Edward Rae

This is an appeal of orders made by Justice Cleghorn on October 22, 2024, in a child protection proceeding.

The mother appealed the dismissal of her motion to set aside a default order from March 21, 2023.

The father and added party A.D. appealed the removal of A.D. as a party to the proceedings.

The child, who has special needs, had been in the care of the Society for over seven years.

Justice Cleghorn dismissed the mother's motion to set aside the default, removed A.D. as a party, and placed the child in extended society care with access to parents.

All three appeals were dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion seeking the release of net proceeds from the sale of a property, which were being held in trust.

The responding party opposed, arguing that a joint credit line/mortgage debt and property tax arrears on other properties needed to be paid from the proceeds first.

The court ordered that $70,000 be retained in trust to cover the outstanding credit line/mortgage debt, with the balance released to the moving party.

The court declined to order the payment of the unspecified property tax arrears from these funds.

This trial addressed complex family law issues between separated parents, including decision-making authority, parenting schedule, child support, equalization of family property, and a restraining order.

The court ordered shared decision-making and equal parenting time for all three children, emphasizing the importance of both parents' involvement despite one child's resistance.

It dismissed the applicant's request for a restraining order, finding the respondent's problematic communications were reactive rather than coercive.

On financial matters, the court deemed the parents' incomes equal for 2023, resulting in no child support payable for that year, and ordered an equalization payment from the respondent to the applicant, dismissing the respondent's claim for an unequal division of property.

The appellant mother appealed a temporary order granting the father increased access, primarily on the ground that the motions judge had previously presided over a settlement conference concerning the same access issue, contrary to Rule 17(24) of the Family Law Rules.

The appellate court found that procedural fairness was lacking and the motions judge lacked jurisdiction to make the order under these circumstances.

The appeal was allowed, the temporary order was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different judge.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court dealing with title to property at 90 Cotton Grass Street, Kitchener, Ontario.

The property was originally owned by Arthur Painter.

On December 16, 2015, a transfer was registered to Nathan Beaucage and Tracey Storr as joint tenants.

On November 28, 2017, a fraudulent transfer was registered purporting to transfer the property from Nathan and Tracey to Tracey and Arthur.

The application judge set aside the fraudulent 2017 transfer and vested title in Nathan and Tracey with corrected personal information.

The appellants argued the order went beyond addressing the fraudulent transfer and improperly determined issues relating to the validity of the 2015 transfer, which remained to be litigated.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, varying the order to simply declare the 2017 transfer void and direct its deletion from the register, while preserving the certificate of pending litigation and directing consolidation of the pending applications for trial.

This motion concerned a dispute over a child's custody and access arrangement.

The Mother unilaterally withheld the 11-year-old son from the Father, citing the child's emotional distress and stated preference not to reside with the Father.

The Father sought compliance with the existing week-about order or custody, alleging parental alienation.

The Mother sought a suspension of the week-about access.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the child's significant anxiety and emotional trauma regarding the existing arrangement.

While acknowledging the Father's concerns about parental alienation, the court found insufficient direct evidence to prove it.

The court temporarily suspended the week-about arrangement, ordering the child to reside full-time with the Mother and granting the Father supervised access.

The Office of the Children’s Lawyer was encouraged to become involved.

The appellant father appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a trial judge's order granting custody of the parties' two children to the respondent mother.

The trial judge had found that the father created an unlawful status quo by failing to make full disclosure on an ex parte motion for temporary custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in finding material non-disclosure by the father, as the father had provided full and fair disclosure of the mother's text messages indicating she could not parent the children.

However, the Court of Appeal declined to order a new trial or change the custody arrangement, finding it was not in the children's best interests.

The appeal was allowed in part only to amend the commencement date for the father's child support obligation.

The respondent sought leave to appeal a motion judge's order requiring him to pay $628 per month in child support.

The respondent, who is unemployable due to a childhood brain injury, receives monthly payments from a personal injury settlement fund administered by his mother.

The motion judge imputed an income of $36,000 to the respondent, grossed up to $42,000, effectively treating capital as income.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the order and noting that the treatment of capital receipts as income for child support purposes is an issue of general importance.

The appellant mother appealed a custody and access order granting her custody of the parties’ two children and providing the father with access.

The father argued the trial judge erred in concluding that an earlier ex parte order granting him temporary custody was obtained through incomplete disclosure and that the resulting status quo should not influence the best interests analysis under s. 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.

The appeal also alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the trial judge’s questioning of witnesses.

The court held the trial judge was entitled to find that material facts were not fully disclosed on the ex parte motion and that the resulting temporary custody arrangement constituted an unlawful status quo.

No reasonable apprehension of bias was established and the custody determination based on the children’s best interests was entitled to deference.

A custody trial concerning a child born in February 2010 to parents involved in a high-conflict dispute.

The applicant, the biological father, sought sole custody against the respondent mother who was married to another man at the time of the child's birth.

The case involved complex factual issues including disputed paternity, false allegations of sexual assault, and parental alienation.

The court awarded sole custody to the biological father, finding that while both parents were capable, the respondent's persistent efforts to marginalize the father's role and her lack of willingness to foster the parent-child relationship were determinative factors.

Applicants sought dependant’s relief under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act, alleging that a deceased father failed to meet child support obligations and made no provision for his adult son.

The court examined the separation agreement, prior support orders, and the son’s circumstances at the time of the father’s death.

Evidence showed the support obligation had been reduced to zero while the father received public assistance and that the son was no longer a child entitled to support.

The court also found that certain insurance and investment proceeds passed outside the estate to a designated beneficiary and were not available for recovery.

The applicants failed to establish entitlement to dependant’s relief from the estate.

Parents appealed a child protection decision finding three children in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act and ordering Crown wardship without access for two children, with the third placed with the biological father under supervision.

The trial judge had concluded that one or both parents inflicted serious injuries on one child but could not determine which parent was responsible, and that the other parent failed to protect the child.

The appellants argued errors in credibility findings, failure to properly assess evidence, and improper consideration of changed circumstances.

The court held that the trial judge’s findings were supported by the evidence and attracted appellate deference absent palpable and overriding error.

Considering the severity of the injuries and the ongoing risk to the children, the court found that the disposition was in the children’s best interests.

Following separation, the applicant father sought sole custody of two young children while the respondent mother sought joint custody with primary residence to her.

Evidence included reports from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer recommending sole custody to the father and therapeutic access for the mother.

The court found joint custody unworkable due to serious communication issues and concerns about the mother’s parenting conduct, including involving the children in the litigation, disregarding professional advice, and problematic behaviour during supervised access.

Applying the best interests test under the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court granted the father sole custody and primary residence.

Access to the mother was restricted to therapeutic supervision, with limited monitored telephone contact and review of access after six months.

The moving party sought to set aside a temporary spousal support order made in his absence, claiming he was out of the country when served.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to satisfactorily explain his delay in bringing the motion to set aside the order after returning to Canada.

The court ordered the matter to proceed to a settlement conference.

The Children's Aid Society brought a child protection application alleging that two children were at risk due to a pattern of neglect and physical assault by their father.

The father subsequently brought a motion for unsupervised access to the children.

The court found that while the children have a fundamental right to maintain contact with their non-custodial parent, the allegations raised sufficient safety concerns to warrant supervised access.

The court ordered supervised access at the paternal grandparents' home, supervised by the paternal grandmother, with specific frequency and conditions, including restrictions on alcohol and drug consumption within 24 hours of visits.

In a family law matter following separation, the court determined issues of child support and spousal support.

The parties had separated in December 2011 and entered into an informal agreement regarding support, which the court found was not a binding domestic contract.

A Consent Temporary Order for child support had been made in March 2012.

The court was required to determine the appropriate spousal support award based on the parties' respective incomes and the Spousal Support Guidelines.

The court found the respondent's 2011 income to be $80,699 and the applicant's to be $14,799, and awarded spousal support of $100 per month retroactive to April 2, 2012.

The appellant appealed a trial decision concerning custody and principal residence of a child following the mother's relocation from North Bay to the Hanover area.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to consider the possibility that she would return to North Bay if ordered by the court.

The appeal judge held there was no evidence before the trial judge that the appellant intended to return, and therefore the trial judge was entitled to treat the relocation as a material change in circumstances requiring reconsideration of custody.

Applying the best interests of the child test, the trial judge’s findings—favouring stability and the father’s parenting—were entitled to deference.

Fresh evidence tendered on appeal was rejected as insufficient to affect the outcome.

The appellant appealed a trial decision granting custody of a child to the mother and addressing the issue of mobility.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by considering custody and mobility together rather than determining custody first, and by misconstruing evidence relating to the parties’ circumstances.

The court held the trial judge properly focused on the best interests of the child under s. 24(1) of the Children’s Law Reform Act and reasonably concluded both parents were capable caregivers.

It was open to the trial judge to find that the child’s contact with both parents would be maximized if the child resided with the mother.

No palpable and overriding error was established and the appeal was dismissed.

In a high-conflict family law matter, the respondent mother sought to suspend the applicant father's access to two young children based on allegations of physical assault and threats, citing criminal charges pending against him.

The applicant father sought to change custody in his favour.

The court dismissed both motions, finding the evidence inconclusive and conflicting.

The court reinstated the consent final order from July 2011 with a police assistance clause, holding that access should only be suspended in extreme circumstances and that the presumption of regular access by a non-custodial parent is in the best interests of children.

The court also imposed restrictions on future motions without leave.

This is a costs decision following a trial on spousal support eligibility and quantum.

The applicant sought costs for two phases of proceedings: the original trial (2008-2009) and a subsequent trial before the judge (2012).

The applicant claimed total costs of $32,925.28 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The respondent, self-represented, opposed the costs award and submitted alternative proposals.

The court awarded costs to the applicant on a partial indemnity basis, but reduced the amount to $12,000.00 to reflect the applicant's contribution to the complexity and length of the proceedings through her tailoring of evidence in prior unrelated proceedings and her role in an ex parte order made in the respondent's absence.

Costs were ordered to be paid by periodic bi-weekly payments of $175.00, enforceable as an incident of support.