Matthew Wilton

The applicant, a family physician, sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board confirming a remedial caution issued by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The caution related to public statements the applicant made objecting to her church's COVID-19 communion protocols, in which she identified herself as a physician.

The applicant argued the decisions failed to reasonably balance her Charter right to religious expression under the Doré framework.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the screening committee reasonably balanced its statutory mandate to protect the public with the applicant's Charter rights, noting she was not precluded from expressing religious views, but cautioned on identifying herself as a physician when doing so.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion to strike out the plaintiffs' statement of claim alleging professional negligence in his representation of the plaintiff dentist during a regulatory discipline proceeding.

The defendant argued the claim was incapable of proof due to the absolute prohibition on admitting discipline proceeding records in civil actions under s. 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the defendant required leave to bring the motion due to delay and having taken a fresh step by filing a statement of defence, and denied leave.

The court further noted that even if leave were granted, the claim would not be struck as the plaintiffs might prove their case using other admissible evidence, such as patient records and admissions in the pleadings.

The appellant dentist appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee revoking his certificate of registration for professional misconduct.

The appellant had repeatedly breached undertakings restricting him from performing dental implant therapy, resulting in harm to at least one patient.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle in the Committee's conclusion that the appellant was ungovernable and that revocation was the only appropriate penalty.

The Court also rejected arguments that the Committee's reasons were insufficient or based on irrelevant considerations.

The Law Society sought judicial review of a disclosure order made by the Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division during an interlocutory suspension proceeding.

By the time the judicial review was heard, the Law Society had complied with the disclosure order and the interlocutory suspension had been imposed, rendering the disclosure issue moot.

The Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot issue, finding that the matter should have proceeded through the Tribunal's internal appeal process and that the Tribunal should be allowed time for its jurisprudence to evolve.

Following a successful discovery motion where the plaintiff obtained an order for answers to undertakings and refusals, the plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $26,964.65.

The defendant argued the amount was excessive and suggested $5,000.

The court found the plaintiff was largely successful and the issues were complex, justifying senior counsel.

However, the court reduced the requested amount by 50% due to the use of two senior lawyers, a late adjournment caused by the plaintiff, and time spent on general discovery matters.

The court fixed costs at $13,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff in a constructive dismissal action brought a motion to compel answers to discovery questions and for non-party production of a workplace investigation file.

The defendant hospital refused to disclose the identities of medical residents interviewed during the investigation, claiming common-law privilege under the Wigmore test.

The court found that while the communications originated in confidence, the public interest in the correct disposal of the litigation outweighed the interest in protecting the identities, as the case involved a routine workplace dispute rather than patient safety or physician credentials.

The court ordered disclosure of the identities and production of the unredacted investigation file.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) requiring him to be cautioned and to participate in a behavioral program.

He argued he was denied procedural fairness because the ICRC failed to disclose 13 interview summaries, 20 internal complaints, and hospital policies considered by its medical inspector.

The Divisional Court found that while the applicant was aware of the complaints and policies, the failure to disclose the 13 interview summaries breached the duty of procedural fairness.

The application was allowed, the ICRC decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted for reconsideration following proper disclosure.

The appellant hospital appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which had ordered the renewal of the respondent physician's active staff privileges without conditions.

The hospital argued the Board unreasonably failed to require the physician to participate in a Physician Health Program due to his history of disruptive behaviour and conflicts with administration and nursing staff.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the physician's working relationships had sufficiently ameliorated was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellant lawyer, acting as an executor, advanced an unsecured loan from estate assets to an employee to placate a client.

The Law Society Hearing Panel found this to be conduct unbecoming a lawyer and a breach of fiduciary duty.

The Appeal Panel affirmed the decision.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the appellant argued the panels failed to properly apply the prudent investor test under section 27 of the Trustee Act.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the standard of review was reasonableness and the panels correctly concluded the investment was imprudent as it was motivated by personal interests rather than an overall investment strategy.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 31.03(2)(a) to compel the defendant hospital to produce an independent contractor physician as its representative for examination for discovery.

The plaintiff argued the physician was the primary actor in his constructive dismissal claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the definition of 'officer, director, or employee' can be expanded in limited circumstances, the hospital's proposed representative (the Director of Medical Affairs) had sufficient knowledge of the internal matters at issue, including the hospital's response to complaints, workplace investigations, and a Ministry audit.

The appellants appealed a judgment interpreting the Constitution of a religious society and upholding a freezing order on memberships.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's finding that a 'bona fide member' only required payment of dues for the last two calendar years, rejecting the appellants' argument for a 24-month probationary period.

The Court also upheld the freezing order, finding it was validly passed by the Executive Committee in response to a forcible takeover and was justified to restore calm.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant physician brought an application for judicial review regarding a referral to the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The applicant argued that the Associate Registrar lacked the statutory authority to appoint investigators and lacked reasonable and probable grounds to do so.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, holding that the threshold jurisdictional issues could and should be raised before the Discipline Committee prior to any hearing on the merits.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondent College.

A 14-year-old child was apprehended and eventually placed in a secure treatment centre by court order.

The child's family sued the treatment centre and its social worker for negligence, claiming $40,000,000 in damages on the basis that the defendants treated the child as if she had been abused by her parents, which allegedly prevented her reintegration into the family.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that recognizing a duty of care owed by child protection service providers to the family of an apprehended child would create a serious potential for conflict with their paramount statutory duty to act in the best interests of the child.

The Court allowed the appeal and struck the statement of claim.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, which confirmed the dismissal of his complaint against a police officer.

The complaint arose from an incident where police responded to a landlord-tenant dispute involving the applicant, who is elderly and disabled.

The Divisional Court applied the patent unreasonableness standard of review and found that the Commission's conclusion—that there was no reasonable basis in the evidence to proceed to a hearing for police misconduct—was not patently unreasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Following the release of the court's reasons, the respondent requested that the court address an argument from their factum to strike out allegations concerning duties owed to a non-party.

The Court of Appeal declined to do so, noting that the motions judge was not asked to strike out those allegations, nor was the court asked to do so during oral argument.

The focus of the appeal remained on whether a duty of care was owed to the plaintiffs.

The appellants, parents of a child apprehended by the Children's Aid Society, brought a negligence action against a secure treatment centre and its social worker.

The appellants alleged the defendants negligently treated the child as a victim of sexual abuse and failed to reintegrate her with her family.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding the defendants owed a duty of care only to the child.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that it was not plain and obvious that the defendants did not owe a duty of care to the parents under the Anns test, given the statutory framework of the Child and Family Services Act and the specific court orders involved.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court order that set aside decisions of its Discipline Committee and remitted the matter for a rehearing.

The Divisional Court had concluded that the Committee's refusal to grant an adjournment to the respondent physician raised fairness and natural justice concerns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Divisional Court's decision and noting that the public interest could be protected during an adjournment by imposing terms.

Costs of $20,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing his action for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's finding that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding malicious prosecution, as the appellant failed to adduce evidence showing an absence of reasonable and probable cause or malice.

The Court also dismissed the false arrest and imprisonment claims, finding that the police had lawful grounds for the arrest and authorization to enter the dwelling under a search warrant.

Dr. Krop, a practitioner of environmental medicine, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario finding him guilty of professional misconduct for failing to maintain the standard of practice.

The appellant argued that the investigation was improper, the Committee lacked jurisdiction, the prosecution was for an improper purpose, the wrong standard of practice test was applied, there was a reasonable apprehension of bias, and the prosecution was an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the Committee correctly applied the test for standard of practice and that the appellant's diagnostic and treatment techniques lacked scientific validity and fell below the standard of practice.

The appellant appealed an order staying her main action after she had signed a release in settling an earlier negligence action against one participant in a dental implant procedure.

In the subsequent action against another dentist and her former lawyer, both defendants commenced third party proceedings against the settling defendant, who then obtained a stay of both the third party proceedings and the main action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal held there was no proper basis to stay the main action, particularly where any reliance on the release by non-parties would require adjudication of the privity exception discussed in Fraser River.

The appeal was allowed, the stay of the main action was set aside, and the appellant was held to her undertaking not to pursue claims that could trigger contribution or indemnity claims against the released party.