Gregory A. Ste. Marie

The respondent, Ross McHardy, brought a motion to terminate his spousal support obligation to the applicant, Cheryl McHardy, citing his retirement, age (over 70), and significant health issues after 16 years of payments following a 29.5-year cohabitation.

The applicant acknowledged the material change but sought continued reduced support.

The court found that Mr. McHardy's retirement constituted a material change in circumstances.

Considering the parties' comparable financial circumstances, including their incomes and roughly similar net worth, and Mr. McHardy's age and health, the court terminated the spousal support obligation effective January 1, 2021, concluding that Ms. McHardy had not demonstrated a need for continued support and that compensation had been achieved.

The moving party, Jefferey Dunn, sought to vary a 2011 child support order and reduce arrears, arguing a material change in circumstances due to lower income and the responding party's delay in enforcement.

The court dismissed his motion, finding he failed to prove a material change, particularly regarding his imputed income, and that he was aware or wilfully ignorant of the original order.

The court also found the responding party's delay in enforcement reasonable given the moving party's erratic and threatening behaviour.

Following a successful motion for disclosure brought by the respondent, both parties made written submissions on costs.

The respondent sought $5,900 on a partial indemnity basis, while the applicant sought $12,704.45, claiming divided success.

The court found the respondent was substantially successful on the motion and awarded her costs of $5,000 on a partial indemnity basis, noting the applicant's counsel's time spent was excessive.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following motions brought by both parties in a family law matter.

The Court found the applicant, Mrs. Syed, to be the successful party on major issues, including the imputation of the respondent Mr. Syed's income at $600,000 per annum and the determination of child and spousal support.

While there was divided success on some minor issues, and Mr. Syed made some concessions, his unreasonable behaviour regarding financial disclosure significantly impacted the costs incurred by Mrs. Syed.

The Court declined to award full-recovery costs, finding Mr. Syed's conduct did not meet the high threshold for bad faith, but awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The applicant sought spousal support and division of family property.

A motion for interim relief was brought, which was settled by consent order on October 18, 2016, reserving costs.

The applicant sought $27,500 in costs, while the respondent argued no costs should be awarded or that the amount was exaggerated.

The court found the applicant's motion reasonable and necessary due to the respondent's conduct and insufficient disclosure of income.

The applicant's offer to settle also entitled her to full indemnity costs from August 24, 2016.

The court awarded the applicant $27,500 in costs.

This endorsement addresses the costs for a motion to change, where the respondent, Donna Walts, was deemed the successful party.

The court found her offer to settle was substantially similar to the final court order.

While the applicant, Ronald Walts, was not found unreasonable in bringing the motion, the respondent was awarded partial recovery costs to the date of the order and full costs thereafter, fixed at $13,250.00, all inclusive.

The applicant, Mr. Walts, brought a motion to change spousal support, seeking a reduction in payments.

He argued that a material change in circumstances had occurred because the respondent, Ms. Walts, had reached age 55 and could now access her Locked-in Retirement Savings Plan (LRSP), and because his own income had decreased due to voluntary retirement and subsequent part-time employment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Mr. Walts had not established a material change in circumstances.

The court imputed his pre-retirement income and determined it was not objectively reasonable to require Ms. Walts to draw on her LRSP at that time, considering her disability, future needs, and market fluctuations affecting her retirement assets.

A review date for spousal support was set for when Mr. Walts reaches age 65.

The applicant father brought a motion to vary a prior order by declaring that an adult daughter with disabilities was no longer a “child of the marriage” under the Divorce Act and by terminating the parties’ obligation to maintain life insurance for her benefit.

The evidence showed that the adult child had lived independently since 2003, maintained full-time employment with benefits, managed her own finances and accumulated substantial savings.

The court held that despite ongoing disabilities and some parental assistance, the adult child had successfully withdrawn from parental charge.

This constituted a material change in circumstances under s. 17 of the Divorce Act and s. 14 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court declared that the adult child was no longer a child of the marriage and vacated the life insurance obligation securing support.

Following a family law motion, both parties sought costs.

The court considered that the respondent was largely successful on the primary contested issue concerning the continued involvement of the Office of the Children's Lawyer, as the applicant’s request to remove or replace that office was rejected.

However, the applicant had made a reasonable offer to settle addressing several issues that were ultimately resolved without court determination, while the respondent made no offer.

Balancing these factors under the Family Law Rules and the policy encouraging settlement offers, the court determined that neither party should receive costs.

The decision reflects the discretionary balancing of litigation success against settlement conduct in family proceedings.

The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) registered liens against a taxpayer's properties for unpaid taxes.

The taxpayer's wife and sister subsequently claimed prior unregistered equitable interests in the properties (constructive trust and equitable mortgages).

The CRA brought a motion to determine if its registered liens took priority over these unregistered equitable interests.

The motion judge held that the CRA's liens did not constitute a 'charge' under the Land Titles Act and therefore did not take priority.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the CRA's appeal, confirming that the statutory liens do not arise from a voluntary act of the landowner and thus do not gain the priority afforded to a registered charge under the Land Titles Act.

The court determined whether agreed costs arising from a successful Rule 21 determination of a question of law should be payable immediately or in the cause pending appeal.

The underlying motion, brought by the tax authority under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, sought determination of a legal issue prior to trial.

The court held that the Rule 21 proceeding constituted a discrete proceeding capable of disposing of the action and therefore warranted immediate costs consequences.

The successful parties were awarded agreed partial indemnity costs payable forthwith rather than in the cause.

The existence of a pending appeal did not justify delaying payment of the costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay 12 years of child support arrears under a separation agreement.

He argued the trial judge erred in enforcing the agreement, calculating his rental income, and failing to apply the Child Support Guidelines.

The Court of Appeal upheld the arrears, finding the separation agreement remained enforceable and the claim was not barred by the Limitations Act.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, reducing the attribution of gross rental income from 70 percent to 40 percent, and ordering that post-secondary education expenses be allocated in accordance with s. 7 of the Guidelines.