James E. Weppler

The Children's Aid Society sought leave to withdraw its child protection application concerning two children.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) and the father opposed the withdrawal, arguing that live protection concerns and parental alienation issues required adjudication.

The court dismissed the society's motion, finding that the children's best interests required a full factual record and timely determination of outstanding issues.

The court ordered that the child protection application and the parents' Children's Law Reform Act application proceed to a combined trial, ensuring OCL involvement and preserving the option of continued society involvement.

This case concerns a temporary care and custody motion for an Indigenous child, L.L.C., who had been residing with a maternal aunt under a Customary Care Agreement (CCA).

Following the CCA's termination, the child was placed with the father.

Kina Gbezhgomi Child and Family Services initiated a protection application seeking a protection finding and a supervision order with the father.

The court determined that the federal An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families (Federal Act) applies and has paramountcy over provincial legislation (CYFSA), altering the method of analysis for Indigenous children's placements.

Applying the Federal Act's national standards, the court found it was in the child's best interests to be placed with the father, without the need for society supervision, as there were no protection concerns.

The court also ordered continued contact with the maternal aunt and suggested the matter be transitioned to a Children's Law Reform Act application.

The mother brought a status review application seeking to terminate an extended society care order and have the child returned to her care.

The child's foster mother brought a motion to be added as a party to the proceeding, along with her husband and daughter.

The mother and the children's aid society opposed the motion.

The court noted several procedural and jurisdictional irregularities in the proceeding, including the society's lack of jurisdiction over the non-Indigenous child.

The court found that the foster parents met the criteria for party status under the Family Law Rules and indicated it would add the foster mother as a party respondent, but temporarily stayed the proceeding until the mother obtained the required leave of the court to bring the status review application.

The accused was tried on a three-count indictment alleging sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault involving a child complainant during a sleepover at the home of the complainant's friend.

The central issue was credibility and reliability, with the defence asserting that the incident never occurred and that the complainant had never slept over at the residence.

Applying the burden of proof principles in Lifchus and the credibility framework in W.(D.), the court accepted the complainant’s detailed evidence, rejected the denials of the accused and supporting defence witnesses, and found that the corroborative evidence supported the complainant on key surrounding circumstances.

Findings of guilt were entered on all three counts.

The applicant Society sought a temporary care and custody order to keep the 10-year-old child in care, while the respondent mother and First Nation requested the child be returned to the mother under supervision.

The child had significant behavioural challenges and trauma from past abuse, and had been placed in specialized foster homes far from her community, which prevented her from accessing necessary trauma therapy.

The court found that the mother had taken significant steps to secure housing and services, and that keeping the child in care without proper therapy was causing harm.

The court concluded there were no reasonable grounds to believe the child was likely to suffer harm if returned to the mother, and ordered the child returned subject to a supervision order with conditions.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexual interference of a person under 16 years of age and three counts of breaching recognizance conditions.

The offences occurred over more than two years, during which the accused engaged in repeated sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old girl, resulting in two pregnancies.

The court imposed a sentence of 50 months imprisonment, with credit for pre-sentence custody, along with mandatory DNA, SOIRA, and firearms prohibition orders, and discretionary section 161 orders restricting contact with the victim and employment involving minors.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault for stabbing the victim in the neck on August 14, 2017.

The accused pleaded not guilty and raised the defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder under section 16 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown and defence agreed on the facts of the assault.

The defence called psychiatric evidence from two experts: Dr. Beth Eayrs and Dr. Maxym Choptiany.

At the initial hearing, the court found the evidence insufficient to establish the defence.

The hearing was reopened to allow for additional evidence.

At the reopened hearing, the court found that although the accused suffered from schizophrenia and likely experienced psychotic symptoms at the time of the offence, the evidence demonstrated that the accused had the capacity to know his actions were morally wrong and proceeded to commit the act anyway.

The court found the accused criminally responsible and convicted him of aggravated assault.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant alleged the accused touched her breasts and vagina while she was passed out after a night of heavy drinking.

The accused denied the contact.

The court found the complainant credible but unreliable due to her intoxication and contradictions from other witnesses regarding key details like sleeping arrangements and interactions.

DNA evidence on the complainant's bra matched the accused, but the defense proposed an innocent transfer through profuse slobbering during repeated social interactions over the drunken weekend.

While finding the innocent transfer implausible, the court could not definitively rule it out, leading to reasonable doubt.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused pleaded not guilty to aggravated assault after stabbing the victim in the neck.

The defence argued the accused was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code, calling a forensic psychiatrist who testified the accused was suffering from a psychotic episode and command hallucinations.

The court rejected the expert evidence, finding it relied on inadequate information and that the accused's statements to police demonstrated he had the capacity to know the act was morally wrong.

The accused was found criminally responsible and guilty of aggravated assault.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault for stabbing the victim in the neck on August 14, 2017.

The accused pleaded not guilty and raised the defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder under section 16 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown and defence agreed on the facts of the assault.

The defence called expert psychiatric evidence from Dr. Beth Eayrs, a forensic psychiatrist, who opined that the accused was suffering from schizophrenia and was psychotic at the time of the offence, acting under command hallucinations.

The court found that while the accused may have been experiencing auditory hallucinations, the evidence demonstrated that he had the capacity to know his conduct was morally wrong.

The court rejected the defence and found the accused criminally responsible for aggravated assault.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple offences including assault causing bodily harm against his former partner, mischief, theft under $5,000, failure to comply with a probation order, and failure to appear in court.

The sentencing involved consideration of Gladue factors as the accused is a member of the M'Chigeeng First Nation.

The court imposed an 8-month conditional sentence with strict conditions including house arrest for the first four months, followed by a curfew, and 16 months of probation.

The sentence emphasized denunciation and deterrence while considering the accused's rehabilitative potential and Aboriginal heritage.

During a jury trial for attempted murder, the trial judge ruled on two issues regarding jury instructions.

First, the judge held that the Crown's cross-examination of the accused regarding his failure to mention self-defence to police violated his right to silence.

The judge instructed the jury to disregard that portion of the cross-examination.

Second, the judge ruled that because the indictment for attempted murder was drafted simpliciter, there were no lesser and included offences to leave with the jury.

The accused was charged with knowingly using a forged document (a cheque) as if it were genuine, contrary to section 368(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and with theft of a cheque belonging to the Sheguiandah First Nation, contrary to section 334(b) of the Criminal Code.

The cheque in question was for $4,730 and was allegedly signed by the Band's Chief and a Band Counsellor.

The court found that while the cheque was stolen and the signatures were forged, it could not determine who committed the theft.

However, the court convicted the accused of knowingly using the forged document because she deposited the cheque into her account without any evidence of entitlement to the funds, and no Band representatives could establish any legitimate claim by her to the money.

The appellant, Adaline Garita Tejado, brought a motion for a stay of an Ontario Court of Justice order dated August 5, 2016, which directed the return of her two children to Webbwood, their former habitual residence.

The appellant had left Webbwood with the children due to domestic violence and was residing in a women's shelter in Mindemoya.

The motion also sought leave to appeal the August 5, 2016 order.

The court granted the stay of the order to return the children, finding that the appeal raised serious questions, the appellant and children would suffer irreparable harm if the stay was not granted, and the balance of convenience favored the appellant, particularly considering the children's best interests and the contradictory nature of the original order which granted the mother interim custody but required the children to return to a home she could not safely inhabit.

The applicant, convicted of sexual interference involving his 14-year-old stepdaughter, challenged the 45-day mandatory minimum sentence under s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing it was grossly disproportionate.

The court considered the gravity of the offence, mitigating factors including the applicant's Indigenous status and community recommendations for restorative justice, and aggravating factors such as the breach of trust.

The court found the appropriate sentence for the applicant was 90 days intermittent imprisonment.

The constitutional challenge to the 45-day mandatory minimum was dismissed, as the court found it was not grossly disproportionate, even when considering reasonable hypotheticals.

During a jury trial for sexual assault, the accused brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on one count, arguing there was no evidence he was awake during the alleged touching and therefore no proof of the required intent.

The complainant testified that she awoke to find a hand under her clothing but could not say whether the accused was awake.

Applying the test from Monteleone, the court held that where there is any admissible evidence that could support a conviction if believed by a properly instructed jury, a directed verdict is inappropriate.

The conflicting evidence regarding whether the accused was awake raised a factual issue for the jury to resolve.

The motion for a directed verdict was therefore dismissed.

During a jury trial for sexual offences, the Crown sought an order permitting the complainant to testify outside the courtroom using a screen or CCTV pursuant to s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code.

The complainant, who had recently turned 18, stated she felt uncomfortable testifying in the presence of the accused and defence counsel and believed remote testimony would allow her to speak more freely.

The court assessed whether the requested accommodation would facilitate a full and candid account while ensuring fairness to the accused and avoiding prejudice before the jury.

The judge concluded the complainant’s fears were not well-founded but determined that use of a screen in the courtroom would balance privacy interests and trial fairness.

The complainant was permitted to testify using a screen, accompanied by jury instructions that the procedure was not indicative of guilt.

The Crown brought a motion under s. 486.1(2) of the Criminal Code seeking an order permitting the complainant, who had recently turned 18, to testify by closed-circuit television with a support person.

The court considered whether an evidentiary basis existed to exercise its discretion to allow testimonial aids for a witness over 18.

While acknowledging the stress of testifying and reviewing a counselling report suggesting the measure could assist, the court found the evidentiary record insufficient and noted concerns about courtroom logistics and the fairness implications of a jury trial.

The court adjourned the application to the commencement of trial so that the complainant could be questioned and an informed determination made regarding the use of testimonial aids.

The Crown brought a motion under s. 486.1(2) of the Criminal Code seeking to permit the complainant, who was slightly over the age of 18, to testify by closed-circuit television with the assistance of a support person.

The Crown argued the accommodation would reduce trauma and facilitate a full and candid account of events.

The court held that for adult witnesses the provision is discretionary and requires an adequate evidentiary basis.

The evidence filed was of limited assistance and the court expressed concerns regarding courtroom logistics and potential prejudice in a jury trial.

The court adjourned the application to the commencement of the trial to permit further inquiry before determining whether testimonial aids would be appropriate.

In a prosecution for sexual assault and sexual touching involving a minor complainant, the court ruled on pre‑trial evidentiary motions.

The defence sought permission under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross‑examine the complainant about viewing pornographic material on a computer, while the Crown sought to introduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct by the accused to show grooming and provide narrative context.

The court held that accessing pornography did not constitute “sexual activity” within the meaning of s. 276 and permitted limited questioning on that topic, subject to sanitizing explicit titles and appropriate jury instructions addressing the twin myths.

The Crown’s application to introduce evidence of teasing, sexual comments, and provision of alcohol as discreditable conduct was dismissed because the probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice and lacked a sufficient nexus to the charged offences.