Michael Carmine Mazzuca

The moving party sought leave to appeal a prior decision of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As no costs outlines were filed, the court ordered that no costs be awarded.

This decision concerns a construction lien action that settled before trial.

The plaintiffs, trustees and agents for union members, registered a lien and commenced an action against the contractor and property owner.

After the underlying debt was paid, the property owner (Con-Form Holdings Limited) sought costs from the plaintiffs, arguing the lien was untimely and exaggerated.

The court dismissed Con-Form’s claim for costs, finding the plaintiffs’ actions were justified by the contractor’s default and that the validity and amount of the lien were never adjudicated.

The court ordered Con-Form to pay the plaintiffs $1,000 in costs for responding to the costs submissions.

Following a successful appeal by the appellant, the parties were unable to agree on the costs of the underlying summary judgment motion.

The respondent argued that costs should be reserved to the trial judge and that the amount claimed was excessive.

The Court of Appeal followed its general practice of deciding costs immediately and awarded the appellant its requested partial indemnity costs of $47,660, finding the amount reasonable given the complexity and importance of the motion.

The court declined to interfere with a separate costs order regarding a co-defendant, as it had not been raised on appeal.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment motion.

The appellant, 4342 Queen St. Niagara Holdings Inc. ('Queen'), challenged a summary judgment ordering it to pay Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. ('Arcamm') nearly $1 million for electrical repair services.

Queen argued that Arcamm's alleged contributory fault for damages to electrical transformers raised genuine issues for trial and that granting summary judgment risked inconsistent findings with a related subrogated claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by failing to properly address the contributory fault defence and by not recognizing the genuine issues for trial and the risk of inconsistent findings.

The Court affirmed that contributory fault can be raised as a defence in contract actions to apportion damages.

The summary judgment was set aside, and Queen was ordered to bring a motion to consolidate the actions.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a costs endorsement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the responding party in the fixed amount of $5,000 all-inclusive.

The appellant supplier claimed it was owed $600,000 for building materials and sought a declaration that the proceeds of the sale of a model home were held in trust under the Construction Act.

The motion judge ordered only a portion of the sale proceeds to be held in court under Rule 45.02, finding a serious issue to be tried only for the materials supplied to that specific home.

The appellant appealed, arguing the order was final.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, holding that the order was interlocutory because it did not finally determine the substantive rights of the parties regarding the scope of the trust.

A surety (Westport) brought an interpleader motion seeking a declaration of priority over funds awarded to a subcontractor (High Tech) in an ODACC adjudication, or alternatively, for the funds to be paid into court.

The funds were held in trust by the general contractor's (BDA) counsel due to competing claims.

The court found that Westport, as surety, had a valid security interest and trust claim over the funds based on the indemnity agreement with High Tech.

The court rejected High Tech's argument that the Construction Act's prompt payment provisions gave it priority.

However, the court also found that there were triable issues regarding Westport's good faith in processing claims and making advances, which precluded a final order for immediate payment to Westport.

Therefore, the court ordered the disputed funds to be paid into court pending the outcome of ongoing litigation between the parties.

Following an appeal where a new trial was ordered, the Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement regarding the costs of the first trial.

The parties had agreed on appeal costs but not on trial costs.

The Court agreed with the respondent's submission that the disposition of the costs of the first trial should be left to the trial judge hearing the new trial, as that judge would be in the best position to determine the issue.

Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. (Arcamm) brought a motion to quash an appeal by 4342 Queen St. Niagara Holdings Inc. (Queen) to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, arguing that the underlying summary judgment, granted in a Construction Act action, should have been appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Arcamm's motion, holding that the appeal properly lay with the Court of Appeal because the summary judgment was granted under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure based on a contractual claim, not under the Construction Act, and the court's jurisdiction is determined by the substance of the order made.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for negligence, fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, and intentional interference with economic relations against an accountant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by prematurely dismissing the action and erroneously rejecting the appellants' accounting expert's testimony.

The expert's reports, though not explicitly using "standard of care" clearly opined on the impropriety and negligence of the respondent's accounting actions, which was relevant to the claims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the dismissal, and ordered a new trial before a different justice due to a miscarriage of justice.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the order of Gorman J. dated October 17, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $5,000.

The moving party, a lumber supplier, sought an extension of time to commence an appeal to the Divisional Court from an order regarding the preservation of funds under Rule 45.02 and the Construction Lien Act.

The moving party had initially appealed to the Court of Appeal, which quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court granted the extension of time, finding that the moving party had a bona fide intention to appeal, provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, caused no prejudice to the respondents, and raised arguable questions of law on the merits.

The court determined costs for two summary judgment motions.

Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. successfully obtained judgment against 4342 Queen St Niagara Holdings Inc. for unpaid invoices, while its claim against Avison Young Real Estate Management Services LP was dismissed as Avison was found to be Queen's agent.

Avison Young also successfully obtained indemnification from 4342 Queen St Niagara Holdings Inc. for its legal costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to Arcamm against Queen, partial indemnity costs to Avison against Queen (for defending Arcamm's claim via a Sanderson Order), and full indemnity costs to Avison against Queen (for its successful indemnification claim).

The decision emphasized Queen's conduct in unnecessarily complicating the proceedings and refusing to admit facts.

The appellant owner appealed a motion judge's order directing the release of holdback funds to subcontractors under the Construction Act.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in calculating the minimum holdback and in ordering payments without a formal summary judgment motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the law regarding basic holdback obligations and set-off, and properly utilized the summary procedure under s. 67 of the Act to expedite payment to subcontractors.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a motion regarding an appeal that arose under the Construction Lien Act.

The moving parties (respondents) argued that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.

The court agreed, finding that jurisdiction for such matters lay with the Divisional Court, and that the question of whether the underlying order was final or interlocutory was for the Divisional Court to decide.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal quashed the appeal and declined to exercise its discretion to transfer the appeal to the Divisional Court.

Costs were awarded to the successful moving parties.

Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. brought a summary judgment motion against Avison Young Real Estate Management Services LP and 4342 Queen St Niagara Holdings Inc. for unpaid invoices related to emergency electrical repairs and equipment replacement at a commercial property.

The court granted summary judgment against 4342 Queen St Niagara Holdings Inc. (Queen), finding it liable as the owner under the Construction Act and in contract for the services and materials provided.

The court dismissed the claim against Avison Young Real Estate Management Services LP (Avison), concluding that Avison acted solely as Queen's agent and was not an "owner" under the Act, nor liable in contract.

The court also addressed the applicability of prompt payment provisions, finding Arcamm's invoices were not "proper invoices" under the Act, and clarified that the decision on Arcamm's invoices would not prejudice related subrogated claims regarding transformer damage.

The defendant owner brought a motion for directions seeking to hold the proceeds of a statutory adjudication award in trust, rather than paying the co-defendant contractor, due to a perfected construction lien registered by the plaintiff subcontractor.

The owner argued that paying the award would expose him to paying twice.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to vary or stay the adjudicator's order under the Construction Act outside of a judicial review application.

The court emphasized the Act's prompt payment scheme, noting that the owner must pay the award and the contractor would hold the funds in trust for the subcontractor.

This is an appeal concerning confidentiality orders in a civil action involving a minor plaintiff (P1), two minor defendants (D1, D2), and a school (XYZ School) with its employees.

The original motion judge had issued broad sealing and publication ban orders to protect the identities of the minor parties, extending to the school and its employees.

The appellants (P1 and Toronto Star) argued these orders were overbroad.

The Court of Appeal, applying the reformulated Sherman Estate test, found that while protecting the minors' identities was an important public interest, anonymizing the school and its employees was not necessary.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the broad sealing order and limiting the anonymity and publication bans to only the minor parties and their litigation guardians, along with specific identifying information, while allowing the school's identity to be public.

This decision addresses motions in three consolidated construction lien actions.

Sutton Forming Inc. sought a declaration on Homes by DeSantis (Lake) Inc.'s minimum holdback obligation under the Construction Lien Act and an order for payment from it.

The court clarified that the holdback is calculated based on the contract price for services actually supplied, not amounts paid, and rejected the owner's objections regarding certificate accuracy and set-off for deficiencies.

The court granted leave for the motion, declared the minimum holdback, and ordered specific payments to Sutton and its sub-subcontractors from the holdback.

The defendant subcontractor moved to declare the plaintiff's construction lien expired and to discharge the lien.

At the time the plaintiff preserved and perfected its lien, the plaintiff corporation had been dissolved for failure to pay a fee, though it was later revived.

The court held that because the corporation was dissolved at the relevant time, it was not a legal entity entitled to preserve or perfect a lien.

The court found it had no equitable discretion to validate the lien retroactively, and even if it did, it would not exercise it in these circumstances.

The motion was granted, the lien discharged, and the security ordered returned.