Alexander D. Kurke

The applicant brought a certiorari application seeking to quash committal to trial on charges of assault causing bodily harm, unlawfully causing bodily harm, and extortion following a preliminary inquiry.

The applicant argued that the evidence did not establish a causal connection between the alleged assault and the complainant’s serious injuries and that the extortion charge lacked evidence of intent to obtain property.

Applying the committal test articulated in R. v. Arcuri, the court held that a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer that the injuries were caused by the alleged assault based on common sense inferences from the evidence.

The court also found sufficient evidence that violence was used to obtain control of the disputed property during the altercation.

The application to quash the indictment was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle, arguing insufficiency of the trial judge’s reasons, lack of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, improper reversal of the Charter onus, and an impermissible inference from the accused’s failure to testify.

The court granted leave to argue sufficiency of reasons despite it not being raised in the notice of appeal.

Applying the framework from Sheppard and R.E.M., the court held that the trial judge’s reasons adequately explained the conviction and permitted meaningful appellate review.

The court further held that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the appellant’s condition and circumstances, and that the trial judge did not improperly shift the Charter burden or draw an impermissible inference from the accused’s silence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, uttering a death threat, and attempting to choke the complainant during the assault.

The case turned largely on credibility, with conflicting accounts provided by the complainant and the accused.

Applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.), the court assessed plausibility, corroborative circumstances, injuries, and contemporaneous text messages.

The court found the complainant’s testimony credible and consistent with the surrounding evidence, including physical injuries and her immediate distress following the incident.

The accused’s evidence was rejected as implausible and inconsistent.

The Crown proved all three offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

An offender convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 25 years of parole ineligibility applied for judicial screening under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code seeking a reduction of the parole ineligibility period.

At the initial screening stage, the court was required to determine whether there was a reasonable prospect that a jury would unanimously recommend reducing the parole ineligibility period, considering the applicant’s character, institutional conduct, the nature of the offence, victim information, and other relevant factors.

The record demonstrated exemplary institutional behaviour, supportive family ties, and risk assessments placing the applicant in the low to moderate range for violent recidivism.

Applying the transitional provisions and the “reasonable prospect of success” threshold, the court concluded the applicant met the screening requirement.

The application was granted and a parole eligibility report was ordered prior to further proceedings.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to comply with a roadside demand to provide a breath sample under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding an unequivocal refusal, provided insufficient reasons, and failed to properly consider the impact of an officer’s misstatement regarding the right to counsel, the absence of a final warning, and the short time between demand and arrest.

The court held that refusal may be inferred from conduct and statements and that the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant constructively refused by repeatedly delaying and refusing to comply.

The officer’s incorrect statement about the right to counsel did not materially mislead the appellant and did not undermine the clarity of the demand.

The appellate court found the trial judge’s reasons sufficient and dismissed the appeal.