home as a child; and

c. Contact with the criminal justice system.

54Nonetheless, and despite the foregoing, I do not believe that restorative justice or rehabilitation ought to play a significant role in this sentencing. T.D.’s allocution suggests to me that his prospects for rehabilitation are remote since he remained firm in his position that he committed no offence. Further, T.D.’s lack of empathy towards E.C. suggests that any rehabilitative or restorative efforts that could be addressed by Gladue programming would not be met with any success.⁴ Thus, and given the clear mandate from Friesen that general and specific deterrence are paramount considerations in cases of sexual abuse involving children, the Gladue framework does not heavily affect my sentence in this case.

Aggravating Features

55The aggravating features in this case are:

a. There were multiple instances of sexual conduct;

b. The offences had a psychological impact upon E.C that caused to her to distance herself and caused her anxiety. Although it cannot be said that the nature of the emotional harm she suffered was debilitating (E.C. is attending post-secondary education and thus appears to be moving forward with her life), neither can it be said that this was the kind of sexual assault that had a minimal impact upon her; and

c. T.D. has a criminal record which has escalated since being arrested for the instant charges. Given the timing of these offences, however, I hereby attribute no weight to his record.

Mitigating Features

56The mitigating features of this case are:

a. T.D. takes care of his mother’s medical treatments, which appear to be important in so far as the PSR writer who dealt with T.D.’s most recent charges stated that T.D. “is relied upon heavily by his mother to assist her in attending medical appointments in and out of town and tasks of daily living due to her health situation… Areas of concern at this time appear to be stress related [sic] to the care of his mother as being the sole caregiver”; and

b. He is gainfully employed, and thus contributes to society.

The Balance

57As noted in Friesen, denunciation and deterrence must be the primary motivating features of any sentence I impose.

58Indeed, the sentencing position of both Crown and defence tacitly acknowledge that fact in so far as neither side is suggesting anything other than a meaningful sentence.

59With respect to the quantum of sentence sought by the Crown, the number is too high given the nature of my findings. In this case, T.D. was not in a position of trust and I do not have any evidence of grooming before me. Although there are aggravating features in this case I am not willing to impose a penitentiary sentence in this matter as such a sentence would be inappropriate.

60I am therefore satisfied that a sentence in the reformatory range is appropriate, which necessitates that I consider the Proulx analysis as to whether a conditional sentence would be appropriate.

61There is no question that a conditional sentence would be of benefit to T.D. and that, if he were to be placed on a conditional sentence, he would not reoffend while serving such a sentence.

62The question, therefore, is whether the principles of denunciation and deterrence demand that T.D. serve his sentence in jail.

63On the facts of this case, a conditional sentence is inappropriate.

64First, the offences had a reasonable impact upon the victim. This is not a case where the victim “shook off” the offences such that they had little impact upon her. Instead, the victim described in great detail how they had an impact upon her and caused her anxiety.

65Second, the offences occurred on a number of occasions. Although this was not an especially lengthy pattern of behaviour, neither can it be said that it was a single, isolated incident. Accordingly, I am not willing to deviate from the principles described in Friesen, A.L., Pike, and M.(M.) that state that denunciation and deterrence must take the fore in sentencing.

66Third, T.D. showed no empathy whatsoever towards the victim which diminishes any prospect for rehabilitation. Although the lack of remorse is not an aggravating factor in sentencing, the clear direction given in Friesen, A.L., Pike, and M.(M.), means that deterrence and denunciation must be attributed full weight, even considering Mr. Dowhaniuk’s Indigeneity. Indeed, the need for deterrence and denunciation is so powerful that T.D. must be incarcerated. Although I am aware that T.D. takes his mother to treatment on a regular basis and that this might impact her medical care, this concern is not sufficiently weighty to override the need to denounce and deter.

CONCLUSION

67Given the foregoing, I hereby sentence T.D. as follows:

1. On the remaining charge before the court, T.D. shall serve nine months incarceration (during which time there will be an order under s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code whereby T.D. will have no contact with the people named by the Crown), which will be followed by:

2. Two years probation with the following terms:

a. The normal statutory terms;

b. No contact with the people named by the Crown;

c. Remain away from any residence, place of employment, school, or other place where you know those people named in subsection (b) above will frequent.

3. There will be a SOIRA order for 20 years given the fact that the accused was found guilty of sexual offences against children. There is no suggestion that this would be a disproportionate imposition given my reasons for judgment;

4. The accused will be subject to a section 109 order for a period of 10 years;

5. He shall give a sample of his DNA since this is a designated offence;

6. There will be an order under section 161(1)(b) of the Criminal Code for life. Given the nature of the offences committed, it would be contrary to the principles of sentencing to allow T.D. to be in a position of trust as regards children;

7. There will be an order under section 161(1)(c) of the Criminal Code for a period of 10 years because T.D.’s acts would appear to put a variety of children at risk.

Varpio J.

Released: March 13, 2026

CITATION: R. v. T.D., 2026 ONSC 1489

Footnotes

1. 1I was advised that the latter two offences post-date the incident before me.
2. 2It should also be noted that I asked for counsel’s position regarding an evidentiary issue about which I was uncertain. That is, I asked whether E.C. gave conflicting testimony regarding why it was that she stopped going to the other complainant’s house. The Crown’s written submissions clarified that E.C. was consistent in her evidence. My initial concern is thus of no moment.
3. 3I am aware that Gladue and other cases make clear that no evidence of causal connection as between T.D.’s Indigeneity and the criminal act in question is needed in order to engage the Gladue analysis. I do not wish this statement to be taken as a tacit suggestion to the contrary.
4. 4It must be noted that no specific programs were outlined in the Gladue report, even though these are required as per Mcintyre-Syrette. Given my findings, none are necessary in this instance. However, such references should be included in the future.