Paul U. Rivard

The applicant mother sought child support under the Divorce Act for the parties' 27-year-old disabled daughter, who resides in a therapeutic home and receives ODSP benefits.

The court found that the daughter's receipt of ODSP displaced the presumptive Guidelines amount, and that she did not have a monthly budget deficit.

However, the court ordered the respondent father to pay $100 per month as his proportionate share of the daughter's section 7 expenses, such as clothing and personal hygiene items.

The appellant mother appealed an Ontario Court of Justice decision granting summary judgment to the Children's Aid Society, which placed her two children in extended care with no access.

The mother, who was unrepresented at the motion, contested much of the Society's evidence and was unable to effectively present her case or cross-examine witnesses.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge erred in using discretionary powers to weigh evidence and evaluate credibility without a trial, as the polarized positions and procedural fairness concerns meant a fair and just result could not be achieved summarily.

The matter was remitted for trial before a different judge.

The appellant mother appealed a custody and access order granting her custody of the parties’ two children and providing the father with access.

The father argued the trial judge erred in concluding that an earlier ex parte order granting him temporary custody was obtained through incomplete disclosure and that the resulting status quo should not influence the best interests analysis under s. 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.

The appeal also alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the trial judge’s questioning of witnesses.

The court held the trial judge was entitled to find that material facts were not fully disclosed on the ex parte motion and that the resulting temporary custody arrangement constituted an unlawful status quo.

No reasonable apprehension of bias was established and the custody determination based on the children’s best interests was entitled to deference.

The moving defendant sought security for costs against non-resident plaintiffs arising from an altercation at a lodge that led to civil claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, mental suffering, breach of contract and negligence.

The responding parties argued that Rule 56 had to be read in light of the Victims’ Bill of Rights, 1995, which bars security for costs unless necessary in the interests of justice.

The court held that pleaded allegations of emotional and psychological harm were sufficient at this stage to establish victim status under the Act without medical or psychological reports.

The motion was dismissed because security for costs was not necessary in the interests of justice, and motion costs were fixed at $2,000 in favour of the responding parties.

The applicant sought spousal support of $1,500 per month while receiving CPP disability benefits and incurring significant monthly drug expenses.

The respondent had a monthly income of approximately $5,021.

The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines suggested a range of $552 to $737 per month based on the parties’ circumstances.

The court found that the applicant’s financial needs, including increased expenses associated with her adult son returning home while attending college and her disability-related costs, justified an award above the guideline range.

Spousal support was set at $1,000 per month and the respondent was ordered to maintain medical and drug coverage.

A municipality brought an application seeking to restrain landowners and a contractor from removing fill and other materials from agricultural-zoned land and to compel restoration of the grading.

The municipality argued the activity constituted an impermissible extractive use and raised safety concerns related to truck access onto a nearby roadway.

The respondents asserted the work was intended to level the property following the removal of a former railway trestle embankment and disputed the existence of safety risks.

The court found several key factual issues—including zoning implications, the legality of the access, and alleged road safety hazards—could not be resolved on the application record and would require a trial.

As an interim measure, the court restrained excavation activity until a specified date and directed the respondents to apply for a municipal access permit while encouraging negotiations to resolve the dispute.

The appellant appealed a trial decision concerning custody and principal residence of a child following the mother's relocation from North Bay to the Hanover area.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to consider the possibility that she would return to North Bay if ordered by the court.

The appeal judge held there was no evidence before the trial judge that the appellant intended to return, and therefore the trial judge was entitled to treat the relocation as a material change in circumstances requiring reconsideration of custody.

Applying the best interests of the child test, the trial judge’s findings—favouring stability and the father’s parenting—were entitled to deference.

Fresh evidence tendered on appeal was rejected as insufficient to affect the outcome.

The plaintiffs sought interlocutory injunctive relief restraining a former shareholder, director, and employee from using confidential information and soliciting customers following the sale of his shares in a closely held corporation.

The evidence indicated the departing fiduciary took electronic files containing proprietary customer information and immediately solicited key customers after the share sale.

The court found a strong prima facie case of breach of fiduciary duty and unfair competition, notwithstanding the absence of a non‑competition agreement.

Given the likelihood of irreparable harm through loss of goodwill and customer relationships, and the balance of convenience favouring the plaintiffs, injunctive relief was granted.

The injunction restrained the former fiduciary and his corporation from using confidential information and soliciting customers for a limited period pending trial.

The appellant appealed a trial decision granting custody of a child to the mother and addressing the issue of mobility.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by considering custody and mobility together rather than determining custody first, and by misconstruing evidence relating to the parties’ circumstances.

The court held the trial judge properly focused on the best interests of the child under s. 24(1) of the Children’s Law Reform Act and reasonably concluded both parents were capable caregivers.

It was open to the trial judge to find that the child’s contact with both parents would be maximized if the child resided with the mother.

No palpable and overriding error was established and the appeal was dismissed.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a consent order requiring him to pay $500 per month in child support for two children.

Shortly before the consent order was finalized, his employment was terminated and he subsequently began receiving a Canada Pension Plan disability pension.

The court accepted that the order had been entered under a mistaken belief that CPP benefits would fully cover his support obligation and found that the CPP payments to the children constituted a material change in circumstances.

Given the father's limited income and inability to pay the ordered amount, the court varied the support obligation.

Child support was reduced to reflect the shortfall between CPP benefits paid for the children and the original order.

Following a motion in estate litigation, the applicant sought recovery of costs against the estate trustees.

The Superior Court of Justice determined that the applicant was entitled to costs of the motion on a partial indemnity scale.

The court assessed the quantum of recoverable fees, HST, and disbursements and fixed the total amount payable by the respondents.

The endorsement deals solely with the quantification and entitlement to costs arising from the motion.

The applicant sought temporary support from the estate of her late common-law spouse, with whom she cohabited for 34 years.

The court found that the deceased had not made adequate provision for her proper support and that she was in need of financial assistance.

Applying the factors under section 62 of the Succession Law Reform Act, the court ordered the estate to pay temporary support of $1,600 per month, including accumulated arrears.

The appellant, a former lawyer, was convicted of six counts of fraud and one count of theft related to the misappropriation of client funds in a land development scheme.

He appealed his convictions and his sentence of 20 months' imprisonment and $164,000 in restitution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's dismissal of the appellant's Charter motion for unreasonable delay, and concluding that the verdicts were reasonable and the jury instructions were adequate.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence.

The appellant was arrested in Nova Scotia and transported to Ontario, where he appeared before a justice of the peace.

The Crown conceded he should have been taken before a justice in Nova Scotia under s. 503(3) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant sought release via habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the arrest may have been illegal, subsequent valid proceedings justified his current detention, precluding release under habeas corpus.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court order that set aside decisions of its Discipline Committee and remitted the matter for a rehearing.

The Divisional Court had concluded that the Committee's refusal to grant an adjournment to the respondent physician raised fairness and natural justice concerns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Divisional Court's decision and noting that the public interest could be protected during an adjournment by imposing terms.

Costs of $20,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The respondents were entitled to costs of the appeal on a party and party basis.

The only outstanding issue was whether the Attorney General should be awarded costs of the cross-appeal on the section 15 issue, which the respondents had raised and lost.

The Court of Appeal awarded the respondents costs of the appeal against the Attorney General on a party and party basis, and awarded the Attorney General costs of the cross-appeal against the respondents on a party and party basis.

Appeal and cross-appeal arising from directions issued by a hospital restructuring body that would substantially reduce the services of Ontario's only francophone community hospital.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 16(3) of the Charter did not constitutionalize the institution's status and that s. 15 could not be used to supplement language rights not expressly conferred by the Charter.

However, the court held that the French Language Services Act had to be interpreted liberally and generously in light of the constitutional principle of respect for and protection of minorities, and that the impugned directions failed to respect that Act.

The court further held that, in exercising a public-interest discretion, the decision-maker was required to give serious weight and consideration to the institution's linguistic, cultural, and educational significance to the francophone minority.

Appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, the quashing order was affirmed, and the matter was remitted for reconsideration.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, sexual interference, and forcible confinement.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his reasons by inappropriately considering what would happen to the complainant if the accused were not convicted, and by framing the credibility assessment as a contest of whether the complainant or the accused was 'guilty' of fabrication.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.