Mia Carella

The appellant supplier claimed it was owed $600,000 for building materials and sought a declaration that the proceeds of the sale of a model home were held in trust under the Construction Act.

The motion judge ordered only a portion of the sale proceeds to be held in court under Rule 45.02, finding a serious issue to be tried only for the materials supplied to that specific home.

The appellant appealed, arguing the order was final.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, holding that the order was interlocutory because it did not finally determine the substantive rights of the parties regarding the scope of the trust.

The moving party, a lumber supplier, sought an extension of time to commence an appeal to the Divisional Court from an order regarding the preservation of funds under Rule 45.02 and the Construction Lien Act.

The moving party had initially appealed to the Court of Appeal, which quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court granted the extension of time, finding that the moving party had a bona fide intention to appeal, provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, caused no prejudice to the respondents, and raised arguable questions of law on the merits.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a motion regarding an appeal that arose under the Construction Lien Act.

The moving parties (respondents) argued that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.

The court agreed, finding that jurisdiction for such matters lay with the Divisional Court, and that the question of whether the underlying order was final or interlocutory was for the Divisional Court to decide.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal quashed the appeal and declined to exercise its discretion to transfer the appeal to the Divisional Court.

Costs were awarded to the successful moving parties.

The plaintiff, an unpaid supplier of building materials, brought a motion under Rule 45.02 to have the proceeds of sale from one of the contractor's construction sites held in court pending the outcome of its action.

The plaintiff argued that the entire proceeds constituted a trust fund under section 8 of the Construction Act, even though the amount owed for materials supplied to that specific property was much less than the total debt owed across multiple projects.

The court held that the statutory trust under section 8 is project-specific, limiting the plaintiff's trust claim to the value of materials supplied to that particular property.

The motion was granted in part, with only the amount owed for that specific property, plus interest, ordered to be retained in court.

The defendant was charged with speeding 60 km/h in a 50 km/h zone contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution presented evidence that the defendant was traveling at 70 km/h.

The defendant, self-represented, raised arguments based on Organized Pseudo Legal Commercial Arguments (OPCA), including that he was merely traveling, that the Highway Traffic Act lacked Royal Assent and was therefore invalid, that he was not properly identified, and that he was a victim of human trafficking.

The court found all constituent elements of the speeding offence established beyond a reasonable doubt and convicted the defendant.

The court imposed a fine of $30, court costs of $5, and a victim fine surcharge of $10 for a total of $45.