Suzanne Y. Côté

The applicant mother sought an order under s. 164 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act to commit the child to a secure treatment program.

The child, who suffers from severe mental health disorders and complex medical needs, had been engaging in continuous self-harming and aggressive behaviours while hospitalized.

The court found that all six statutory criteria for secure treatment were met, relying on expert medical testimony that the child required a long-term therapeutic process in a secure setting.

The application was granted, and the child was committed to the secure treatment program for 90 days.

The Children's Aid Society sought secure treatment for a child, A.A. The child's counsel brought a motion to strike references to Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) information from the Society's application, arguing it was improperly obtained and disclosed without a youth court order.

The Society contended the information was admissible as it was obtained during their guardianship and was part of their child protection records.

The court ruled that while child protection records are not YCJA records, Section 129 of the YCJA broadly prohibits disclosure of YCJA-related information by anyone who gained access to it, even if recorded in their own notes, without a youth court order.

The court granted the motion in part, ordering the striking and sealing of the original application and allowing refiling without the excised YCJA-identifying information.

The mother was successful in dismissing the father's motion to vary his child support obligations retroactively.

The mother sought costs of $12,975.84, while the father argued each party should bear their own costs.

The court found the mother was presumptively entitled to partial indemnity costs and that her claimed amounts were reasonable, especially compared to the father's legal fees.

The court ordered the father to pay $8,500 in costs, enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as a child support order.

The court considered costs following a 16-day trial concerning custody of and access to a child.

Both parties sought full recovery of costs, alleging unreasonable behaviour by the other.

The court found divided success, noting the applicant was successful in obtaining generous unsupervised access, while the respondent had greater success on ancillary issues.

Neither party's offer to settle was found to be more favourable than the final order.

Despite some unreasonable behaviour from both sides and the applicant's failure to comply with disclosure, the court was not persuaded that the applicant's actions constituted bad faith under Rule 24(8) of the Family Law Rules.

Considering all factors, including the divided success and the proportionality of costs, the court determined that no costs should be awarded to either party.

In this family law trial, the court determined custody, access, travel, restraining order, and police-enforcement issues for a young child amid serious but unproven allegations of sexual and physical abuse by the father.

Applying the best-interests analysis under the Divorce Act and Children's Law Reform Act, the court found significant credibility problems on all sides, held the abuse allegations were not proven on a balance of probabilities, and assessed the future risk of harm as low.

Sole custody was granted to the mother because of conflict, prior domestic violence, and a power imbalance, while the father received a graduated unsupervised access regime rather than supervised access.

The court also imposed significant travel-document restrictions on the father, granted a restraining order, and declined to include a police enforcement clause.

The children's aid society sought an order making a two-year-old child a Crown Ward.

The child was apprehended when the mother, who was fifteen at the time of birth, left her father's home and moved to a shelter.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the mother's lack of parenting skills, failure to attend parenting programs, and the grandfather's interference with medical and childcare advice.

Finding no viable less intrusive options, the court ordered Crown Wardship without access for the mother or grandfather, concluding that access would not be meaningful or beneficial and could impair future adoption opportunities.

The applicant sought full recovery costs after an interim order granted her significant child and spousal support, a non-depletion order, and other relief, based on the respondent's significantly higher income.

The respondent argued for divided success.

The court found the applicant more successful on major issues, particularly spousal support and the non-depletion order, and awarded partial indemnity costs of $2,500 to the applicant, considering the importance and complexity of issues, parties' behaviour, and counsel's reasonable rates.

This endorsement addresses the costs for a motion to change, where the respondent, Donna Walts, was deemed the successful party.

The court found her offer to settle was substantially similar to the final court order.

While the applicant, Ronald Walts, was not found unreasonable in bringing the motion, the respondent was awarded partial recovery costs to the date of the order and full costs thereafter, fixed at $13,250.00, all inclusive.

The applicant wife sought interim child and spousal support, determination of Section 7 expenses, a non-depletion order against the husband's corporation, and financial disclosure.

The respondent husband disputed support quantum, sought income imputation for the wife, and opposed the non-depletion order.

The court determined the husband's income for support, declined to impute income to the wife, set ongoing child and spousal support, specified Section 7 expenses, issued a non-depletion order for $500,000 against the husband's corporation, and ordered specific financial disclosure.

Retroactive support claims were reserved for trial.

The Ottawa Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that the child, PZ, was in need of protection and an order for Crown wardship without parental access.

The biological mother, L.K.M.-B., opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that genuine issues for trial remained regarding the mother's parental capacity, her support network, and the evolving nature of her relationship with the child, particularly given her young age at the child's birth and recent efforts to prioritize the child's needs.

The court also noted concerns about the reliance on hearsay evidence by the applicant.

The applicant, Mr. Walts, brought a motion to change spousal support, seeking a reduction in payments.

He argued that a material change in circumstances had occurred because the respondent, Ms. Walts, had reached age 55 and could now access her Locked-in Retirement Savings Plan (LRSP), and because his own income had decreased due to voluntary retirement and subsequent part-time employment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Mr. Walts had not established a material change in circumstances.

The court imputed his pre-retirement income and determined it was not objectively reasonable to require Ms. Walts to draw on her LRSP at that time, considering her disability, future needs, and market fluctuations affecting her retirement assets.

A review date for spousal support was set for when Mr. Walts reaches age 65.

This costs endorsement followed a motion to change spousal support.

The applicant initially sought termination of spousal support, later amending his position to seek variation.

The respondent sought to maintain support, obtain life insurance, and a retroactive cost-of-living adjustment.

The court varied spousal support, rejected the life insurance request, and granted a partial retroactive cost-of-living adjustment.

In determining costs, the court considered the parties' success, the reasonableness of their positions and settlement offers, and their financial circumstances.

The applicant was deemed the more successful party overall, despite his initial unreasonable position, and was awarded net costs of $4,220.83, with enforcement stayed.

The applicant brought a motion to change seeking to terminate or reduce his spousal support obligations, arguing that his retirement and poor health constituted a material change in circumstances.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing the retirement was voluntary to avoid support, and sought retroactive indexation of support and life insurance to secure it.

The court found that the applicant's retirement was reasonable given his age and medical conditions, constituting a material change.

Spousal support was reduced based on the parties' current incomes.

The court also granted the respondent's request for retroactive indexation back to October 2011, but dismissed her request for life insurance.

The applicant sought supplementary directions on the calculation of retroactive spousal support arrears following a prior decision overriding portions of a separation agreement under the Miglin framework.

The dispute turned on whether arrears should be calculated by netting child support and section 7 payments against spousal support, or by accounting for the tax consequences of a retroactive lump-sum spousal support award.

The court held that Ontario and appellate authority required consideration of the tax ramifications of retroactive lump-sum support awards tied to the SSAG.

It rejected the applicant's proposed netting approach and fixed arrears at $14,363.02 less a 37% reduction for the payor's average marginal tax rate, for net arrears of $9,048.70.

The applicant sought retroactive and ongoing spousal support pursuant to the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines despite a separation agreement that effectively eliminated further support through a net disposable income formula tied to child support payments.

Applying the two‑stage test in Miglin v. Miglin, the court examined both the circumstances surrounding the agreement’s formation and whether its continued enforcement remained consistent with the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The court concluded that enforcement of the agreement would be unconscionable because it failed to recognize the applicant’s compensatory and non‑compensatory entitlement arising from career sacrifices, primary caregiving responsibilities, and health issues.

The court found that the parties could not reasonably have contemplated that the agreement would eliminate ongoing spousal support once the respondent regained stable employment.

The court therefore overrode the relevant provisions of the separation agreement and fixed mid‑range SSAG spousal support retroactive to March 1, 2012, while extending the termination date of support.

Motion by a respondent to vary prior family law orders respecting parenting time, child support, and spousal support.

The court rejected both parties’ proposed parenting schedules due to impracticality arising from the father’s atypical work schedule and instead crafted a schedule tied to the father’s extended periods off work.

Child support was ordered to be calculated using the offset method due to variable parenting time.

The court found a material change in circumstances arising from changes in the parties’ incomes and terminated spousal support effective December 1, 2012.

The father was also ordered to reimburse half of specified daycare expenses and maintain a previously agreed equalization payment.

Following a family law motion to change, the successful responding party sought costs on a full recovery basis.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Court Rules and the discretionary costs power under the Courts of Justice Act.

While the successful party was presumptively entitled to costs, the court adjusted the claim to exclude fees associated with a case conference where costs had not been reserved and to remove duplication arising from a change of counsel.

Considering the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct, offers to settle, and proportionality, the court fixed partial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded in a reduced amount reflecting fairness and the circumstances of the litigation.

The applicant brought a motion to change a divorce order incorporating a separation agreement, seeking termination of spousal support upon his retirement and a division of the respondent’s pension based on alleged non-disclosure.

The court held that the pension had been disclosed during negotiations and that the applicant knowingly waived any claim to it; therefore the domestic contract could not be set aside under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The applicant also failed to establish a material change in circumstances under s. 17 of the Divorce Act.

His planned retirement at age 55 was voluntary, foreseeable at the time of the agreement, and unsupported by medical evidence showing inability to work.

The court found termination of support would significantly reduce the respondent’s income and therefore dismissed the motion.

The Crown applied for an assessment order under section 672.12(3) of the Criminal Code to determine whether the accused was not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder at the time of committing uttering threat offences and breaches of probation.

The accused opposed the application, arguing the Crown had not met the statutory threshold of "reasonable grounds to doubt" criminal responsibility.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the evidence, including Dr. Komer's assessment and the accused's history of mental illness, pointed to a potential inability to understand the nature and consequences of his actions or that they were wrong as contemplated by section 16 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown applied pursuant to section 672.12(3)(b) of the Criminal Code for an order to assess whether the accused was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD).

The accused had been ordered to undergo a fitness assessment, which found him fit to stand trial but raised concerns about potential NCRMD.

The court dismissed the Crown's application as premature, holding that the Crown may only raise the NCRMD issue at two specific junctures: when the accused puts mental capacity into issue, or after a finding of guilt but before conviction.

The application was brought before trial, violating the principles established in R. v. Swain.