David Gregory Rodgers

An offender was found guilty of second-degree murder of an Indigenous victim.

The Crown sought a 13-year parole ineligibility period, citing the offender's extensive criminal record, history of violence, and non-compliance with court orders.

The defence requested the minimum 10-year parole ineligibility, emphasizing the impact of colonialism and intergenerational trauma on the offender, as detailed in a Gladue report, and his struggles with substance abuse and mental health.

The court considered the sentencing principles, including denunciation and deterrence, balanced against the Gladue factors, and the jury's recommendation.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for 10 years, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition, DNA order, and a communication prohibition.

Mr. Paucsek was charged with assault with a weapon and aggravated assault after stabbing his wife with a samurai sword.

He claimed self-defence, arguing his wife violently attacked him.

The Crown conceded the wife used force but argued Mr. Paucsek's response was unreasonable.

The court applied the objective reasonableness test under s. 34 of the Criminal Code, considering factors like the parties' physical capabilities, history of violence, and the accused's retreat.

The court found the wife's testimony unreliable and accepted Mr. Paucsek's account of being attacked.

Given the prior severe beating and the current assault, the court found Mr. Paucsek's use of the sword, though unusual, was a reasonable and proportional response in the circumstances.

Mr. Paucsek was found not guilty.

The defendants, Mark and Isabelle Cunningham, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging an infringement of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court addressed whether the delay period should commence from an earlier Provincial Offences Act (POA) prosecution or a later criminal prosecution, and how to calculate net delay, accounting for defence delay, the COVID-19 pandemic, and a mistrial.

The court found that the RTA offence was not quasi-criminal, thus s. 11(b) did not apply to that initial period.

It also determined that pre-charge delay for Isabelle Cunningham was not relevant under s. 11(b).

After deducting periods of defence-attributable delay and exceptional circumstances (COVID-19 and mistrial), the court concluded that the remaining delay was below the presumptive ceiling.

Consequently, the applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.

The defendants, charged with obstruction of justice and uttering a forged document, sought to relitigate pre-trial Charter applications previously dismissed by Justice Gomery and had subpoenaed a provincial prosecutor and an assistant Crown attorney.

The Crown moved to quash the subpoenas.

The court dismissed the defendants' request to relitigate the Charter applications, finding no new evidence or arguments to rebut the presumption of binding prior rulings under s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court also quashed the subpoenas, determining the witnesses' testimony was not relevant or material to the s. 11(b) Charter application.

Miguel Ngabirano pleaded guilty to kidnapping, robbery, and use of an imitation firearm.

The court considered general sentencing principles, aggravating and mitigating factors, and the collateral immigration consequences of a custodial sentence.

The Crown sought 15 months custody, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence or a shorter custodial term.

The court imposed a sentence of three months custody followed by 21 months less a day conditional sentence and three years probation, specifically tailoring the custodial portion to be less than six months to preserve the offender's right to appeal a potential removal order to Burundi, an unstable country.

The Crown applied to revoke Sam Tsega's bail pending sentencing after he was found guilty of manslaughter.

Tsega was initially charged with murder but tried for manslaughter, meaning his bail was not automatically revoked post-conviction under s. 523(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought revocation based on the tertiary ground (maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice) under s. 515(10) of the Code.

The court reviewed five principles for post-conviction bail revocation, emphasizing that the Crown must generally present new facts.

The court found that the circumstances relied upon by the Crown were known when Tsega was initially granted bail by the Court of Appeal in 2017, and no new facts or breaches of conditions were alleged.

Considering the relatively short delay until sentencing and potential difficulties for Tsega to prepare while incarcerated due to the pandemic, the court concluded that the Crown had not shown that immediate incarceration was required to maintain public confidence.

The application to revoke bail was denied.

The accused, J.P., was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault involving a five-year-old complainant.

The case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused being found naked in bed with the complainant whose shorts and underwear were down, inculpatory statements by the accused, and DNA evidence.

The court found the mother's evidence unreliable due to inconsistencies and emotional state, and the expert DNA evidence inconclusive regarding the source and timing of semen.

The accused's testimony was disbelieved due to inconsistencies.

However, considering the evidence as a whole, the court was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt, leading to dismissal of all charges.

The accused was charged with five offences arising from a motor vehicle collision on June 29, 2017: impaired operation, operation with blood alcohol over 80 mg/100 mL, dangerous operation, and two counts of breach of probation.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The trial was conducted as a blended voir dire and trial.

The court heard evidence from three Crown witnesses and received expert toxicology evidence by affidavit.

The defence filed an affidavit regarding lawyer contact procedures.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation and dangerous operation, but acquitted on the over 80 charge due to uncertainty regarding the timing of the accident and concerns about bolus drinking assumptions in the expert evidence.

The breach of probation charges were to be resolved separately.

The defendant applied under section 276.1 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of evidence regarding prior sexual activity with the complainant in a sexual assault case.

The defendant sought to introduce evidence of an ongoing consensual sexual relationship with the complainant before and after the alleged assault, as well as evidence regarding the lack of explicit verbal consent in their prior encounters.

The court granted the application in part, permitting evidence of the nature and duration of the relationship but prohibiting evidence of specific sexual acts and the absence of explicit verbal consent in prior encounters.