Francis Amenyo Aheto-Tsegah

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to place the child, K, in the custody of her paternal great-grandmother, D.L., pursuant to section 102(1) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA).

K's parents, E.K. (Mother) and O.K. (Father), opposed the motion, while D.L. supported it.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding that the parents had not made significant progress to address protection concerns since a previous order, and that it was in K's best interest to remain in D.L.'s care, ensuring a safe, stable environment and continuity of care, especially given K's serious medical needs.

The applicant father sought orders for decision-making, medical decision-making, and full-time Montessori pre-school attendance for their two-and-a-half-year-old daughter, Maeve, citing her severe neutropenia and the mother's alleged indifference and communication failures.

The respondent mother argued the motion was premature, pending a report from the Ontario Children’s Lawyer, and that there was insufficient medical evidence to support the father's claims or compel changes to the status quo.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding he had not met the high onus to vary an interim order, as the evidence did not clearly and unequivocally establish that the current arrangements placed the child's welfare at risk.

The court also ordered case management due to the high conflict between the parties and awarded costs to the mother.

The Applicant Father brought a motion seeking interim orders regarding parenting time, decision-making, and communication, and to strike portions of the Respondent Mother’s pleadings for failing to provide court-ordered disclosure.

The Mother filed a cross-motion addressing similar issues.

The court granted the Father increased parenting time, ordered the Mother to provide full consent for the child's developmental services, and compelled her to complete outstanding financial disclosure.

The Mother was also ordered to pay the Father's costs due to her non-compliance with disclosure orders.

The court declined to grant sole decision-making responsibility to either parent, leaving that issue for a future trial.

The father brought a motion to compel the mother to return to Ottawa with their two children or, alternatively, for primary residence.

The mother had relocated to Smith Falls without notice or consent, citing domestic violence and safety concerns.

The mother brought a cross-motion to remain in Smith Falls and reduce the father's parenting time.

The court found the mother was justified in moving without notice due to credible threats to her safety, exempting her from the notice requirements under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court ordered that the children's primary residence remain with the mother in Smith Falls, but dismissed the mother's request to reduce the father's weekend parenting time, maintaining the status quo.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion prior to a case conference seeking sole decision-making power, primary parenting responsibility, and supervised access for the respondent mother.

The father alleged that the mother's parents, who temporarily moved in with her, created an unsafe environment due to alcohol-fueled arguments and a recent homicide investigation at their property.

The court dismissed the motion, noting the lack of corroborating evidence from child protection agencies and finding that the conflicting affidavit evidence did not establish an emergency or that the requested orders were in the child's best interests.

In a child protection proceeding, the child protection issues were resolved on a final basis with the children remaining in the primary care of the father and a prohibition of contact between the children and the mother's spouse.

The father sought costs against the mother for delay and unreasonable conduct.

The court found that the mother's conduct in pursuing contact between the children and her spouse, who had a violent criminal history, was unreasonable and not in the children's best interests.

The court awarded costs of $7,800 to the father.

The children's aid society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of an infant who presented at the hospital with unexplained brain and retinal haemorrhages.

The parents claimed the injuries resulted from a fall off a couch, but medical professionals suspected non-accidental trauma.

The society apprehended the child after the parents failed to maintain a 24-hour supervision safety plan.

The court applied the unexplained injury principle and found reasonable grounds to believe the child was at risk of harm and could not be adequately protected by a supervision order.

The child was ordered to remain in the society's care pending trial, with access granted to the parents.

The respondent father brought a motion to change the parenting arrangement, which was largely dismissed.

The applicant mother sought costs of $25,000.

The court found the mother was the successful party and that the father's conduct in bringing the motion without proper evidence and ignoring a previous order was unreasonable.

The court awarded the mother $20,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, balancing the father's unreasonable conduct against his limited financial resources.

Mr. Debassige, a member of the M’Chigeeng First Nation, sought to vary a parenting schedule to increase the children's connection to their First Nation's heritage, including changing their primary residence to Ottawa, having them attend school in Ottawa, and specific time for Indigenous events.

Ms. Wakeling opposed these claims, arguing there was no material change in circumstances and that she supported the children's heritage.

Ms. Wakeling also sought an order preventing Mr. Debassige from bringing further variation motions without leave.

The court found no material change warranting a change in primary residence or school attendance.

However, it did find a material change regarding the ongoing conflict over Aboriginal Day and powwow schedules, which warranted a variation to provide clarity.

The court varied the schedule to include specific provisions for these events and dental appointments, emphasizing the children's best interests and connection to their heritage.

Ms. Wakeling's request to prevent Mr. Debassige from bringing further motions was dismissed.

The court considered costs following a 16-day trial concerning custody of and access to a child.

Both parties sought full recovery of costs, alleging unreasonable behaviour by the other.

The court found divided success, noting the applicant was successful in obtaining generous unsupervised access, while the respondent had greater success on ancillary issues.

Neither party's offer to settle was found to be more favourable than the final order.

Despite some unreasonable behaviour from both sides and the applicant's failure to comply with disclosure, the court was not persuaded that the applicant's actions constituted bad faith under Rule 24(8) of the Family Law Rules.

Considering all factors, including the divided success and the proportionality of costs, the court determined that no costs should be awarded to either party.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of two children who had been apprehended due to allegations of physical and emotional harm.

The parents admitted to using physical discipline but argued it was reasonable and permitted under the Criminal Code.

The court found credible and trustworthy evidence that the children were at risk of likely harm if returned home, citing a history of corporal punishment using objects and emotional abuse.

The court concluded that a supervision order would not adequately protect the children given the parents' lack of insight and refusal to cooperate with the Society.

The motion for temporary care and custody was granted.

In this family law trial, the court determined custody, access, travel, restraining order, and police-enforcement issues for a young child amid serious but unproven allegations of sexual and physical abuse by the father.

Applying the best-interests analysis under the Divorce Act and Children's Law Reform Act, the court found significant credibility problems on all sides, held the abuse allegations were not proven on a balance of probabilities, and assessed the future risk of harm as low.

Sole custody was granted to the mother because of conflict, prior domestic violence, and a power imbalance, while the father received a graduated unsupervised access regime rather than supervised access.

The court also imposed significant travel-document restrictions on the father, granted a restraining order, and declined to include a police enforcement clause.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her claim against the respondent for vicarious liability.

The appellant was assaulted by a snowblower operator contracted by the respondent.

The trial judge found that the operator was an independent contractor and that his intentional tortious actions were outside the scope of his contract.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual determinations regarding the independent contractor relationship and the lack of vicarious liability.

In a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, the court determined whether an infant should remain with the mother or be placed with the father.

The evidence included a long history of child protection involvement concerning the mother, prior custody losses of several children, concerns about relationships exposing children to risk, and a parenting capacity assessment identifying ongoing issues with insight and responsibility.

The father had no protection history and had been caring for the child for approximately one year with support from extended family, during which the child was thriving.

The court found the child to be in need of protection while in the mother’s care pursuant to s. 37(2)(b)(g) of the Child and Family Services Act.

Considering the best interests factors under s. 37(3), the court ordered custody to the father without supervision and granted the mother conditional access.

A father sought leave under s. 65.1(4) and (5) of the Child and Family Services Act to bring an application to review the status of his children, who had been crown wards placed for several years with their maternal grandparents.

The court considered the governing criteria for leave, including bona fides, whether unusual circumstances justified reopening a permanent placement, whether the review would advance the purposes of the Act, and whether the applicant established a prima facie case.

The evidence showed the children were thriving in a stable and nurturing home with their grandparents and maintained a positive relationship with their father.

The father failed to demonstrate unusual circumstances or provide a compelling basis to disturb the children’s long‑standing placement.

The motion for leave was dismissed.

Child protection disposition following an amended status review under the Child and Family Services Act concerning two young children with significant behavioural and developmental challenges.

The applicant society sought Crown wardship without access for the purpose of adoption and a restraining order against the father.

Both parents opposed the application and proposed separate plans of care, including supervision orders and kinship placement with maternal grandparents.

The court found the children continued to be in need of protection and that neither parent’s plan provided sufficient stability, parenting capacity, or ability to work cooperatively with required support services.

Crown wardship for the purpose of adoption was ordered and a restraining order was issued restricting the father’s contact with the society, foster parents, and future adoptive parents.

The respondents requested to strike parts of a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal in the awarding of training contracts.

The Tribunal found that a prior settlement and release barred the applicant from pursuing claims related to a 2002 contract renewal.

Furthermore, the Tribunal struck the reprisal allegation because the applicant's prior civil action did not raise human rights issues, meaning the alleged reprisal was not for enforcing rights under the Human Rights Code.

The remainder of the application was permitted to proceed to mediation.