Julie I. Bourgeois

The accused, Anessa Katapatuk, pleaded guilty to simple assault and uttering threats.

The Crown sought 12 months jail, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court, applying Gladue and Ipeelee principles, found that a conditional discharge with 12 months probation was appropriate, emphasizing the accused's reduced moral blameworthiness due to her traumatic Indigenous background and systemic factors.

The judge concluded that incarceration would be contrary to the public interest and the rehabilitative goals of sentencing for an Indigenous offender.

The accused, David Séguin, pleaded guilty to five charges, including impaired driving (drug/alcohol), dangerous driving, failure to stop at the scene of an accident, and driving while prohibited.

These offenses occurred on two separate dates (August 17, 2021, and December 29, 2021).

The Crown sought a global sentence of four years, while the defence proposed time served plus probation.

The court considered aggravating factors, notably the accused's extensive criminal record for similar driving offenses (11th impaired driving conviction, 2nd dangerous driving, 3rd prohibited driving), and the fact that offenses were committed while prohibited and on bail for a prior similar offense.

Attenuating factors included the guilty plea and successful completion of addiction therapy.

The court imposed a global sentence of approximately 36.5 months of imprisonment, a 10-year driving prohibition, and $900 in victim fine surcharges.

The accused was found guilty of dangerous driving, possession of loaded prohibited firearms, and possession of marijuana.

This decision concerns her sentencing.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of three to four years, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court considered the seriousness of the offences, the accused's personal circumstances, including systemic racism and a difficult upbringing, and the principles of sentencing, particularly denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.

Applying the principles from R. c.

Morris regarding systemic racism and the availability of conditional sentences, the court imposed a global conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by 18 months of probation, a lifetime weapons prohibition for certain items and 10 years for others, a DNA order, and forfeiture of seized items.

A fine and driving suspension were also imposed for the Highway Traffic Act offence.

The accused, William Manroe, was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, S.G., testified that she awoke to the accused sexually assaulting her after inviting him to sleep in her bed.

She attempted to stop the assault by turning away and later by masturbating him, but he persisted and eventually penetrated her.

The accused claimed the sexual activity was consensual, initiated by the complainant.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding it incredible and internally incompatible.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence as credible and reliable, concluding that she did not consent to any sexual activity.

The accused was found guilty.

Marcus Gil pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the large quantity of fentanyl (276.2 grams), its proximity to a children's daycare, and the offender's criminal history and breach of probation.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea, expressed remorse, young age (22), and strong family support.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount objectives due to the ongoing opioid crisis and the destructive effects of fentanyl.

A total sentence of eight and a half years imprisonment was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in six years and ten months to serve.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime firearm prohibition, a DNA order, and forfeiture of seized items.

The accused, Hassan Bdeir, brought a motion at the start of his sexual assault trial to have witnesses testify without face coverings or masks, arguing that facial expressions are crucial for credibility assessment and his right to make full answer and defence.

The court dismissed the motion, ruling that witnesses testifying in person must wear masks, citing the precautionary principle in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and balancing the accused's constitutional rights against public health and safety.

The Crown brought an application pursuant to section 601(2) of the Criminal Code to amend counts 1 and 2 at the close of its case.

Count 1 sought to replace the named victim (Special Constable Condie) with a group (Carleton University security personnel) and to include both descriptions of the offence under section 264.1(1)(a) (threat to cause death or bodily harm).

Count 2 sought similar amendments, replacing Special Constable Larochelle with Carleton University security personnel and adding the complete wording of the offence.

The defence objected on grounds of timing and irreparable prejudice.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the timing was appropriate under the Criminal Code, that the defence had prior notice, and that no irreparable prejudice would result from the amendments.

The accused was charged with six counts: possession of child pornography (s. 163.1(4)), accessing child pornography (s. 163.1(4.1)), breach of undertaking conditions, and voyeurism (s. 162(1)(c)).

The Crown proved that the accused possessed and accessed child pornography on two seized cellphones through forensic analysis demonstrating the accused's exclusive use of the devices, intentional downloading and accessing of images from a specific website, and knowledge of the material's nature.

The accused was also found guilty of surreptitiously recording a child at a shopping mall food court for a sexual purpose, breaching her reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court rejected the defence arguments regarding data integrity, accidental downloading, and the definition of child pornography.

The accused was charged with two offences: operating a motor vehicle with impaired ability due to alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and failing or refusing to provide breath samples for analysis in an approved screening device contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms based on an alleged delay between the officer's formation of reasonable suspicion and the demand for a breath sample.

The court rejected the Charter application and found the accused guilty on both counts based on evidence of impairment and failure to comply with the breath demand.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing that his rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) were infringed and that evidence should be excluded under section 24(2).

The court found no breach of section 10(a) but found a three-minute delay in informing the accused of his right to counsel constituted a breach of section 10(b).

However, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) analysis, finding the breach was not serious enough to exclude the evidence.

The court also addressed the availability of the presumption of identity under transitional provisions and found it remained available for legacy cases.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant pleaded guilty to three counts: operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs, carrying a loaded restricted firearm without reasonable precautions for safety, and possessing a loaded restricted firearm without a licence or registration certificate.

The Crown sought a global sentence of three years imprisonment.

The defence sought a conditional sentence or, alternatively, pre-trial custody credit and a fine.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 30 months on the firearm possession charge, nine months on the careless handling charge, and a $1,500 fine with a 12-month driving prohibition on the impaired driving charge.

The court also imposed a lifetime firearm prohibition for prohibited firearms and a 10-year prohibition for other firearms, a DNA order, and forfeiture of the handgun.

The accused was convicted of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (not for commercial purpose) contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and breaching a probation order contrary to s. 733.1 of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing hearing considered the accused's personal background, including ADHD and learning disabilities diagnosed at a young age, exposure to racism, family instability, and addiction issues.

The court rejected the Crown's submission that the accused's incomplete participation in rehabilitation programming should be treated as an aggravating factor.

The court imposed a sentence of 7 months imprisonment (with credit for pre-trial custody and residential programming already served), followed by 18 months of probation with conditions including drug counselling, school attendance or employment, and community service.

A mandatory lifetime firearms prohibition was imposed.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm under s. 249(3) of the Criminal Code after colliding with another vehicle at a red light on Ogilvie Road in Ottawa.

The collision caused the victim to suffer a stroke requiring emergency neurosurgery.

The court applied the modified objective test from R. v. Beatty and R. v. Roy, finding that while the accused's failure to stop at the red light constituted civil negligence, it did not constitute a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the same circumstances.

The court found the accused not guilty, emphasizing that the momentary lapse of attention caused by an obstructed street sign, combined with the accused's unfamiliarity with the area, did not rise to the level of criminal culpability.

The accused pleaded guilty to making available child pornography videos, possessing child pornography videos, and breaching a probation order.

The court imposed a global sentence of three years imprisonment.

The sentencing decision emphasizes the serious nature of child pornography offences, the vulnerability of child victims, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The court rejected the accused's explanation that he accessed the material to understand his own victimization, finding it demonstrated a lack of insight into the harm caused to children.

The court considered the accused's difficult background, including exposure to sexual abuse and family dysfunction, but found these factors did not significantly mitigate the serious nature of the offences.

A 19-year-old first-time offender pleaded guilty to nine counts: six counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking in various Schedule I substances (cocaine, crack cocaine, MDA, MDMA, fentanyl, and heroin), one count of possession of proceeds of crime ($1,070), and two counts of possession of firearms without a licence.

Police discovered approximately $300,000 worth of drugs, two loaded firearms (a Tikka rifle and a 12-gauge shotgun), and various weapons in the accused's apartment.

The court imposed a sentence of four years and nine months (57 months), less 21 days of pre-trial custody credited at 1.5 days, resulting in 56 months to be served concurrently on the drug and proceeds counts, with 30 months concurrent on the firearms counts.

The court balanced serious aggravating factors (nature and quantity of drugs, loaded firearms, commercial enterprise) against significant mitigating factors (youth, lack of criminal record, guilty plea, strong family support, and rehabilitation prospects).

The accused, a personal support worker at a long-term care facility, pleaded guilty to assaulting an elderly dementia patient in a wheelchair.

The assault was captured on video surveillance and consisted of 11 strikes to the victim's face during a diaper change.

The victim suffered no physical injuries but the family experienced significant emotional trauma.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent jail sentence with 18 months' probation, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles.

The court rejected a conditional sentence order, finding that incarceration was necessary to protect vulnerable populations and deter similar conduct by caregivers.

The accused pleaded guilty to fraud under $5,000 contrary to s.380(b) of the Criminal Code, covering fraudulent transactions totalling $47,045.41 committed over approximately six years (January 2010 to April 2016) against a developmentally disabled adult.

The accused, employed as a support worker, exploited her position of trust to make 871 fraudulent transactions using the victim's debit card for personal luxuries while the victim lived in poverty.

The Crown sought 15 months incarceration plus probation and a 10-year prohibition order.

Defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court imposed 12 months incarceration followed by 24 months probation, finding that while full restitution was paid and mitigating factors existed, the egregious breach of trust, vulnerability of the victim, and need for general deterrence and denunciation required a custodial sentence.

The offender was convicted after trial of sexual assault contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code for forcing his cellmate to perform fellatio on him without consent on three occasions while incarcerated at the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre on November 5, 2015.

The Crown sought a sentence of three and a half to four years penitentiary, while the defence sought 12 to 18 months jail.

The court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment, finding that denunciation and specific and general deterrence were paramount.

The court rejected the defence argument for enhanced credit beyond the statutory 1.5 to 1 ratio under Section 719(3.1), finding that the offender's segregation was a result of his own criminal conduct and that he had refused alternatives offered by the institution.

The accused was convicted of being a party to the offence of intentionally discharging a handgun while reckless as to life or safety, breaching firearm prohibition orders, careless storage and use of firearms, pointing a firearm, possession of firearms without a licence, occupying a motor vehicle with a firearm, and possession of loaded prohibited firearms.

The accused was the driver in a drive-by shooting incident on Bank Street in Ottawa.

The Crown sought a sentence of 8 years, while the defence sought the mandatory minimum of 5 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7.5 years, taking into account sentencing principles of deterrence, denunciation, and retribution, while considering rehabilitation and the accused's role as the driver rather than the actual shooter.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application challenging delay in prosecution following his conviction on multiple counts related to a drive-by shooting.

The total delay from arrest to trial was 28 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown relied on exceptional circumstances, including the discrete event of defence counsel's appointment to the bench and the case's inherent complexity.

The court found the delay reasonable based on the discrete event exception, case complexity, and transitional considerations reflecting the parties' reliance on the previous Morin framework.