William Brunton

Following a motion in estate litigation, the applicant sought recovery of costs against the estate trustees.

The Superior Court of Justice determined that the applicant was entitled to costs of the motion on a partial indemnity scale.

The court assessed the quantum of recoverable fees, HST, and disbursements and fixed the total amount payable by the respondents.

The endorsement deals solely with the quantification and entitlement to costs arising from the motion.

The applicant sought temporary support from the estate of her late common-law spouse, with whom she cohabited for 34 years.

The court found that the deceased had not made adequate provision for her proper support and that she was in need of financial assistance.

Applying the factors under section 62 of the Succession Law Reform Act, the court ordered the estate to pay temporary support of $1,600 per month, including accumulated arrears.

The respondent was successful in defeating the appellant's motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing a stay motion.

The respondent sought costs of $8,026.68 for the motion and additional costs for the appeal that was commenced as of right before the appellant realized leave was required.

The court noted the underlying action was a Rule 76 claim for $22,000 in unpaid rent, making the costs claimed disproportionate.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, fixing the costs of the motion at $3,700 and the costs of the abandoned appeal at $1,800.

The appellant appealed a judgment extinguishing its title to a triangular parcel of land based on adverse possession.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider the nature of the use of the surplus land and whether the respondent's actions were sufficiently inconsistent with that use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent's predecessor in title had paved the parcel, placed curb stones, and used it constantly for parking, effectively excluding the true owner.

The applicants, employees of Northland Glass and Metal Limited, applied to terminate the bargaining rights of the respondent union.

The union argued that the application was instigated by the employer because the lead applicant had asked the employer for the name of a lawyer to assist with the decertification.

The Board found that this single inquiry, standing alone, was insufficient to indicate management influence, especially since the employees had previously considered decertification.

The Board concluded the statement of desire was voluntary and directed a representation vote.

One Board member dissented, finding the employer involvement sufficient to dismiss the application.