Patrick Berchmans Keaney

The Crown brought a pre‑trial motion seeking to admit two prior consistent statements made by the complainant in a prosecution for sexual assault and sexual exploitation.

The court reviewed the general rule that prior consistent statements are inadmissible for the truth of their contents but may be admitted for limited purposes such as narrative context or credibility assessment.

One statement to the complainant’s mother was conceded as admissible to explain how the allegations came to the attention of police.

The court also admitted a statement made to the complainant’s boyfriend, finding it necessary to explain the circumstances of disclosure and to avoid undermining the credibility of the witness whose observations prompted the disclosure.

The statements were admissible only in general terms and not for the truth of their contents.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle, arguing insufficiency of the trial judge’s reasons, lack of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, improper reversal of the Charter onus, and an impermissible inference from the accused’s failure to testify.

The court granted leave to argue sufficiency of reasons despite it not being raised in the notice of appeal.

Applying the framework from Sheppard and R.E.M., the court held that the trial judge’s reasons adequately explained the conviction and permitted meaningful appellate review.

The court further held that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the appellant’s condition and circumstances, and that the trial judge did not improperly shift the Charter burden or draw an impermissible inference from the accused’s silence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm after striking a pedestrian in a parking lot.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to conduct a meaningful analysis of the mens rea component of the offence, specifically whether his conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge conflated the actus reus and mens rea by inferring fault simply from the dangerous manner of driving without assessing all circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with assault and assault with a weapon in connection with domestic violence allegations.

The accused brought a motion to stay the charges based on an alleged violation of his Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from charge to the motion hearing was 557 days (approximately 18.5 months).

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the delay, allocating it among inherent delay, Crown and institutional delay, and defence delay.

The court found that the combined Crown and institutional delay fell within the Morin guidelines and that there was a strong societal interest in completing the serious matter.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, charged with robbery, brought applications for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the date of arrest to the anticipated end of trial was 25 months.

The court attributed significant portions of the delay to the Crown, including late disclosure of a 9-1-1 audio recording and failure to expedite scheduling.

Finding that the delay was unreasonable and that the accused suffered real prejudice from restrictive bail conditions, the court granted the applications and stayed the charges.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to comply with a roadside demand to provide a breath sample under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding an unequivocal refusal, provided insufficient reasons, and failed to properly consider the impact of an officer’s misstatement regarding the right to counsel, the absence of a final warning, and the short time between demand and arrest.

The court held that refusal may be inferred from conduct and statements and that the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant constructively refused by repeatedly delaying and refusing to comply.

The officer’s incorrect statement about the right to counsel did not materially mislead the appellant and did not undermine the clarity of the demand.

The appellate court found the trial judge’s reasons sufficient and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, arguing the trial judge erred in finding no breach of the right to counsel and in concluding that breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The court held that the trial judge did not commit a palpable and overriding error in determining there was no breach of the appellant’s right to counsel during the roadside delay awaiting an Approved Screening Device.

However, the court found the trial judge’s reasons regarding whether the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable were insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review.

This deficiency constituted an error of law.

A new trial was ordered.