# WARNING
This is a case under the [Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017](https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/170014) and subject to subsections 87(8) and 87(9) of this legislation. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:
**87(8) Prohibition re identifying child** — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.
**87(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged** — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
**142(3) Offences re publication** — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.
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# ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
**BETWEEN:**
**Family & Children's Services of Guelph and Wellington County**
Applicant (Respondent on Appeal)
**- and -**
**C.H.**
Respondent (Appellant on Appeal)
**S.H.**
Respondent (Appellant on Appeal)
**A.D.**
Respondent (Appellant on Appeal)
---
**Counsel:**
- Arnab Quadry, for the Applicant
- Samalie Nsubuga, for C.H.
- Edward Rae, for S.H.
- Gerald Punnett, for A.D.
**Heard:** September 26, 2025
**The Honourable Madam Justice D. Piccoli**
---
# JUDGMENT
## [1] Introduction
[1] The mother, C.H., the added party, A.D., and the father, S.H., appeal the orders of Justice Cleghorn made on October 22, 2024. The father and A.D. appeal removing A.D. as a party. The mother appeals the dismissal of her motion seeking to set aside the order of Justice Caspers, dated March 21, 2023, as it relates to noting her in default.
[2] For the reasons that follow, all three appeals are dismissed.
---
## BACKGROUND
[3] The child who is the subject of the appeal is N.H., ("the child"). The child has special needs.
[4] The child was removed from the care of his mother by Family & Children's Services of Guelph and Wellington ("the Society"). Child protection proceedings commenced in the summer of 2018. The child was removed to a place of safety on March 29, 2019, and brought into the care of the Society pursuant to an interim interim order granted April 2, 2019. On July 15, 2019, that order was made an interim order.
[5] On December 19, 2019, Justice O'Dea on summary judgement motion found the child to be in need of protection due to risk of physical harm. The child was placed in the interim care of the Society for a period of six months.
[6] During the first status review application, the Society sought extended society care without access. It brought a motion for summary judgment. Justice Fueth determined that the mother was unable to meet the child's complex needs due to her longstanding and continued bipolar disorder. The status review application ("SRA") was referred to trial on the issue of the father's plan and that of the Society. The trial was held before Justice Hardman and lasted 9 days. It was heard between August 9, 2021 and April 18, 2022. Justice Hardman released her reasons for judgement on December 13, 2022. Her decision placed the child in the care of A.D. subject to supervision by the Society for a period of six months.
[7] The child remained in a foster placement while the trial proceeded, and the parties awaited the decision. Between the trial and the date when the reasons for decision of Justice Hardman were released, the Society learned of allegations relating to A.D. and the safety of the children in the home of A.D. As a result, the child was never placed in A.D.'s care. Immediately upon receiving the reasons for decision of Justice Hardman, the Society commenced an SRA on December 13, 2022, which sought an order that the child be placed in the extended care of the Society.
[8] On December 15, 2022, Justice Caspers placed the child in the temporary care of the Society on an interim interim basis.
[9] This order of Justice Caspers of December 15, 2022, was made an interim order on March 21, 2023.
[10] On March 21, 2023, Justice Caspers noted both parents (who had been served with the SRA on December 14, 2022) in default as neither had filed an Answer and Plan of Care. Both parents were present. Neither parent appealed that order, and the father was represented by duty counsel, Mr. Poole.
[11] In her reasons, Justice Caspers noted that there had been four different judges who to that point had made it very clear that neither parent could assume full time care of the child.
[12] On March 21, 2023, Justice Caspers added A.D. as a party to the proceedings. The Society did not take a position on the motion. None of the parties objected to A.D.'s motion to be added as a party.
[13] A.D. resides in Windsor. The Society asked Windsor-Essex Society to conduct an assessment of A.D.'s ability to care for the child. That assessment was completed, and A.D. was not recommended as a kinship adoptive parent for the child. The Society maintained its position that the child should be placed in extended society care.
[14] Despite both parents being present when Justice Caspers made her order noting them in default, neither parent moved to set aside the noting in default until the mother brought her motion in October 2024, 18 months later. The mother brought a motion to set aside the noting in default on October 16, 2024; the trial was scheduled to begin on October 22, 2024.
[15] The child has never resided with A.D.
[16] On October 22, 2024, Justice Cleghorn ruled on two motions. The first motion was made by the mother to set aside the order of Justice Caspers made on March 21, 2023, noting her in default. Justice Cleghorn dismissed this motion, giving oral reasons.
[17] The second motion was the court's own motion seeking to determine whether A.D. should remain a party in the proceedings. The parties received notice of that motion on October 21, 2024. In her endorsement of October 21, 2024, Justice Cleghorn stated, "In preparation for the trial, it has come to my attention that a preliminary issue must be determined. It is unclear if [A.D.] should have party status."
[18] After hearing viva voce evidence on October 22, 2024, Justice Cleghorn ruled that A.D. be removed as a party to the proceedings.
[19] Given the orders on the motions, Justice Cleghorn moved forward to a judgement based on the trial affidavit material before her and the statement of agreed facts ("SAF") signed by the Society.
[20] The child was placed in extended society care with access to his parents pursuant to the final order of Justice Cleghorn made on October 22, 2024.
[21] The father served his initial Notice of Appeal on the Society on November 20, 2024, and then served an Amended Notice of Appeal on November 25, 2024.
[22] A.D. served her Notice of Appeal on the Society on November 21, 2025.
[23] The mother served her Notice of Appeal on the Society on November 22, 2024.
[24] Pursuant to an order on December 14, 2024, Justice Barnes ordered all Appellants to perfect their appeals by February 28, 2024. He also ordered the appeals to be combined into one appeal.
[25] The appeals were not perfected as ordered by Justice Barnes. On May 26, 2025, Justice Peterson ordered all three Appellants to perfect their appeals by serving and filing an appeal record and factum by June 16, 2025. The Respondent Society was ordered to serve and file its responding material by June 23, 2025.
[26] On August 5, 2025, Justice Mills granted leave to the father to file his appeal record by August 8, 2025, and to file the transcript of evidence of Justice Caspers from March 2023 and the case worker affidavit of December 2022.
[27] As of the date of hearing this appeal, mother had not perfected her appeal. More will be said about this later in the decision.
[28] At the date of hearing of this appeal, the child had been in care 2,699 days, almost 7.5 years, which is well outside the timelines set out in section 122(1) of the [Child, Youth and Family Services Act](https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/170014) ("CYFSA").
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## MATERIALS BEFORE THE COURT
[29] At the commencement of the motion, the court – not having received confirmations – confirmed the following material was before it:
**(a) For the Appellant, A.D.:** her Appeal record, and her factum dated March 14, 2025
**(b) For the Appellant mother:** her Notice of Appeal dated November 22, 2024; her affidavit dated July 21, 2025; and her factum dated February 28, 2025. She did not file an Appeal record. She did not provide this court with the motion material she served and filed in relation to her motion before Justice Cleghorn on October 22, 2024.
**(c) For the Appellant father:** his Appeal record (2 volumes); his Supplementary Appeal Record (which included the transcript of proceedings before Justice Caspers on March 21, 2023, and the affidavit of Tammy Rombout dated December 14, 2022); his appeal book and compendium; and his factum, dated July 25, 2025.
**(d) For the Respondent Society:** its factum dated June 23, 2025; and its book of authorities; and its supplementary book of authorities.
[30] Given the lack of clarity in the Notice of Appeals and the factums of the Appellants, the court sought clarification as it relates to the grounds of the appeal for each Appellant.
---
## THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
[31] Mother argues that Justice Cleghorn made an error in law and in fact by refusing to set aside the March 21, 2023, order of Justice Casper noting her in default. She asserts that Justice Cleghorn should have applied the legal test for summary judgement to her request and that because Justice Cleghorn did not apply that test, she made an error in law. She relies on s. 90 of the CYFSA for the stated proposition that a hearing is required in child protection cases. She also maintains that there is no provision in the legislation to note a person in default and that as such she should not have been noted in default by Justice Caspers in March 2023.
[32] Mother asks to be permitted to serve and file an Answer and Plan of Care within 30 days, that the SRA proceed to a hearing, that the child be placed in her care, that costs be paid to her, and that the Ministry of the Attorney General pay costs "Due to the high-handed and unlawful conduct of the motions/trial judge outlined below". She did not pursue the issue of costs related to the Ministry of the Attorney General in oral arguments. She maintains that Justice Cleghorn was correct in removing A.D. as a party as she strongly disagrees that A.D. should be a party.
[33] It is the position of A.D. that Justice Cleghorn erred in exercising her discretion because she did not give her proper notice of the court's motion referrable to her party status. She was given less than a day's notice to prepare and make submissions and call evidence. A.D. also asserts that Justice Cleghorn made an error in law in removing her as a party as she was entitled to remain a party under ss. 74(5), (6) and (7) of the CYFSA or Rule 7 of the Family Law Rules. She insists that she showed a settled intention to treat the child as her own. She maintains that she should have been given the opportunity to present her full plan of care and answer the allegations made by the Society in a fulsome hearing, i.e., a trial. She further submits for the first time in argument (not in her notice of appeal or her factum) that her lawyer in acceding to the proposition that she was not a parent as defined in the CYFSA, misunderstood the definition of parent and believed that a parent only included a biological or adopted parent. Finally, she argued in her factum that she should have been given a chance to amend her Answer and Plan of Care if the court believed there to be a deficiency. This ground of appeal was not pursued.
[34] A.D. asks for an order setting aside Justice Cleghorn's order of October 22, 2024, that she remain a party to the litigation, that a trial proceed, and that she be allowed to amend her pleadings. She also seeks her costs.
[35] The father argues that Justice Caspers made an error in law by noting him in default in 2023.
[36] The father maintains that Justice Cleghorn made an error in law and violated the principles of natural justice in the exercise of her discretion when she removed A.D. as a party to these proceedings. He also clarified that his argument that he was deprived of his rights under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms related to his argument that Justice Cleghorn violated the principles of natural justice. He argues that removing A.D. as a party was tantamount to a motion for summary judgement given that the end result was "taking a child away".
[37] The father asserts that he did not put forward an Answer and Plan of Care because he supported the Answer and Plan of care of A.D., who is his friend. Given the removal of A.D. as a party, his plan collapses and the cumulative effect of these procedural decisions resulted in a lack of natural justice.
[38] The father contends that Justice Cleghorn erred by reading the endorsements and continuing record in advance of trial and that was contrary to the principles of natural justice.
[39] The father maintains that Justice Cleghorn made an error in law by accepting a SAF signed only by the Applicant and asserts that is not evidence upon which to ground a finding or make an order.
[40] During oral argument, the father abandoned his appeal on the grounds that Justice Cleghorn "showed actual bias or, in the alternative, a reasonable apprehension of bias and/or was motived by "judicial laziness" rather than any valid and principled legal reason, by prejudging the matter and making up her own mind about the outcome before the commencement of trial". Finally, he abandoned his request for costs from the Ministry of the Attorney General.
[41] The father seeks to file an Answer and Plan of Care within 30 days. The Plan of Care may include an alternative Plan that the child be placed in the care of A.D., that a trial proceeds on the issues of a continuing need of protection, and that the trial and pre-trial conference be heard by a judge other than Justice Cleghorn.
[42] The father and A.D. both argue that in removing A.D. as a party, Justice Cleghorn improperly sat in the appeal of the Justice Caspers order of March 21, 2023.
[43] All parties agree that Justice Cleghorn had jurisdiction to bring her own motion relating to the party status of A.D.
---
## LAW AND ANALYSIS
### Overarching Legal Principles and Legal Test on Appeal
[44] The paramount purpose of the CYFSA as set out at s. 1(1), is to promote the best interests, protection, and well-being of children. This paramount purpose is framed by the other purposes set out at s. 1(2), which require the court to recognize the importance of the autonomy and integrity of the family unit and the importance of choosing the least disruptive course of action for families only to the extent these considerations do not blur the primary purpose. As stated by Justice L'Heureux-Dubé in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in [Catholic Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. M. (C.)](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1994/1994canlii83/1994canlii83.html), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 165 speaking to the scheme of Ontario's child protection legislation "The focus of maintaining family units is only commensurate as long as it is in the best interests of the child; otherwise, it would be at cross purposes with the plan objectives of the Act…"
[45] In [Housen v. Nikolaisen](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2002/2002scc33/2002scc33.html), 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, the Supreme Court of Canada set out different standards of review that depend on the nature of the issue under appeal, namely, whether it is a question of law, a finding of fact, or a question of mixed fact and law.
[46] In [Children's Aid Society of the Niagara Region v. C.(J.)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onscdc/doc/2007/2007canlii8919/2007canlii8919.html), (2007), 281 D.L.R. (4th) 328 at para. 5, Justice Aitken for the Divisional Court set out the standard of review to be applied in the child protection context as follows:
> ... In regard to a pure question of law, the standard of review is correctness. For findings of fact, the standard of review is palpable and overriding error. Where the trial judge draws inferences from facts, the standard of review first is whether the trial judge made any palpable and overriding error in making the factual findings and then whether the trial judge made any palpable and overriding error in drawing inferences from those factual findings (the second part of the test is not simply whether the inferences could reasonably be drawn from the factual findings). In regard to a mixed question of law and fact, if it involves the trial judge's interpretation of the evidence as a whole, the standard is palpable and overriding error. If it involves the trial judge's interpretation of a legal standard or its application, the error may amount to an error in law and be subject to the standard of correctness.
[47] An appeal court must intervene when there is a material error, a serious misapprehension of evidence, or an error of law. However, it may not overturn a decision "simply because it would have made a different decision or balanced the factors differently". Deference owed to factual determinations in child protection cases is particularly high and compelling. See [Niagara Region v. C.(J.)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onscdc/doc/2007/2007canlii8919/2007canlii8919.html), at para. 6; [D.(D.) v. Children's Aid Society of Toronto](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2015/2015onca903/2015onca903.html), 2015 ONCA 903, at paras. 27–30; and [Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. L.P.](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2012/2012onca890/2012onca890.html), 2012 ONCA 890.
[48] The test for appellate review of the exercise of judicial discretion is whether the judge at first instance gave sufficient weight to all relevant considerations: see [Reza v. Canada](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1994/1994canlii91/1994canlii91.html), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 394, at para 24. Similarly, in [R. v. Regan](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2002/2002scc12/2002scc12.html), 2002 SCC 12, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, at para. 117, Justice LeBel for the Supreme Court majority described the standard of review of a discretionary decision as follows: "…where a trial judge exercises her or his discretion, that decision cannot be replaced simply because the appellate court has a different assessment of the facts." A discretionary decision must not be lightly interfered with – an appellate court will only be justified in intervening if the Judge below has misdirected himself or herself or the decision is so clearly wrong as to amount to an injustice, and no weight or insufficient weight has been given to the relevant factors: see [Wong v. Lee](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2002/2002canlii44916/2002canlii44916.html), (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 398, at paras. 28 and 30. Discretion assumes freedom to choose among lawful alternatives.
[49] In [A.M. v. Valoris Pour Enfants et Adultes de Prescott-Russell](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2017/2017onca601/2017onca601.html), 2017 ONCA 601, 139 O.R. (3d) 211, at para. 21, the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed in the child protection context that absent palpable and overriding error, or an error of law, or an unreasonable exercise of discretion, the decision of the Motions Judge should not be interfered with.
---
### Appellants' Arguments Related to Noting in Default
[50] All parties argued that there is no provision in the CYFSA or the Family Law Rules to note a party in default as Justice Caspers did on March 23, 2023. This argument fails for a number of reasons.
[51] None of the parties appealed the order of Justice Caspers, and they are well out of time to appeal that order as it was made over two years ago.
[52] It is correct that there is no provision in the CYFSA or the [Family Law Rules](https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/990114) to note a party in default. However, Rule 10(5) is clear that if a party does not file an Answer, then they are not entitled to further participate in the case. The timetable set out in Rule 33 of the Family Law Rules confirms this. These provisions in the Family Law Rules gave Justice Caspers the authority to proceed without the parties' participation. The act of noting the parents in default did not amount to a greater exercise of her authority.
[53] There is an important purpose to endorsing that a party is noted in default, particularly in child protection matters where the stakes are high. In child protection matters, litigants also often have, inter alia, limited resources, difficulty finding counsel, and difficulty accessing the necessary technology. The timelines are extended, sometimes by months, to give respondents every opportunity to participate. However, the right of a respondent to participate in child protection proceedings needs to be balanced with the timelines in the CYFSA and the Family Law Rules. These vulnerable children cannot be left in limbo. As set out in Rule 33(3), the court is directed to only lengthen the timelines if it is in the best interests of a child.
[54] Because of these provisions in the law, at some point, the court must be clear that Rule 10(5) will be applied, and that the matter must proceed to the next step. The endorsement noting a party in default is how this is done. It gives a signal to the Society that the non-responding party has been provided sufficient time to serve and file an answer and that it may proceed with its application. The endorsement gives a signal to the other litigants that they must now be prepared to move to the next stage of the litigation.
---
### Mother's Appeal
[55] In this case, the mother was noted in default on March 21, 2023. She did not serve a motion to set aside her noting in default (default judgement) until October 16, 2024. At the time, the child had been in the care of the Society for 2030 days (5 years and 7 months). The mother did not provide this court with an appeal record, nor any of the motion material that was before Justice Cleghorn on October 16, 2022. When this court pointed out the deficiency, she did not seek an adjournment or leave to file the material. As such she has not perfected her appeal, and that appeal is dismissed outright, see Rules 61.09(1) and 61.13(3.1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
[56] Despite the dismissal of the appeal outright, the court will address the mother's arguments on the basis of the material before it.
[57] At no point during argument of the motion did the mother assert that the legal test reinstating the mother's status was tantamount to a motion for summary judgement. She cannot in an appeal raise an issue that was not before Justice Cleghorn in the motion. Her reliance on section 90 of the CLRA does not support her proposition. Section 90 of the CYFSA is the section that authorizes the holding of a child protection hearing. A child protection hearing may take many forms depending on the circumstances. It may proceed on consent, take the form of a motion seeking leave to withdraw, a motion for summary judgement, or a trial. The hearing may take place on affidavit evidence: see [Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v. A.V.](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2016/2016onca361/2016onca361.html), 2016 ONCA 361, at para. 14. The test on a motion to set aside a default judgment is not the test for a motion for summary judgement.
[58] The mother had been served with the SRA on December 14, 2022. It was 18 months later that she was noted in default on March 21, 2022, and a further 18 months before she brought her motion to set aside the noting in default. Her access to the child continued to be supervised.
[59] During argument of her motion, the mother conceded that she could not meet the first of the 3 criteria. The motions judge considered all relevant factors. The motions judge then went on to consider the two additional factors set out by the Court of Appeal in [Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2014/2014onca194/2014onca194.html), 2014 ONCA 194, 119 O.R. (3d) 561, at para 49, and found that the prejudice to the child was "to the extreme. This child has been in care far too long, to the point where it is offensive and the prejudice of the child would outweigh the mother's request, even if she were able to meet the first three criterial under the test." She also held that the integrity of the administration of justice in this file was already in question and that further delay would impact the integrity of the administration of justice. The motions judge made no palpable or overriding error in her factual findings or in drawing inferences from those findings. There was no unreasonable exercise of her discretion.
[60] In conclusion, Justice Cleghorn made no error of law, of mixed law and fact, or in exercising her discretion. In this case, the interests of justice do not favour setting aside the order of Justice Caspers. This child who has been in care most of his life needs permanency and stability.
---
### A.D.'s Appeal
[61] As previously stated on October 21, 2024, Justice Cleghorn advised the parties by endorsement that she wanted to hear from them regarding whether A.D. should continue to be a party to these proceedings.
[62] All parties agree that Justice Cleghorn had the authority to bring this motion. A statutory court also has the power to control its own process. That power is necessarily implied in a legislative grant of power to function as a court of law: [R. v. Cunningham](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2010/2010scc10/2010scc10.html), 2010 SCC 10, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 331, at para. 19.
[63] On October 22, 2025, A.D. provided viva voce evidence, and she was cross examined. At no point did she seek an adjournment to allow her more time to prepare or provide further evidence. As such, it is not possible for her to succeed on her argument in this appeal on the basis that she was given insufficient time to prepare.
[64] During submissions and argument of the motion before Justice Cleghorn related to her party status, A.D. acknowledged that she was not a parent as defined in s.74(1) of the CYFSA. Justice Cleghorn is entitled to rely on this submission. As such, the issue was whether A.D. should remain a party to the proceeding under rule 7(3)(ii) of the Family Law Rules. It is improper for A.D. to raise for the first time in argument of this appeal that she misunderstood the definition of "parent." This submission is particularly concerning given that in her endorsement of October 21, 2024, Justice Cleghorn sets out the definition of "parent" under section 74(1) of the CYFSA.
[65] Justice Cleghorn in addressing the issue of A.D.'s continuing party status relied on cases including the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in [Children's Aid Society and Middlesex v. T.E.](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2023/2023onca149/2023onca149.html), 2023 ONCA 149. Party status is fluid: see paras. 46 and 48. Individuals entitled to party status are entitled to it at the time of the motion: see para. 49. See also [Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. C.P.I.](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2023/2023oncj289/2023oncj289.html), 2023 ONCJ 289, at paras. 63-71.
[66] A.D.'s argument that Justice Cleghorn sat in appeal of Justice Caspers March 2023 order granting party status is also rejected. In child welfare proceedings, the court is required to assess the situation on a continuous basis. The issue of a kin caregiver's party status is always subject to review by the court. A judge in October 2024 cannot be bound by the facts as they existed in March 2023. Moreover, counsel for A.D. agreed with the court that the court could revisit the issue of party status. There is no error in hearing evidence from A.D. prior to the trial and in re-visiting A.D.'s party status.
[67] This court adopts the reasoning of Justice Sherr in [Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. C.P.I.](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2023/2023oncj289/2023oncj289.html), at paras. 63, 64 and 67-71:
> [63] Here, the court is not being asked to remove a party who is a parent. It is being asked to remove a person who is not a parent as defined by the Act and who was incorrectly named as a party in the status review application.
>
> [64] The court finds that it has the authority to correct this mistake pursuant to its right to control its court process.
>
> [67] The court's authority to control its own process by removing a person who has already been named as a party to a child protection proceeding, albeit incorrectly, is discretionary. There may be situations (for example, the case is close to trial, the person has actively participated in the case, the person has expended money on counsel in the case), where the court exercises its discretion not to remove the incorrectly named party. Any request to remove the person as a party should be made on notice to that person.
>
> [68] Here, it is appropriate for the court to use its authority to control its own process and remove the maternal grandfather as a party. He was improperly named as a party. As of the date of this hearing, he was not a parent as defined by the Act.
>
> [69] It is not in the child's best interests or consistent with the primary purpose of the legislation for the maternal grandfather to be a party. Maintaining him as a party runs the risk of delaying permanency planning for the child. It could unreasonably add to the time and expense for this case. It would give him the right to obtain sensitive and private information about the child and the parties.
>
> [70] Lastly, the maternal grandfather has shown no interest in participating in these proceedings. If he changes his mind and wishes to seek an access order while the child protection case is ongoing, he has the right to bring a separate application under subsection 104 (1) of the Act. If a custody order is granted under section 102 of the Act, as requested by the society and the father, the maternal grandfather has the right to bring an application for contact with the child pursuant to section 21 of the [Children's Law Reform Act](https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/900012).
>
> [71] The court finds that it is just in the circumstances of this case, as defined by rule 2, to remove the maternal grandfather as a party.
[68] As per the recent decision of Justice Law in [Catholics Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. B.W. et al.](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2025/2025onsc3510/2025onsc3510.html), 2025 ONSC 3510, at para. 25:
> The finding that a person is a "parent" can change the very nature of the case, including the legal principles to be applied, the priority of placement under the CYFSA, and even the applicable legislation. This finding can also impose additional obligations on the Society and the court not contemplated at the outset of the case, leading to delay. In short, a finding that a person is a "parent" can have serious procedural and substantive implications on a child protection proceeding. The court must not exercise its power to find a person to be a "parent" lightly.
[69] In this case, A.D. provided oral evidence, a voir dire was held, and she was cross examined. Justice Cleghorn properly considered the facts, which include the following: the child did not ever live with A.D.; A.D.'s access was sporadic after October 2023; and up to the time of the motion, access was generally based on the father's parenting time or once per month. At no time had A.D. brought a motion for access or placement. A.D. conceded that the child was not placed with her after the December 2022 Justice Hardman order because there was an ongoing child protection concern in her home, and she conceded that she did not pass the safe assessment, which is a requirement for placement.
[70] Justice Cleghorn considered all five principles in the caselaw with respect to adding parties in child protection proceedings:
> (i) whether the addition of the party in the best interests of the child
>
> (ii) whether the addition of the party will delay or prolong proceedings
>
> (iii) whether the addition of the party is necessary to determine the issues
>
> (iv) whether the additional party is capable of putting forward a plan that is in the best interests of the child
>
> (v) whether the person has a legal interest in the proceeding
>
> (See: [A.M. v. Valoris Pour Enfants et Adultes de Prescott-Russell](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2017/2017onca601/2017onca601.html), 2017 ONCA 601, 139 OR (3d) 211, at paras. 22-23; [Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. H.(S.)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2002/2002canlii46218/2002canlii46218.html))
[71] Justice Cleghorn also properly applied the best interests test. It is not necessary for all principles to favour the person seeking party status for the court to add him or her: see [A.M. v Valoris](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2017/2017onca601/2017onca601.html), at para. 24. However, she found that the detrimental impact of further delay on the child who had been in care for close to 5.5 years was considerable. She also found that A.D. was not capable of putting forward a plan that was in the child's best interest. She held that the delay was highly prejudicial to permanency planning. Justice Cleghorn properly applied the law to the facts and gave sufficient weight to all of the factors. She made no error.
---
### Father's Appeal
[72] It is the father's position that Justice Cleghorn's order as it relates to A.D. be set aside, as it was his plan that the child be placed with A.D. He says the orders made that day are wrong in law and they should not have been made. The issue of the court removing A.D. as party to these proceedings has been addressed above.
[73] Regarding his assertion that by removing A.D. as a party the court denied him natural justice given his intention that he would exercising access through A.D., the court notes the following:
> (a) Based on the material before it, the father was present at all court attendances that are referenced in this decision. He was assisted by duty counsel. He knew or ought to have known of the risks of failing to file his own Answer and Plan of Care.
>
> (b) The father never brought a motion in the Ontario Court of Justice to have his noting in default set aside or to allow him to file and Answer and Plan of Care. It is not appropriate to raise the issue for the first time in appeal.
>
> (c) The father did not seek to make any submissions related to the removal of A.D. as a party during the hearing on October 22, 2024, even though he was present.
[74] Regarding his argument that Justice Cleghorn reviewed material she should not have reviewed, there is no evidence of that. In her reasons she confirms that she reviewed the trial documents, which is exactly what she is supposed to review. She made no error.
[75] Regarding his argument that Justice Cleghorn made a final order without evidence relying only on a statement of agreed facts, that is also wrong. It is clear she read the trial record (Transcript of proocedings before Justice Cleghorn at 8). The trial record as per the endorsement of Justice Cleghorn dated May 14, 2024 included affidavits from the Society's 7 witnesses. That is evidence. Even if the father were correct, the proper order would be that the matter move to an uncontested trial, and not that all party status be reinstated.
[76] Regarding his argument that Justice Cleghorn erred in making an order that A.D. not have status and that making such an order is tantamount to a motion for summary judgement, that argument has already been addressed above.
---
## CONCLUSION
[77] All of the appeals are dismissed. There has been significant delay in permanency for this child. He has been in care for over 7 years. He deserves permanency and stability. It is hoped that with this decision the parties can move forward and allow the child this permanency and stability.
---
**D. Piccoli J.**
Released: October 20, 2025
minicounsel