Alyssa Caverson

The accused, A.S., brought an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to admit evidence of the complainant's sexual activity at trial.

The Crown largely agreed with the admissibility of communications containing explicit sexual references but objected to specific paragraphs referencing the complainant's sexual activity with her husband.

The court found that the evidence, including the contested paragraphs, was relevant to issues such as consent, the complainant's state of mind, motive to fabricate, and credibility, and was necessary for the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The court concluded that the evidence had significant probative value not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, and was not tendered to support the "twin myths." The application was granted in its entirety, allowing all requested evidence to be admitted without redaction.

The accused, Ghyslain Hebert, was charged with sexual assault.

The central issue was consent to sexual intercourse with the complainant, R.B. The court found the complainant's evidence credible, noting the accused's "boundary issues" and the complainant's actions being driven by fear rather than consent.

The defense of honest but mistaken belief in consent was rejected as the accused's actions (tearing clothing, telling the complainant to "shut up") were inconsistent with a reasonable belief in consent.

The Crown proved both the physical and mental elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to a finding of guilty.

The appellant was substantially successful on appeal and sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant $7,500 in costs on a partial indemnity basis for the appeal.

However, the court declined to alter the costs order from the underlying motion to strike, finding that the respondent remained the successful party on that motion.

The appellant tenant sued the respondent landlord for damages arising from two sewer backups, alleging breach of lease, negligence, and misrepresentation.

The motion judge struck most claims, finding they were barred by the lease's covenant to insure.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the covenant to insure barred the negligence and breach of contract claims, it was not plain and obvious that it or the 'entire agreement' clause barred the negligent misrepresentation claim.

The Court also allowed the tenant's claim that the landlord was estopped from relying on the covenant to insure for the second backup to proceed.

A commercial tenant alleged that it was induced to enter into a lease by fraudulent misrepresentations about the condition of the landlord’s plumbing system and later suffered business losses after repeated sewer back‑ups.

The landlord moved under Rule 21 to strike the amended statement of claim based on contractual provisions including a covenant requiring the tenant to insure against losses such as flooding and sewer backup, and a release executed after the first incident.

The court held that the covenant to insure barred the tenant’s claims for breach of contract, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation because the tenant had assumed the risk of those losses through insurance.

However, it was not plain and obvious that the covenant or the release barred a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation inducing the lease, particularly given allegations of economic duress surrounding the release.

The tenant was granted leave to amend its pleading to advance only the fraudulent misrepresentation claim.