Broghan Masters

The applicant builder sought judicial review of a decision by the warranty corporation requiring it to pay $45,688.71 for a retaining wall.

The corporation had initially determined the retaining wall was not a warranted defect, but later reversed its position based on new submissions from the homeowner, without providing the applicant notice or an opportunity to respond.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding that the corporation breached procedural fairness.

The impugned finding was quashed and the matter remitted for a fresh decision following a fair process.

Following a successful appeal by the appellant, the parties were unable to agree on the costs of the underlying summary judgment motion.

The respondent argued that costs should be reserved to the trial judge and that the amount claimed was excessive.

The Court of Appeal followed its general practice of deciding costs immediately and awarded the appellant its requested partial indemnity costs of $47,660, finding the amount reasonable given the complexity and importance of the motion.

The court declined to interfere with a separate costs order regarding a co-defendant, as it had not been raised on appeal.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment motion.

The appellant, 4342 Queen St. Niagara Holdings Inc. ('Queen'), challenged a summary judgment ordering it to pay Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. ('Arcamm') nearly $1 million for electrical repair services.

Queen argued that Arcamm's alleged contributory fault for damages to electrical transformers raised genuine issues for trial and that granting summary judgment risked inconsistent findings with a related subrogated claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by failing to properly address the contributory fault defence and by not recognizing the genuine issues for trial and the risk of inconsistent findings.

The Court affirmed that contributory fault can be raised as a defence in contract actions to apportion damages.

The summary judgment was set aside, and Queen was ordered to bring a motion to consolidate the actions.

The appellant supplier claimed it was owed $600,000 for building materials and sought a declaration that the proceeds of the sale of a model home were held in trust under the Construction Act.

The motion judge ordered only a portion of the sale proceeds to be held in court under Rule 45.02, finding a serious issue to be tried only for the materials supplied to that specific home.

The appellant appealed, arguing the order was final.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, holding that the order was interlocutory because it did not finally determine the substantive rights of the parties regarding the scope of the trust.

Following an appeal where a new trial was ordered, the Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement regarding the costs of the first trial.

The parties had agreed on appeal costs but not on trial costs.

The Court agreed with the respondent's submission that the disposition of the costs of the first trial should be left to the trial judge hearing the new trial, as that judge would be in the best position to determine the issue.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for negligence, fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, and intentional interference with economic relations against an accountant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by prematurely dismissing the action and erroneously rejecting the appellants' accounting expert's testimony.

The expert's reports, though not explicitly using "standard of care" clearly opined on the impropriety and negligence of the respondent's accounting actions, which was relevant to the claims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the dismissal, and ordered a new trial before a different justice due to a miscarriage of justice.

The plaintiffs brought a summary judgment motion seeking specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for a cottage.

The defendants argued the APS was invalid due to alleged irregularities in signing, unauthorized amendments to an OREA form, and late deposit payment, and further claimed the agreement was unconscionable.

The court found the APS valid, the deal not unconscionable, and the property unique, granting specific performance to the plaintiffs.

The moving party, a lumber supplier, sought an extension of time to commence an appeal to the Divisional Court from an order regarding the preservation of funds under Rule 45.02 and the Construction Lien Act.

The moving party had initially appealed to the Court of Appeal, which quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court granted the extension of time, finding that the moving party had a bona fide intention to appeal, provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, caused no prejudice to the respondents, and raised arguable questions of law on the merits.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a successful summary judgment motion by the Defendant, Styrok Inc., against the Plaintiff, Liya Fu.

The Defendant sought elevated costs of $15,000 or, alternatively, partial indemnity costs.

The Plaintiff argued for each party to bear their own costs or a reduced partial indemnity amount.

The court rejected the Plaintiff's arguments, finding the Defendant was wholly successful and entitled to costs.

It denied elevated costs, stating the Plaintiff's conduct was not reprehensible, and awarded partial indemnity costs in the amount of $11,335.00, adjusting the Defendant's claimed amount to reflect appropriate partial indemnity rates.

The applicant, a real estate salesperson, sought to invalidate a commission split agreement he entered into with a managing partner of his former brokerage.

He argued the agreement was an unreasonable restraint of trade and lacked consideration, seeking higher commissions on two specific property sales.

The court dismissed the application, finding the agreement was supported by consideration and did not restrict the applicant's ability to compete or solicit after leaving the brokerage.

The court also held that the applicant's claims were based on an incorrect interpretation of the contracts.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a motion regarding an appeal that arose under the Construction Lien Act.

The moving parties (respondents) argued that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.

The court agreed, finding that jurisdiction for such matters lay with the Divisional Court, and that the question of whether the underlying order was final or interlocutory was for the Divisional Court to decide.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal quashed the appeal and declined to exercise its discretion to transfer the appeal to the Divisional Court.

Costs were awarded to the successful moving parties.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's breach of contract claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff contended the action was not statute-barred due to a continuing breach or anticipatory breach.

The court found no continuing or anticipatory breach, concluding that the plaintiff had discovered her claim by July 8, 2018, at the latest.

As the action was commenced on August 11, 2021, it was out of time.

The defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted, and both the plaintiff's action and the defendant's counterclaim were dismissed.

The defendant owner brought a motion for directions seeking to hold the proceeds of a statutory adjudication award in trust, rather than paying the co-defendant contractor, due to a perfected construction lien registered by the plaintiff subcontractor.

The owner argued that paying the award would expose him to paying twice.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to vary or stay the adjudicator's order under the Construction Act outside of a judicial review application.

The court emphasized the Act's prompt payment scheme, noting that the owner must pay the award and the contractor would hold the funds in trust for the subcontractor.

This is an appeal concerning confidentiality orders in a civil action involving a minor plaintiff (P1), two minor defendants (D1, D2), and a school (XYZ School) with its employees.

The original motion judge had issued broad sealing and publication ban orders to protect the identities of the minor parties, extending to the school and its employees.

The appellants (P1 and Toronto Star) argued these orders were overbroad.

The Court of Appeal, applying the reformulated Sherman Estate test, found that while protecting the minors' identities was an important public interest, anonymizing the school and its employees was not necessary.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the broad sealing order and limiting the anonymity and publication bans to only the minor parties and their litigation guardians, along with specific identifying information, while allowing the school's identity to be public.

This is a motion to quash appeals of a non-publication and sealing order.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order was final for the media (Toronto Star) as it finally determined their constitutional rights under s. 2(b) of the Charter, allowing their appeal to proceed as of right.

For the plaintiffs, the order was interlocutory, but the court exercised its discretion under s. 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act to hear their appeal concurrently due to the interrelation of the issues.

The motion to quash the appeals was dismissed.

The plaintiff, an unpaid supplier of building materials, brought a motion under Rule 45.02 to have the proceeds of sale from one of the contractor's construction sites held in court pending the outcome of its action.

The plaintiff argued that the entire proceeds constituted a trust fund under section 8 of the Construction Act, even though the amount owed for materials supplied to that specific property was much less than the total debt owed across multiple projects.

The court held that the statutory trust under section 8 is project-specific, limiting the plaintiff's trust claim to the value of materials supplied to that particular property.

The motion was granted in part, with only the amount owed for that specific property, plus interest, ordered to be retained in court.

The appellant foreign corporations appealed a Master's order dismissing their motion to stay or dismiss the action for lack of territorial jurisdiction.

The Master found a real and substantial connection to Ontario based on a good arguable case that an oral contract for a 5% ownership interest was made and breached in Ontario.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the Master's characterization of the dispute or her conclusion, and dismissed the appeal.

The defendants, two American corporations, brought a motion under Rule 21.01(3)(a) to dismiss an oppression claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing they were not governed by the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA).

The plaintiffs alleged an oral agreement for a 5% ownership interest in the defendant companies, asserting they were beneficial owners and the defendants were affiliates of Ontario corporations controlled from Ontario.

The court found that the OBCA's definition of "affiliate" could include foreign corporations controlled by the same person as an Ontario corporation, and that the Ontario Superior Court had jurisdiction over the oppression claim, as well as other claims for breach of contract and tracing.

The motion to dismiss was denied.