WARNING

This is a case under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 and subject to subsections 87(8) and 87(9) of this legislation. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87 (8) Prohibition re identifying child — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142 (3) Offences re publication — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v B.W. et al, 2025 ONSC 3510

Court File No.: FC 529-24
Date: 2025-06-12
Superior Court of Justice – Ontario

RE: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton, Applicant
AND: B.W., D.F., S.W., Respondents

Before: T. Law
Counsel:
Sarah Edwards, Counsel for the Applicant
Amy Katz, Counsel for the Respondent

Heard: 2025-05-30

Endorsement

Introduction

[1] This is a motion brought by the paternal grandmother, M.P., to be added as a party to these child protection proceedings involving the child, K.F.-W.

[2] The father consents to this request. The Applicant Society, the mother, and the maternal grandmother (current kin caregiver and party to these proceedings) oppose this request.

[3] I reviewed the following materials for this motion:

• Notice of motion, dated May 14, 2025
• Affidavit of M.P., sworn May 14, 2025
• Affidavit of the CCAS worker, sworn May 22, 2025
• Affidavit of the mother, sworn May 26, 2025

The father and maternal grandmother did not provide any evidence for this motion.

Brief Background

[4] The Society became involved with this family on November 27, 2023 as a result of a referral made by M.P. At that time, the mother and K.F.-W. were residing with M.P. The protection concerns raised related primarily to the parents’ substance use.

[5] K.F.-W. initially resided with M.P. for a period of four months between December 2023 and April 2024 under a voluntary kinship arrangement.

[6] K.F.-W. was returned to his parents in April 2024. A protection application was commenced on May 1, 2024 and the Society obtained a temporary supervision order placing K.F.-W. with his parents.

[7] Unfortunately, K.F.-W.’s placement with his parents broke down in November 2024. The parents were clear that they did not want K.F.-W. residing with M.P. because of the conflict between them. As a result, the child was placed with his paternal aunt, M.P.-D., on November 28, 2024 pursuant to the order of Justice Brown. This placement broke down within a month.

[8] K.F.-W. was placed with the maternal grandmother and current caregiver, S.W., on December 20, 2024, by order of Justice Kril. K.F.-W. continues to reside at the maternal grandmother’s home. There is no evidence that K.F.-W.’s placement with the maternal grandmother is at risk of breaking down at present. The Society’s evidence is that the maternal grandmother successfully completed a kin assessment and that the child continues to do well in her care.

The Parties’ Narratives

[9] M.P. now moves to be added as a party, more than a year after the commencement of the protection application. She has not had K.F.-W. in her care for 17 months.

[10] M.P. filed a short four-page affidavit in support of her motion. M.P.’s evidence is as follows:

• Despite no longer caring for K.F.-W., she continues to have a significant relationship with him. She currently has six hours of contact with K.F.-W. arranged voluntarily by the Society.
• M.P. says she identified K.F.-W. as having symptoms of autism and encouraged the parents to seek services for him.
• M.P. says she drove K.F.-W. to daycare for most of his life.
• M.P. has provided financial support to the parents in the form of a loan agreement. M.P. initially said that she provided this support to the maternal grandparents, however, the loan agreement clearly shows this was untrue.
• M.P. is concerned that if the placement with the maternal grandmother breaks down, the Society will not consider her as a placement.
• M.P. obtained a clean vulnerable sector check.
• M.P. is prepared to work with the Society to ensure that K.F.-W.’s needs are met.

[11] In submissions, M.P. elaborated on her position. She argued that she had evidence that could only be provided to the court if she were allowed to participate as a party. She is furthermore concerned that there has been evidence provided to the court about her conflictual relationship with the parents, to which she has been unable to respond. Finally, she would like to present a plan because she does not want to lose K.F.-W. to “the system”.

[12] The father was self-represented. He supported M.P.’s request. He is currently living with M.P. and believes that she deserves a voice in these proceedings. The father claimed that M.P. had not been able to defend herself when the other parties unfairly call her difficult. The father says M.P. has been there to support him, including financially. The father stated that if the child’s placement with the maternal grandmother breaks down, he would submit a plan that K.F.-W. reside with him or M.P.

[13] The Society and the mother oppose M.P.’s request. They argue that the request by M.P. is premature as there is no evidence that K.F.-W.’s placement with the maternal grandparents is at risk of breaking down. In addition, M.P. and the father are aligned and he is able to present her plan if there is any placement breakdown. The Society and the mother state that there has been conflict between M.P. and the parents. The mother points to evidence in her affidavit of the nature of the conflict, including M.P. yelling and screaming at the mother for two hours and refusing to allow her to leave the home the day the Society permitted her to return to live with K.F.-W. This was not refuted by M.P. in reply. The Society and the mother say that adding M.P. as a party would not be in the child’s best interests. The Society and the mother note that M.P. can maintain contact with the child, as she has done now, without being made a party.

[14] The maternal grandmother was self-represented. She did not understand why M.P. should be added as a party since she already has liberal contact with K.F.-W. She says that M.P. is a grandparent and not a parent.

Analysis

Is M.P. a statutory party?

[15] There are two ways in which persons can be added as parties in child protection proceedings: a finding that he or she is a statutory party pursuant to s. 79(1) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sch. 1 (the “CYFSA”) or pursuant to r. 7(5) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (the “Rules”).

[16] Section 79(1) of the CYFSA sets out the “statutory parties” to a child protection proceeding. They include: the applicant, the society having jurisdiction in the matter, the child’s parent, and in the case of a First Nations, Inuk, or Métis child, a representative chosen by each child’s First Nations, Inuit or Métis community.

[17] M.P. claims that she is a “parent” pursuant to s. 74(1) of the CYFSA. Specifically, she states that she qualifies under paragraph 6 of the definition of “parent”, which is as follows:

An individual who, during the 12 months before intervention under this Part, has demonstrated a settled intention to treat the child as a child of the individual’s family, or has acknowledged parentage of the child and provided for the child’s support.

[18] The words “settled intention to treat the child as a child of the individual’s family” have been interpreted in the context of the payment of child support. In that context, Chartier v. Chartier, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 242 is the leading case. At para. 39, the Supreme Court of Canada stated the relevant factors in defining the parental relationship include, but are not limited to:

whether the child participates in the extended family in the same way as would a biological child; whether the person provides financially for the child (depending on ability to pay); whether the person disciplines the child as a parent; whether the person represents to the child, the family, the world, either explicitly or implicitly, that he or she is responsible as a parent to the child; the nature or existence of the child’s relationship with the absent biological parent.

[19] When faced with determining who is a “parent” under s. 74(1)(6), several child protection cases have imported the interpretation of “settled intention” from the child support context into the child protection context, with modifications. In Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. E.V.B.H. et J.A., 2024 ONSC 891, para 26, the court held that declaring a person a “parent” within s. 74(1) is discretionary. The factors to be considered largely come from the child support context, as set out in Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand-Norfolk v. A. (L.M.), para 16:

The overriding onus rests with the applicant society. Intention is in dispute and therefore individual facts of this individual case require that it be dealt with on its own merits. The society must show more than a conduct of common courtesy or hospitality on the part of the respondent… The facts of family life established by evidence must show a pattern of responsibility for the child by the parent arising out of a demonstrated settled intention consciously formed and firmly established. The onus to rebut an existing settled intention rests with the respondent… and it is a heavy one. [Citations omitted.]

[20] While the above factors are relevant to the determination of who is a parent under s. 74(1)(6) of the CYFSA, it is critical to remember that child protection proceedings are fundamentally different from child support proceedings, and therefore require other additional considerations. In my opinion, this means that it is important that courts proceed cautiously when exercising its discretion to declare a person a “parent” for the purposes of this legislation. There can be serious implications to child protection proceedings and to the child if an expansive definition of “parent” is adopted.

[21] The paramount purpose of the CYFSA as set out at s. 1(1), is to promote the best interests, protection, and well-being of children. This paramount purpose is framed by the other purposes set out at s. 1(2), which require the court to recognize the importance of the autonomy and integrity of the family unit and the importance of choosing the least disruptive course of action for families. It should be remembered that s. 101 of the CYFSA sets out criteria which aims to return children to parents or their pre-intervention caregivers (who are also frequently “parents”).

[22] Adopting an expansive definition of “parent” would unduly complicate proceedings, make it impossible for the Society to service families, and promote conflict between parties. This is because a finding that a person is a “parent” carries both procedural and substantive rights beyond the filing of an Answer and participation in proceedings under the CYFSA.

[23] In Halton Children’s Aid Society v. M.S.L., 2018 ONCJ 762, Justice Starr discussed the substantive rights that would be impacted if a person was found not to be a “parent.” Justice Starr noted, at para. 27, that in the context of child protection proceedings, parents have substantive rights including the right to have the child returned to the parents’ care, the right of access, preferential status in terms of placement within the child’s community, and entitlement to support and services from the Society. Finding a person to be a “parent” necessarily includes conferring on them these rights as provided by the statute.

[24] In Children’s Aid Society of Halton Region v. L.C., 2019 ONCJ 149, paras. 43-44, Justice Sullivan also noted that the identification of a parent impacts on the Society’s ability to service parents and children. For example, a parent’s First Nations, Inuit or Métis ancestry would directly impact on the types of services received by a child and the legislation applicable to the proceeding. Similarly, a parent’s race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, family diversity, creed, and cultural and linguistic heritage would also impact on the services provided to the child. Finally, recognition of a person as a parent impacts on the discovery of the child’s “extended family” and “community” as defined in the CYFSA.

[25] The complications that come with finding a person to be a “parent” far outweigh the procedural complexity that comes with adding a party to a proceeding. The finding that a person is a “parent” can change the very nature of the case, including the legal principles to be applied, the priority of placement under the CYFSA, and even the applicable legislation. This finding can also impose additional obligations on the Society and the court not contemplated at the outset of the case, leading to delay. In short, a finding that a person is a “parent” can have serious procedural and substantive implications on a child protection proceeding. The court must not exercise its power to find a person to be a “parent” lightly.

[26] In this case, I would not find M.P. to be a parent. M.P. provided sparse evidence of her role in K.F.-W.’s life prior to these proceedings. While K.F.-W. did reside with M.P. for four months prior to the start of these proceedings, I have little evidence that she adopted the role of a parent during that time, including making major decisions about K.F.-W. or holding herself out as a parent. I note that M.P. did not file a copy of the agreement she made with the Society with respect to her voluntary care of the child, and therefore there is no evidence before the court of the details of that arrangement. While M.P. did provide some financial support to the parents, providing a loan of $1,600 does not speak to a level of financial support to the child that would make M.P. a parent. Finally, while M.P. does exercise six hours of parenting time a week, that fact alone does not mean she is a parent.

[27] I also find that adding M.P. as a parent would not be consistent with the purposes of the CYFSA. This matter has been ongoing for more than a year; finding M.P. to be a parent would unduly complicate the Society’s service plan at a late stage in these proceedings. It would delay the ultimate conclusion of these proceedings as it would force the Society to re-assess its planning in light of M.P.’s status as a “parent.” Delaying finality for K.F.-W., given the minimal evidence supporting M.P.’s assertion that she is a parent, is not in the child’s best interests.

[28] I find that at all material times, M.P. acted as a concerned and supportive grandparent. This does not elevate her status to that of a parent.

Is M.P. a party pursuant to r. 7(5)?

[29] M.P. also argues that she should be made a party pursuant to r. 7(5) of the Rules.

[30] Rule 7(5) states that “[t]he court may order that any person who should be a party shall be added as a party, and may give directions for service on that person.”

[31] The legal principles for the court to consider when adding a party to a child protection proceeding are set out at para. 22 in A.M. v. Valoris Pour Enfants et Adultes de Prescott-Russell, 2017 ONCA 601, para 22, citing CAS of London and Middlesex v. H.(S.):

• Whether the addition of the party is in the best interests of the child;
• Whether the addition of the party will delay or prolong proceedings unduly;
• Whether the addition of the party is necessary to determine the issues;
• Whether the additional party is capable of putting forward a plan that is in the best interests of the child; and
• Whether the person seeking to be added has a legal interest in the proceedings (i.e., whether an order can be made in their favour or against them).

[32] It is not necessary to satisfy all of the criteria before the court will add the person as a party: see Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v. C.V., 2011 ONCJ 83, para 19. The overarching consideration is the child’s best interests: see A.M. v. Valoris Pour Enfants et Adultes de Prescott-Russell, 2017 ONCA 601, para 20.

[33] In considering the best interests of the child, the level of conflict between the parties and the proposed party and the conflict a child may be exposed to are relevant factors in determining whether a person should be added as a party: see Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. G.M., 2014 ONCJ 209, para 13.

[34] I find that M.P. is not a party pursuant to r. 7(5) for the following reasons:

• This matter is at the settlement conference stage. M.P. provided no explanation or reason as to why she had failed to bring a motion earlier to add herself as a party. There are already three respondents in these proceedings. The Society is moving forward with reuniting the mother with K.F.-W. with the support of the maternal grandmother. Adding M.P. would increase the number of parties that would need to consent to this arrangement and unduly delay the case.
• It is unclear what M.P. would add to these proceedings. The father was clear that he would be advancing M.P.’s plan should the child’s current placement break down. Adding M.P. now would only serve to add another potentially dissenting view to these proceedings.
• M.P.’s argument that she should be allowed to refute the allegations made against her is not a reason to add her as a party. She is able to refute those allegations through an affidavit put forward by the father. The father was clear that he supported M.P. defending herself and is clearly aligned with M.P.
• While the court accepts that M.P. may have some relevant evidence to provide in these proceedings, that does not elevate her from a witness to party status: see Noik v. Noik, paras 25-33; Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. G.M., 2014 ONCJ 209, para 13.
• M.P.’s evidence failed to provide any details of her plan, should she be made a party. It is unclear to the court whether she wishes to have K.F.-W. placed in her care, whether she is supporting a plan to place K.F.-W. with the father, or whether she merely seeks access. While the court need not determine that the plan proposed would be successful for the purposes of adding M.P. as a party, the question at this stage is whether her plan merits consideration at all: see Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. H.(D.), 2009 ONCJ 2, para 13. The court is unable to assess this when she has not provided evidence of her plan.
• The evidence before the court is that M.P.’s relationship with the mother and her family is conflictual. The mother provided evidence of a serious incident of conflict involving yelling and screaming for two hours. The Society also provided evidence that M.P. and other paternal family members continue to make disparaging comments about the mother and her family. It should be noted that the parents refused to place K.F.-W. back in the care of M.P. when his placement with them fell apart primarily because of the conflict between them. The court is concerned that adding M.P. as a party would only increase this conflict, which is not in the child’s best interests.
• Adding M.P. would permit her to access the deeply personal information contained in the Society’s files as of right. Given the conflict between the parties, the court is concerned that this would enable M.P. to engage in a fishing expedition through the Society’s file. This is not in K.F.-W.’s best interests.
• Most of the submissions made by M.P.’s counsel focused on the benefits of adding M.P. should the child’s current placement with the maternal grandmother fail. This is a request that is based on largely speculative grounds. At this point, there is no reason to believe that the child’s placement with his maternal grandmother is at risk of breaking down.

[35] As a result of the foregoing, M.P.’s request to be added as a statutory party pursuant to s. 79 of the CYFSA or to be added as a party under r. 7(5) of the Rules is dismissed.

T. Law
Date: June 12, 2025