Andrew L. Buttazzoni

The Children's Aid Society sought secure treatment for a child, A.A. The child's counsel brought a motion to strike references to Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) information from the Society's application, arguing it was improperly obtained and disclosed without a youth court order.

The Society contended the information was admissible as it was obtained during their guardianship and was part of their child protection records.

The court ruled that while child protection records are not YCJA records, Section 129 of the YCJA broadly prohibits disclosure of YCJA-related information by anyone who gained access to it, even if recorded in their own notes, without a youth court order.

The court granted the motion in part, ordering the striking and sealing of the original application and allowing refiling without the excised YCJA-identifying information.

The applicant, a long-term foster parent who had cared for a child with severe physical and cognitive disabilities for nearly 15 years under a Customary Care Agreement, sought a status review application after the child was removed from his care by a child protection agency.

The respondent agency argued the court lacked jurisdiction because there was no existing protection order affecting the child's status.

The court found it had no jurisdiction to hear the status review application, as the child was not in extended society care under a valid protection order.

The application was dismissed without prejudice, with the court noting concerns about the characterization of the removal as a "change in placement" rather than an apprehension, but finding the applicant could pursue alternative remedies under custody and access provisions.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 9, seeking exclusion of breath sample analysis.

The court found that the officer had both subjective and objective reasonable grounds to believe the Approved Screening Device (ASD) was functioning properly and that the "fail" reading provided sufficient grounds for an Intoxilyzer demand.

The court rejected the Charter application and admitted the breath analysis results.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of his rights under sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the accused was unlawfully arrested without reasonable and probable grounds, subjected to unlawful breath and blood demands, and that his privacy interests were violated during hospital detention.

The court also found that the search warrant used to seize the blood sample was invalid due to material non-disclosure and misleading information in the Information to Obtain.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these breaches, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with assault and assault with a weapon in connection with domestic violence allegations.

The accused brought a motion to stay the charges based on an alleged violation of his Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from charge to the motion hearing was 557 days (approximately 18.5 months).

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the delay, allocating it among inherent delay, Crown and institutional delay, and defence delay.

The court found that the combined Crown and institutional delay fell within the Morin guidelines and that there was a strong societal interest in completing the serious matter.

The application for a stay was dismissed.