Stephanie Esther Baker

The accused was charged with multiple offences arising from two separate incidents of domestic violence against an intimate partner.

The first incident on August 1, 2019 involved assault causing bodily harm, and the second on November 11, 2019 involved assault with a weapon.

The accused also faced charges for breaching probation conditions and a recognizance.

The court found the accused guilty of assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon, breach of probation, and breach of recognizance.

The court acquitted the accused of harassment and uttering threats, finding insufficient evidence on those charges.

The decision emphasizes the pattern of controlling and aggressive behaviour by the accused toward the complainant.

The accused, John Leach, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code of Canada, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and a new plan of care as a material change in circumstances.

The accused, a 44-year-old with no criminal record, faced over 20 charges including domestic offences, human trafficking allegations, and weapons offences.

The court conducted a bail hearing de novo.

While the primary ground for detention was not met, the court found that detention was necessary on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The proposed plan of care was deemed insufficient to mitigate the risk of reoffending, particularly given the serious nature of the firearms charges (possession of non-hunting weapons, including a sawed-off shotgun and pistols, after a police standoff).

The court also considered the impact of COVID-19 but found it did not substantially alter the analysis in this specific case.

The application for release was dismissed.

A youth was charged with sexual assault under the Criminal Code following an incident at a party on January 30, 2016.

The complainant, a 15-year-old girl, consumed significant quantities of alcohol and had no memory of the alleged assault.

The Crown relied primarily on the testimony of a witness who claimed to have found the accused and complainant together in a locked bedroom.

The defence challenged the reliability of the witness testimony and argued there was insufficient evidence to prove the essential elements of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the witness evidence to be fraught with inconsistencies, contradictions between trial testimony and police statements, and significant reliability concerns.

The court acquitted the accused, finding the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that force was applied or that any force took place in circumstances of a sexual nature.

The accused, Ghyslain Hebert, was charged with sexual assault.

The central issue was consent to sexual intercourse with the complainant, R.B. The court found the complainant's evidence credible, noting the accused's "boundary issues" and the complainant's actions being driven by fear rather than consent.

The defense of honest but mistaken belief in consent was rejected as the accused's actions (tearing clothing, telling the complainant to "shut up") were inconsistent with a reasonable belief in consent.

The Crown proved both the physical and mental elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to a finding of guilty.

The applicant sought certiorari quashing a preliminary inquiry judge’s decision committing him to stand trial on charges of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The applicant argued that the committal was made in the absence of evidence on an essential element of the offence, namely the purpose of trafficking.

The reviewing court applied the test from R. v. Arcuri and held that the preliminary inquiry judge’s role is limited to determining whether there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict of guilty.

Considering the circumstantial evidence collectively, including the drugs found, cash in multiple locations, and a brief vehicle interaction consistent with drug transactions, the court found that a reasonable inference of trafficking could be drawn.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on multiple sexual offence charges involving a child complainant.

The appeal court held that, read in the context of the evidence and submissions, the trial judge's reasons did not disclose why he found a conflict of equally credible evidence or how he arrived at reasonable doubt.

Applying the governing framework on sufficiency of reasons and the principles associated with W. (D.), the court found the verdict could not be meaningfully reviewed on appeal.

The acquittal was set aside and the matter remitted for a new trial, but convictions were not substituted.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's order staying charges against the respondents due to unreasonable delay under s 11(b) of the Charter.

The Crown argued the trial judge made several errors in attributing delay and assessing prejudice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's analysis consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Godin.

The Court emphasized deference to the trial judge's knowledge of local court practices and her strong factual findings regarding the prejudice suffered by the respondents over the 25-month delay.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, uttering a death threat, and attempting to choke the complainant during the assault.

The case turned largely on credibility, with conflicting accounts provided by the complainant and the accused.

Applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.), the court assessed plausibility, corroborative circumstances, injuries, and contemporaneous text messages.

The court found the complainant’s testimony credible and consistent with the surrounding evidence, including physical injuries and her immediate distress following the incident.

The accused’s evidence was rejected as implausible and inconsistent.

The Crown proved all three offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused, charged with robbery, brought applications for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the date of arrest to the anticipated end of trial was 25 months.

The court attributed significant portions of the delay to the Crown, including late disclosure of a 9-1-1 audio recording and failure to expedite scheduling.

Finding that the delay was unreasonable and that the accused suffered real prejudice from restrictive bail conditions, the court granted the applications and stayed the charges.