Deanne Fowler

This endorsement determines costs following a prior motion.

The court granted the respondent's request for late filing of cost submissions, finding no prejudice to the applicant.

The applicant sought full recovery of costs ($12,509.67) as the successful party on the underlying motion and due to an offer to settle.

The respondent sought full recovery of his costs ($14,128.25), arguing greater success and unreasonable conduct by the applicant.

The court found the applicant to be the successful party, supported by her reasonable offer to settle, which was more favorable than the respondent's offers.

However, the court did not find either party's conduct unreasonable to warrant full recovery.

Costs were fixed at $8,000 in favor of the applicant, enforceable as child support.

The applicant sought a retroactive increase in child support from January 2013, while the respondent opposed and claimed overpayment.

The court imputed income to the applicant due to voluntary underemployment and determined both parties' incomes for child support purposes.

Applying the D.B.S. principles, the court found the respondent liable for retroactive child support from January 2013, adjusting the amount to reflect the original separation agreement's deviation from Child Support Guideline table amounts.

The court also addressed s.7 expenses, life insurance obligations, and Child Tax Benefit claims, ultimately ordering a set-off of the respondent's arrears against the applicant's future child support obligations.

Following a family law motion to change, the successful responding party sought costs on a full recovery basis.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Court Rules and the discretionary costs power under the Courts of Justice Act.

While the successful party was presumptively entitled to costs, the court adjusted the claim to exclude fees associated with a case conference where costs had not been reserved and to remove duplication arising from a change of counsel.

Considering the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct, offers to settle, and proportionality, the court fixed partial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded in a reduced amount reflecting fairness and the circumstances of the litigation.

The applicant brought a motion to change a divorce order incorporating a separation agreement, seeking termination of spousal support upon his retirement and a division of the respondent’s pension based on alleged non-disclosure.

The court held that the pension had been disclosed during negotiations and that the applicant knowingly waived any claim to it; therefore the domestic contract could not be set aside under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The applicant also failed to establish a material change in circumstances under s. 17 of the Divorce Act.

His planned retirement at age 55 was voluntary, foreseeable at the time of the agreement, and unsupported by medical evidence showing inability to work.

The court found termination of support would significantly reduce the respondent’s income and therefore dismissed the motion.

The moving party sought termination of long‑standing spousal support and cancellation of a life insurance policy securing the support obligation following retirement and a significant reduction in income.

The responding party argued there had been no material change in circumstances and relied on the compensatory basis of support arising from her role as primary caregiver during the marriage.

The court held that the combination of retirement, reduced income, and ongoing responsibilities toward children from the moving party’s subsequent marriage constituted a material change in circumstances.

However, immediate termination of support was not appropriate given the responding party’s financial circumstances and the length of time support had been paid.

The court ordered a gradual reduction in spousal support over several years, after which support would cease, and required the insurance policy to remain in place until the support obligation ended.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment granting sole custody of the children to the respondent.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by rejecting the expert evidence of Dr. Weinberger without explanation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's disposition and noting it could not retry the case.