William A. Sangster

The plaintiff, an elderly widow, sought to set aside two property transfers that gave her son, the defendant, an interest in her home property.

The plaintiff alleged she did not understand the nature of the documents she signed and was subject to undue influence.

The defendant counterclaimed for an interest in the property based on unjust enrichment and proprietary estoppel, citing his contributions to expanding a workshop on the property.

The court found the transfers void due to non est factum, mistake, and undue influence, restoring the plaintiff as sole owner.

The defendant's counterclaim was dismissed because he did not come to the court with clean hands, having engaged in unconscionable conduct by secretly transferring the property and refusing to return it.

The parties separated in 2001 due to the respondent's alcoholism but maintained contact and engaged in numerous activities together between 2003 and 2009.

The applicant sought a valuation date of February 26, 2009, while the respondent argued for June 1, 2001.

The court applied the Molodowich factors and found that the parties had resumed cohabitation between 2003 and 2009, despite maintaining separate residences.

The court determined the valuation date for equalization of net family property to be February 26, 2009, as there was no reasonable prospect of the resumption of cohabitation after that date.

The moving party sought to set aside a temporary spousal support order made in his absence, claiming he was out of the country when served.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to satisfactorily explain his delay in bringing the motion to set aside the order after returning to Canada.

The court ordered the matter to proceed to a settlement conference.

Following dismissal of a summary judgment motion that sought to bar an unjust enrichment claim on limitation grounds, the applicant requested costs based on her success.

The court held that although the motion had been dismissed, the outcome resulted partly from the applicant’s own failure to amend her pleadings to properly include the unjust enrichment claim after obtaining leave to do so.

The respondent had also failed to plead the limitation issue, contributing to the motion’s failure.

In the circumstances, the court determined that awarding costs to the applicant would improperly reward her pleading deficiency.

The request for costs was therefore dismissed and no costs were awarded to either party.

The respondent in a family property dispute brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim on the basis that it was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The moving party argued the claim was commenced outside the limitation period.

The responding party contended that either the ten‑year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act applied, that no limitation period applied to the equitable claim, or that the issue required a trial.

The court held that the summary judgment motion could not be determined on the existing record because the application had not yet been formally amended to plead unjust enrichment and the responding party had not pleaded the limitation defence.

The motion was therefore dismissed and no costs were awarded.

The appellant appealed a trial decision concerning custody and principal residence of a child following the mother's relocation from North Bay to the Hanover area.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to consider the possibility that she would return to North Bay if ordered by the court.

The appeal judge held there was no evidence before the trial judge that the appellant intended to return, and therefore the trial judge was entitled to treat the relocation as a material change in circumstances requiring reconsideration of custody.

Applying the best interests of the child test, the trial judge’s findings—favouring stability and the father’s parenting—were entitled to deference.

Fresh evidence tendered on appeal was rejected as insufficient to affect the outcome.

A child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act concerning a seven-year-old child found to be in need of protection.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown Wardship without access, supported by the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The mother sought return of the child to her care; the father supported that position and sought access.

The court found that the mother had a long history of mental health issues, emotional instability, substance abuse, and had emotionally abused and neglected the child.

The child had thrived in foster care with relatives and experienced significant anxiety during supervised access with the mother.

The court determined that return to the mother's care was not in the child's best interests and ordered Crown Wardship without access to either parent.

The appellant appealed a finding that he breached a consent order prohibiting him from maintaining outside storage in his rear yard exceeding 75% lot coverage.

The appellant argued that 'lot coverage' included the area covered by a garage and sheds, meaning he could use 100% of the remaining open area for storage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's interpretation that the order restricted the appellant to using 75% of the open areas of the lot as a whole for outside storage.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging that a labour arbitrator discriminated against her when dismissing her discharge grievance.

The Tribunal considered whether it had jurisdiction over the allegations against the arbitrator.

The Tribunal held that labour arbitrators, as statutory decision-makers, are protected by the doctrine of judicial immunity from human rights complaints arising from the execution of their adjudicative duties.

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a judgment extinguishing its title to a triangular parcel of land based on adverse possession.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider the nature of the use of the surplus land and whether the respondent's actions were sufficiently inconsistent with that use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent's predecessor in title had paved the parcel, placed curb stones, and used it constantly for parking, effectively excluding the true owner.