Dawn Velda Dubois

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought an application regarding the child F.R.D. The respondent father, J.C., brought a motion for access to the child, which was opposed by the Society, the mother (C.D.), and Michipicoten First Nation.

The court dismissed the father's motion for access, finding that his extensive criminal history, including sexual offenses against his own children and the mother, and his lack of insight, meant that granting access was not in the child's best interests, despite the principle of maximum contact.

The Children's Aid Society sought secure treatment for a child, A.A. The child's counsel brought a motion to strike references to Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) information from the Society's application, arguing it was improperly obtained and disclosed without a youth court order.

The Society contended the information was admissible as it was obtained during their guardianship and was part of their child protection records.

The court ruled that while child protection records are not YCJA records, Section 129 of the YCJA broadly prohibits disclosure of YCJA-related information by anyone who gained access to it, even if recorded in their own notes, without a youth court order.

The court granted the motion in part, ordering the striking and sealing of the original application and allowing refiling without the excised YCJA-identifying information.

A child protection case involving two young children apprehended at birth due to parental neglect, domestic violence, and unsafe living conditions.

The Children's Aid Society sought a Crown wardship order.

The parents opposed this, with the mother seeking return of the children under supervision and the father proposing placement with his mother and sister.

Following a mini-trial to address genuine issues regarding parenting capacity, the court granted Crown wardship without access to the biological parents, finding that the children's best interests were served by permanent placement for adoption with their foster parents.

This is a child protection case under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving two young children apprehended at birth due to deplorable living conditions, lack of prenatal care, domestic violence, and parental capacity concerns.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship with no access for adoption purposes.

The parents sought return of the children to the mother's care, with the father seeking alternative return to his care.

The court found that a parenting capacity assessment report constituted a genuine issue requiring trial determination and ordered a "mini-trial" under Rule 16(6.2) of the Family Law Rules to hear evidence from the psychologist and the parents before deciding whether a full trial was necessary.

The Children's Aid Society (CAS) appealed a motion judge's decision denying summary judgment for Crown wardship of a child, A.G. The child was apprehended after parents C.G. and D.S. left her at the hospital with a friend, G., under a private custody agreement, having concealed the pregnancy from the CAS.

The appeal court found the motion judge erred in deeming G.'s party status and the custody agreement's validity as triable issues.

The court declared the private custody agreement a nullity, as it was designed to circumvent the CAS's statutory duty to protect children.

Consequently, the child was found to be in need of protection due to the parents' unavailability and failure to make adequate provision for her care.

The appeal was allowed, and the case was remitted for an expedited trial on disposition, but the request for immediate Crown wardship without access was denied.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking Crown wardship without access for a child (B.C.) who had been in care for nearly two years.

The child was apprehended shortly after birth due to parental inadequacy.

The respondent father had substance abuse issues, anger management problems, spousal violence history, and criminal involvement, and had lost contact with the child over a year prior.

The respondent mother failed to address her parenting deficiencies and repeatedly engaged in relationships with abusive men despite counseling opportunities.

The court found no genuine issue for trial and granted the Society's motion for Crown wardship without access, with a view to adoption.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order for Crown wardship without access to a child in need of protection.

The respondent parents opposed the motion and requested that the matter proceed to trial.

The court found that the parents had unresolved issues including substance abuse, domestic violence, and parenting inadequacy.

The child had been in care for over 400 days and was thriving with foster parents.

The court granted the motion for Crown wardship without access, finding that no genuine or material issues remained to be resolved at trial and that the child's best interests required immediate placement for adoption with the foster parents.

The father appealed a child protection order declaring the child a Crown ward with no access and sought placement of the child with proposed caregivers under a supervision order.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the caregivers’ ability to care for the child and erred in concluding that continued parental access was not in the child’s best interests.

Applying the standards of correctness and palpable and overriding error, the court found ample evidence supporting the trial judge’s findings, including concerns about the proposed caregiver’s health, past parenting difficulties, and the risks associated with parental access.

The trial judge properly weighed the competing placement proposals and emphasized the importance of permanency for a child who had been in care since birth.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused brought an application under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code seeking production of third‑party records from a psychologist and a children’s aid society relating to the complainant in a sexual assault prosecution.

The defence argued the records were likely relevant to credibility and reliability because the complainant had stated he sometimes “made things up” or misinterpreted events.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Mills and R. v. O’Connor governing production of confidential records and held that the threshold of likely relevance was met for the psychologist’s records.

Those records were ordered produced to the judge for review for the period April 1, 2009 to July 24, 2013.

Although the evidentiary basis for production of children’s aid society records was not otherwise established, the court ordered production of the records already obtained by police because they had been improperly requested and reviewed during the investigation.

Following dismissal of a child protection appeal, the successful respondent sought a full recovery costs award.

The court considered Family Law Rule 24, which removes the usual presumption that a successful party receives costs in child protection matters.

Applying discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and by analogy to Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court evaluated factors including the result, settlement offers, importance of the issues, conduct of the parties, and policy considerations related to the statutory mandate of children’s aid societies.

Although the respondent had succeeded and had made a written settlement offer, the court found the society acted reasonably in pursuing the appeal given the seriousness of the allegations and prior judicial comments that the appeal raised serious issues.

In light of the policy that child protection authorities should not be discouraged from pursuing their statutory mandate, the court declined to award costs.