Marc Huneault

The applicant sought specific performance of a share transfer agreement to acquire 25% of the shares in two privately held corporations from the respondent.

The respondent opposed, arguing the agreement was unclear, unconscionable, signed under duress, barred by estoppel, and outside the limitation period.

The court utilized its enhanced fact-finding powers to resolve the application without a trial.

The court found the agreement valid, clear, and supported by consideration in the form of significant personal guarantees provided by the applicant's principal.

The court rejected the respondent's defenses and ordered specific performance, finding that the shares were unique and damages would be inadequate.

The court addressed two competing motions arising from overlapping proceedings: an application commenced by 9165-6462 Quebec Inc. in Sudbury seeking enforcement of a Transfer Agreement and declarations regarding share ownership, and an action commenced by the plaintiff in Cochrane seeking declarations that the Transfer Agreement is void and that he remains the owner of shares in the DJB companies.

The plaintiff sought to consolidate the proceedings and transfer them to Cochrane, while 9165 Inc. sought to stay or dismiss the action in favour of the application.

The court found that permitting the action to proceed would constitute an abuse of process and an improper collateral attack on a prior judicial order declining to transfer the application.

The court stayed the action against 9165 Inc. pending resolution of the application and dismissed the consolidation motion without prejudice.

The appellant supplier claimed it was owed $600,000 for building materials and sought a declaration that the proceeds of the sale of a model home were held in trust under the Construction Act.

The motion judge ordered only a portion of the sale proceeds to be held in court under Rule 45.02, finding a serious issue to be tried only for the materials supplied to that specific home.

The appellant appealed, arguing the order was final.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, holding that the order was interlocutory because it did not finally determine the substantive rights of the parties regarding the scope of the trust.

The moving party, a lumber supplier, sought an extension of time to commence an appeal to the Divisional Court from an order regarding the preservation of funds under Rule 45.02 and the Construction Lien Act.

The moving party had initially appealed to the Court of Appeal, which quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court granted the extension of time, finding that the moving party had a bona fide intention to appeal, provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, caused no prejudice to the respondents, and raised arguable questions of law on the merits.

The plaintiff, an unpaid supplier of building materials, brought a motion under Rule 45.02 to have the proceeds of sale from one of the contractor's construction sites held in court pending the outcome of its action.

The plaintiff argued that the entire proceeds constituted a trust fund under section 8 of the Construction Act, even though the amount owed for materials supplied to that specific property was much less than the total debt owed across multiple projects.

The court held that the statutory trust under section 8 is project-specific, limiting the plaintiff's trust claim to the value of materials supplied to that particular property.

The motion was granted in part, with only the amount owed for that specific property, plus interest, ordered to be retained in court.

The accused, charged under a 13-count indictment, brought an application for the disclosure of unredacted police notes and source documents.

The Crown resisted the application, claiming the redacted information was protected by confidential informant privilege.

Following an in camera Basi hearing, the court found that the individual who provided the information had an expectation of confidentiality and was a confidential informant, not a police agent.

The court scheduled a further in camera hearing to review the unredacted material to determine if any portions could be disclosed to the defence.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction requiring the respondent to remove a fence and trees obstructing an access road to their waterfront property.

The respondent argued the road was not an 'access road' under the Road Access Act because alternate access existed.

The court found the limited, conditional access over a neighbour's property did not constitute alternate access.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court granted the injunction, finding a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm due to the loss of vehicular access, and a balance of convenience favouring the applicants.

The accused, facing charges including breach of trust, fraudulent computer access, and organized crime affiliation, brought an application to compel the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) to produce extensive computer records for his defence.

The CRA opposed, citing taxpayer privacy under the Income Tax Act and arguing the request was overly broad.

The Crown characterized the request as a fishing expedition.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused failed to establish the likely relevance of the requested information to an issue at trial or witness competence, noting the vague assertions and the accused's own admissions of unauthorized access.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal of an order dismissing a motion to discharge a construction lien.

The moving party argued that the order was interlocutory and therefore unappealable under s. 71(3) of the Construction Lien Act.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the dismissal of the motion to discharge the lien did not finally dispose of the lien's validity, as the moving party would still have to prove the lien at trial.

The motion to quash was granted and the appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The accused, a professional engineer, was charged with criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm following the partial collapse of the Algo Centre Mall roof parking deck, which killed two people and injured another.

The Crown alleged the accused failed to properly inspect the mall and identify severe corrosion of the steel structure caused by decades of water infiltration.

The court found the accused's engineering work was shoddy and inadequate, but concluded the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable engineer, given expert evidence that other professionals had also missed the severity of the corrosion.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant sought a stay of charges for sexual assault and sexual interference, or alternatively, a stay of charges related to two complainants or the removal of Crown Attorneys, alleging abuse of process due to prosecutorial misconduct during the preliminary hearing.

The alleged misconduct involved Crown Attorneys encouraging, hugging, and providing candy to child witnesses during breaks in cross-examination, and one Crown Attorney unilaterally excusing a witness.

The court applied the R. v. Babos test for abuse of process, considering the unique challenges of child witnesses in sexual assault cases.

The court found the Crown's actions, while requiring judicial direction, were innocuous attempts to console distressed child witnesses and did not compromise trial fairness or undermine judicial integrity.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown brought applications to quash subpoenas issued by the defence against two prosecutors, David Holmes (federal) and Steven Scharger (provincial).

The defence sought to compel their testimony at a preliminary hearing regarding an officer's alleged history of misconduct and excessive force, arguing it was material to the officer's credibility and the accused's ability to make full answer and defence.

The court found that the proposed evidence was not likely material to the preliminary hearing issues, was governed by the collateral fact rule, and that the necessity test for compelling counsel's testimony was not met.

The applications to quash the subpoenas were granted.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder arising from a fatal stabbing, brought an application to admit evidence of the deceased’s bad character in support of a self-defence theory.

The proposed evidence included the deceased’s criminal record, reputation as a “tough guy”, prior drug use, and police occurrence reports.

The court held that evidence of bad character not known to the accused must still satisfy the requirements of relevance and admissibility, and that its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The court found the proposed evidence lacked sufficient probative value and risked inviting the jury to reason improperly about the deceased’s character.

The application was largely dismissed, though evidence of the deceased’s intention to confront and assault the accused on the night in question was permitted.

The plaintiff commenced a foreclosure action regarding a Multiple Unit Residential Building (MURB) investment scheme.

The investors, who had signed powers of attorney in favour of the developer, alleged financial manipulation and breach of fiduciary duty.

Given the complex financial history, the lack of proper accounting by the mortgagee, and the overlapping shareholder oppression claims, the case management judge directed a reference to determine the mortgage accounting and related issues.

The judge also ordered a stay of the foreclosure action and oppression applications pending the reference.

An offender convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 25 years of parole ineligibility applied for judicial screening under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code seeking a reduction of the parole ineligibility period.

At the initial screening stage, the court was required to determine whether there was a reasonable prospect that a jury would unanimously recommend reducing the parole ineligibility period, considering the applicant’s character, institutional conduct, the nature of the offence, victim information, and other relevant factors.

The record demonstrated exemplary institutional behaviour, supportive family ties, and risk assessments placing the applicant in the low to moderate range for violent recidivism.

Applying the transitional provisions and the “reasonable prospect of success” threshold, the court concluded the applicant met the screening requirement.

The application was granted and a parole eligibility report was ordered prior to further proceedings.

The plaintiffs sought interlocutory injunctive relief restraining a former shareholder, director, and employee from using confidential information and soliciting customers following the sale of his shares in a closely held corporation.

The evidence indicated the departing fiduciary took electronic files containing proprietary customer information and immediately solicited key customers after the share sale.

The court found a strong prima facie case of breach of fiduciary duty and unfair competition, notwithstanding the absence of a non‑competition agreement.

Given the likelihood of irreparable harm through loss of goodwill and customer relationships, and the balance of convenience favouring the plaintiffs, injunctive relief was granted.

The injunction restrained the former fiduciary and his corporation from using confidential information and soliciting customers for a limited period pending trial.

The accused, an OPP officer, was charged with attempted murder, arson, and administering a noxious substance after a fire broke out in her daughter-in-law's bedroom.

The Crown alleged the accused drugged the victim's drink with diphenhydramine during a visit to discuss a bitter custody dispute, then set fire to the bedroom closet once the victim was asleep.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility and expert evidence regarding the fire's origin and the toxicology results.

The accused was found guilty of arson and administering a noxious substance, but acquitted of attempted murder as the specific intent to kill was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.