Suzanne Y. Côté

The Children's Aid Society sought secure treatment for a child, A.A. The child's counsel brought a motion to strike references to Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) information from the Society's application, arguing it was improperly obtained and disclosed without a youth court order.

The Society contended the information was admissible as it was obtained during their guardianship and was part of their child protection records.

The court ruled that while child protection records are not YCJA records, Section 129 of the YCJA broadly prohibits disclosure of YCJA-related information by anyone who gained access to it, even if recorded in their own notes, without a youth court order.

The court granted the motion in part, ordering the striking and sealing of the original application and allowing refiling without the excised YCJA-identifying information.

The court considered costs following a 16-day trial concerning custody of and access to a child.

Both parties sought full recovery of costs, alleging unreasonable behaviour by the other.

The court found divided success, noting the applicant was successful in obtaining generous unsupervised access, while the respondent had greater success on ancillary issues.

Neither party's offer to settle was found to be more favourable than the final order.

Despite some unreasonable behaviour from both sides and the applicant's failure to comply with disclosure, the court was not persuaded that the applicant's actions constituted bad faith under Rule 24(8) of the Family Law Rules.

Considering all factors, including the divided success and the proportionality of costs, the court determined that no costs should be awarded to either party.

The children's aid society sought an order making a two-year-old child a Crown Ward.

The child was apprehended when the mother, who was fifteen at the time of birth, left her father's home and moved to a shelter.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the mother's lack of parenting skills, failure to attend parenting programs, and the grandfather's interference with medical and childcare advice.

Finding no viable less intrusive options, the court ordered Crown Wardship without access for the mother or grandfather, concluding that access would not be meaningful or beneficial and could impair future adoption opportunities.

The applicant sought full recovery costs after an interim order granted her significant child and spousal support, a non-depletion order, and other relief, based on the respondent's significantly higher income.

The respondent argued for divided success.

The court found the applicant more successful on major issues, particularly spousal support and the non-depletion order, and awarded partial indemnity costs of $2,500 to the applicant, considering the importance and complexity of issues, parties' behaviour, and counsel's reasonable rates.

This endorsement addresses the costs for a motion to change, where the respondent, Donna Walts, was deemed the successful party.

The court found her offer to settle was substantially similar to the final court order.

While the applicant, Ronald Walts, was not found unreasonable in bringing the motion, the respondent was awarded partial recovery costs to the date of the order and full costs thereafter, fixed at $13,250.00, all inclusive.

The applicant wife sought interim child and spousal support, determination of Section 7 expenses, a non-depletion order against the husband's corporation, and financial disclosure.

The respondent husband disputed support quantum, sought income imputation for the wife, and opposed the non-depletion order.

The court determined the husband's income for support, declined to impute income to the wife, set ongoing child and spousal support, specified Section 7 expenses, issued a non-depletion order for $500,000 against the husband's corporation, and ordered specific financial disclosure.

Retroactive support claims were reserved for trial.

The Ottawa Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that the child, PZ, was in need of protection and an order for Crown wardship without parental access.

The biological mother, L.K.M.-B., opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that genuine issues for trial remained regarding the mother's parental capacity, her support network, and the evolving nature of her relationship with the child, particularly given her young age at the child's birth and recent efforts to prioritize the child's needs.

The court also noted concerns about the reliance on hearsay evidence by the applicant.

The applicant, Mr. Walts, brought a motion to change spousal support, seeking a reduction in payments.

He argued that a material change in circumstances had occurred because the respondent, Ms. Walts, had reached age 55 and could now access her Locked-in Retirement Savings Plan (LRSP), and because his own income had decreased due to voluntary retirement and subsequent part-time employment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Mr. Walts had not established a material change in circumstances.

The court imputed his pre-retirement income and determined it was not objectively reasonable to require Ms. Walts to draw on her LRSP at that time, considering her disability, future needs, and market fluctuations affecting her retirement assets.

A review date for spousal support was set for when Mr. Walts reaches age 65.

Following a family law motion to change, the successful responding party sought costs on a full recovery basis.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Court Rules and the discretionary costs power under the Courts of Justice Act.

While the successful party was presumptively entitled to costs, the court adjusted the claim to exclude fees associated with a case conference where costs had not been reserved and to remove duplication arising from a change of counsel.

Considering the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct, offers to settle, and proportionality, the court fixed partial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded in a reduced amount reflecting fairness and the circumstances of the litigation.

The applicant brought a motion to change a divorce order incorporating a separation agreement, seeking termination of spousal support upon his retirement and a division of the respondent’s pension based on alleged non-disclosure.

The court held that the pension had been disclosed during negotiations and that the applicant knowingly waived any claim to it; therefore the domestic contract could not be set aside under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The applicant also failed to establish a material change in circumstances under s. 17 of the Divorce Act.

His planned retirement at age 55 was voluntary, foreseeable at the time of the agreement, and unsupported by medical evidence showing inability to work.

The court found termination of support would significantly reduce the respondent’s income and therefore dismissed the motion.