Patrick Berchmans Keaney

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milliliters of blood within two hours of ceasing to operate the vehicle, contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proved that the accused drove erratically, veering into oncoming traffic on multiple occasions.

His partner called 911 reporting suspected impairment.

Police attended and the accused was transported to the hospital.

An approved screening device test was administered en route, which the accused failed.

Formal breath tests at the hospital yielded readings of 280 milligrams.

The accused challenged the legality of the police conduct, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court rejected all Charter challenges and convicted the accused.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, renewed his application for judicial interim release based on a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic and new sureties.

The court acknowledged COVID-19 as a material change but found its impact on the tertiary ground of detention minimal given the specific measures at the detention facility and the lack of specific evidence of the applicant's heightened vulnerability.

The court also found the proposed new sureties unsuitable due to evasive testimony.

Ultimately, the court concluded that continued detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, considering the gravity of the offence, the circumstances of its commission, and the strength of the Crown's case.

The accused pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving arising from a head-on collision on Highway 17 near Walden in Greater Sudbury.

The accused deliberately drove his truck into oncoming traffic as a suicide attempt.

One victim (Dawn Ceasar) was killed, and two others (Hartley Ceasar and Jack Ceasar) suffered serious injuries.

The court imposed a 15-month custodial sentence followed by three years probation, rejecting both the Crown's request for 18 months incarceration and the defence request for an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court found that while the accused suffered from depression and demonstrated remorse and rehabilitation efforts, the gravity of the offence and harm to victims required a custodial sentence to satisfy principles of denunciation and general deterrence.

A 31-year-old mother pleaded guilty to failing to provide the necessities of life to her 18-month-old son, contrary to section 215(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, resulting in the child's death by drowning in a bathtub.

The mother left the child unsupervised while engaged in an 11-minute Facebook conversation.

The Crown sought a 9-month jail sentence; the defence sought a 4-month conditional sentence.

The court imposed 90 days jail to be served intermittently on weekends, plus 24 months probation, finding that actual incarceration was necessary to meet the objectives of denunciation and general deterrence, particularly given the aggravating circumstances involving abuse of a child and the emerging issue of distracted parenting through social media.

The appellant appealed his conviction for invitation to sexual touching.

The trial judge had inferred an invitation from the act of touching alone, despite the child complainant's unequivocal testimony that the appellant said nothing.

The appellate court found this inference to be an error involving an essential element of the offence, as it was demonstrably incompatible with the uncontradicted evidence.

Consequently, the verdict was deemed unreasonable, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The applicant, Robert Steven Wright, charged with first-degree murder, sought judicial interim release.

The court considered the application under the reverse onus provisions of the Criminal Code, specifically focusing on the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

While the secondary ground (public safety/reoffending) was not met due to the applicant's lack of criminal record and stable employment, the tertiary ground (maintaining confidence in the administration of justice) was central.

The court found the Crown's case, based on DNA and fingerprint evidence, to be very strong, bordering on overwhelming.

Considering the gravity of the offence, the violent circumstances, the potential lengthy imprisonment, and concerns regarding the proposed surety and release plan, the court concluded that detention was necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for interim judicial release was dismissed.

The accused was charged with five offences arising from a motor vehicle collision on June 29, 2017: impaired operation, operation with blood alcohol over 80 mg/100 mL, dangerous operation, and two counts of breach of probation.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The trial was conducted as a blended voir dire and trial.

The court heard evidence from three Crown witnesses and received expert toxicology evidence by affidavit.

The defence filed an affidavit regarding lawyer contact procedures.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation and dangerous operation, but acquitted on the over 80 charge due to uncertainty regarding the timing of the accident and concerns about bolus drinking assumptions in the expert evidence.

The breach of probation charges were to be resolved separately.

The accused was charged with inviting his six-year-old granddaughter to touch him sexually.

The alleged incident occurred between July 31 and August 5, 2016, at the accused's home in Greater Sudbury.

The Crown called two witnesses: the child complainant and her mother.

The accused did not testify.

The trial judge assessed the child's evidence using a common sense approach, finding her testimony reliable and credible on the essential elements of the charge despite inconsistencies and memory gaps during cross-examination.

The court convicted the accused of invitation to sexual touching.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the accused drove with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath test results on Charter grounds and argued the instruments were unreliable and inaccurate.

The trial spanned 18 days over approximately two years.

The court found the police lawfully stopped the vehicle based on speeding, had reasonable and probable grounds to demand breath samples, and properly administered the breath tests.

Expert evidence from the Crown's toxicologist established the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 C results.

The defence expert's theory of instrument drift was rejected as unscientific and based on incomplete data.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from a collision on Highway 144 in October 2013.

The Crown proved the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol through evidence of the accident circumstances, observations of impairment, and breath test results of 201 and 203 milligrams.

The defence challenged the reliability of the Intoxilizer 8000C device through expert evidence regarding historical maintenance records and COBRA data.

The court rejected the defence expert's evidence as lacking proper foundation and logical relevance, finding it did not meet the threshold for admissibility.

The court convicted the accused on both charges.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath test evidence, arguing that the required breath tests were not administered "as soon as practicable" as required by the Criminal Code.

The accused identified three periods of alleged delay: from initial stop to departure for headquarters, during booking-in procedures, and during preparation and administration of breath tests.

The court examined the reasonableness of police conduct throughout the entire chain of events and found that the police acted reasonably under the circumstances.

The application to exclude the breath test evidence was dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He brought a Charter application alleging violations of section 10(b) rights (right to retain and instruct counsel without delay) on three occasions: during the roadside detention before the screening device arrived, during detention at the police station, and during the breathalyzer procedure.

The court found no realistic opportunity to consult counsel during the roadside detention period and that the police made reasonable efforts to contact the accused's chosen counsel at the station.

The accused was offered legal aid assistance but refused.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion to stay a charge of care and control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, alleging a violation of her right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay was approximately 27 months over two trial dates.

The court analyzed the delay in two phases and concluded that institutional delay fell within the Morin guidelines.

The applicant experienced some prejudice from the delay, but not sufficiently significant to warrant a stay.

The motion was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre‑trial motion seeking to admit two prior consistent statements made by the complainant in a prosecution for sexual assault and sexual exploitation.

The court reviewed the general rule that prior consistent statements are inadmissible for the truth of their contents but may be admitted for limited purposes such as narrative context or credibility assessment.

One statement to the complainant’s mother was conceded as admissible to explain how the allegations came to the attention of police.

The court also admitted a statement made to the complainant’s boyfriend, finding it necessary to explain the circumstances of disclosure and to avoid undermining the credibility of the witness whose observations prompted the disclosure.

The statements were admissible only in general terms and not for the truth of their contents.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle, arguing insufficiency of the trial judge’s reasons, lack of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, improper reversal of the Charter onus, and an impermissible inference from the accused’s failure to testify.

The court granted leave to argue sufficiency of reasons despite it not being raised in the notice of appeal.

Applying the framework from Sheppard and R.E.M., the court held that the trial judge’s reasons adequately explained the conviction and permitted meaningful appellate review.

The court further held that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the appellant’s condition and circumstances, and that the trial judge did not improperly shift the Charter burden or draw an impermissible inference from the accused’s silence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with assault and assault with a weapon in connection with domestic violence allegations.

The accused brought a motion to stay the charges based on an alleged violation of his Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from charge to the motion hearing was 557 days (approximately 18.5 months).

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the delay, allocating it among inherent delay, Crown and institutional delay, and defence delay.

The court found that the combined Crown and institutional delay fell within the Morin guidelines and that there was a strong societal interest in completing the serious matter.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to comply with a roadside demand to provide a breath sample under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding an unequivocal refusal, provided insufficient reasons, and failed to properly consider the impact of an officer’s misstatement regarding the right to counsel, the absence of a final warning, and the short time between demand and arrest.

The court held that refusal may be inferred from conduct and statements and that the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant constructively refused by repeatedly delaying and refusing to comply.

The officer’s incorrect statement about the right to counsel did not materially mislead the appellant and did not undermine the clarity of the demand.

The appellate court found the trial judge’s reasons sufficient and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, arguing the trial judge erred in finding no breach of the right to counsel and in concluding that breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The court held that the trial judge did not commit a palpable and overriding error in determining there was no breach of the appellant’s right to counsel during the roadside delay awaiting an Approved Screening Device.

However, the court found the trial judge’s reasons regarding whether the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable were insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review.

This deficiency constituted an error of law.

A new trial was ordered.