Kenrick William Abbott

The self-represented offender brought an application for a mistrial and to introduce fresh evidence prior to a dangerous offender hearing, alleging non-disclosure and ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The court dismissed the fresh evidence application, finding no reliable evidentiary record of non-disclosure.

The court also dismissed the mistrial application, ruling it lacked jurisdiction post-verdict to declare a mistrial and finding no evidence of a miscarriage of justice.

The self-represented offender applied to adjourn his dangerous offender hearing pending the outcome of several appeals at the Court of Appeal, including an appeal of the predicate offence conviction.

The court dismissed the application, noting that the appeals had not yet been scheduled and that further delaying the sentencing hearing, which had already been delayed for over seven years, would cause unacceptable fragmentation of the criminal proceedings and prejudice the public interest.

The Crown brought an application to appoint amicus curiae for the self-represented accused in a complex dangerous offender proceeding.

The accused opposed the appointment, asserting his right to represent himself.

The court granted the application, finding that the complexity of the dangerous offender hearing, the potential for an indeterminate sentence, and the need to ensure a fair trial necessitated the appointment of amicus to assist the court with legal issues and cross-examination of the complainant.

The Crown applied to have Jean-Claude Breton declared a dangerous offender under section 753 of the Criminal Code, seeking an indeterminate sentence.

Breton had been convicted of eight charges, including forcible confinement and assault.

The court considered psychiatric evidence, including reports from Dr. Treena Wilkie and testimony from Dr. Amil Joseph, as well as Breton's extensive criminal history and institutional conduct.

Despite defence arguments regarding treatability and the unreliability of some assessments, the court found that Breton met the criteria for a dangerous offender, exhibiting a pattern of repetitive and aggressive behaviour and a high likelihood of future violent recidivism.

The court concluded there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser sentence would adequately protect the public.

The accused brought a pre-trial application alleging violations of his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, seeking to exclude drug evidence.

The police had entered a residence without a warrant after arresting the primary tenant outside, fearing the accused would destroy evidence inside.

The court dismissed the s. 8 claim regarding the search of the residence without a hearing, as the accused failed to establish a privacy interest.

The court further held that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry under s. 11(7) of the CDSA, and that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused after observing him attempting to flush drugs down a toilet.

The application was dismissed.

At a preliminary inquiry, the defendant was charged with attempted murder under s. 239 of the Criminal Code for an alleged assault on the complainant on August 18, 2014.

The Crown presented evidence of a brutal beating with a wooden board that resulted in serious injuries including a lacerated liver, broken ribs, broken arm, and head injury requiring a three-and-a-half-week coma.

The defendant did not testify but called one witness.

The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the specific intent to kill required for attempted murder, or whether the evidence only supported a committal on the lesser charge of aggravated assault under s. 268 of the Criminal Code.

The accused, charged with robbery, brought applications for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the date of arrest to the anticipated end of trial was 25 months.

The court attributed significant portions of the delay to the Crown, including late disclosure of a 9-1-1 audio recording and failure to expedite scheduling.

Finding that the delay was unreasonable and that the accused suffered real prejudice from restrictive bail conditions, the court granted the applications and stayed the charges.

The accused was charged with criminal harassment contrary to section 264(2)(b) of the Criminal Code for conduct occurring between March 5 and March 27, 2011.

The complainant, his estranged wife, alleged that the accused repeatedly communicated with her directly and indirectly, causing her to fear for her safety.

The conduct included emails, appearing near her vehicle, leaving a broken guitar with a note on her car, and arranging for flowers to be delivered.

The court found that while the accused engaged in the conduct alleged, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew or was reckless as to whether the complainant was harassed, or that her fear was reasonable in all the circumstances.

The accused was acquitted of the criminal harassment charge but ordered to enter into a recognizance to keep the peace and not communicate with the complainant.