Shaun Nakatsuru

The appellant, suffering from liver cancer, was denied a liver transplant in Ontario as he did not meet the medical criteria.

He obtained a living-related liver transplant in England for $450,000 and sought reimbursement from OHIP.

OHIP denied the claim because the treatment was not 'generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in the same medical circumstances' under s. 28.4(2) of Regulation 552.

The Health Services Appeal and Review Board upheld the denial.

On appeal, the Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and concluding that the Regulation did not violate s. 7 of the Charter because the state's refusal to fund out-of-country treatment did not constitute a deprivation of life or security of the person.

The appellant sought to amend his appeal to the Divisional Court to include a section 7 Charter challenge against OHIP's refusal to fund his out-of-country liver transplant.

The Charter issue was not raised before the Health Services Appeal and Review Board.

Applying the prerequisites from R. v. Brown, the court allowed the amendment, finding a sufficient evidentiary record, no tactical delay, and that refusing the amendment could result in a miscarriage of justice, particularly given recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in Chaoulli and legislative changes preventing the Board from hearing constitutional issues.

The appellant failed to appear for the hearing of his appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting both the failure to appear and the absence of any merit in the appeal, relying on the thorough judgment of the trial judge.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The applicants sought to quash the Minister's decision to close the Land Registry Office in Welland, a designated area under the French Language Services Act, and relocate its services to St. Catharines.

They argued the decision violated the Act and the constitutional principle of respect for and protection of minorities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Act requires the provision of services to a designated area but does not prohibit relocating the office outside the area, provided the services remain available.

The court also dismissed as premature a related application by a seniors' residence seeking to administer its own waiting list for subsidized housing to preserve its francophone character.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ministry of Transportation's decision to deny him a religious exemption from the requirement to have a digital photograph on his driver's licence.

He argued the requirement violated his freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter, citing beliefs based on the Book of Revelations and the Second Commandment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that his objection was based on a sincere religious belief, noting inconsistencies in his practices and evidence that his true concerns were secular privacy issues.

The applicants sought costs of $120,000 on a partial indemnity basis following a successful judicial review application.

The respondents argued that $30,000 was appropriate.

Applying the overriding principle of reasonableness from Boucher, the Divisional Court considered factors including the length of the hearing, the complexity of the issues, the voluminous record, and duplication of effort by applicants' counsel.

The court fixed costs at $60,000.

The appellant appealed a conviction under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, arguing that the definition of 'employer' in section 1 of the Act is overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the definition is not overbroad and declining to revisit the court's previous decision in R. v. Wyssen.

The appellants appealed a trial management order in a child protection proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the exercise of discretion.

The Court clarified that the statutory requirement for a child to be 'brought before the court' does not mandate physical presence in the courtroom, and confirmed that the governing legislation permits a bifurcated, non-continuous hearing.

The applicants, parents of children with severe disabilities, applied for additional special needs funding from the Ministry of Community, Family and Children's Services.

They submitted detailed proposals but were awarded only a fraction of their requests without any explanation, criteria, or opportunity to respond.

The applicants sought judicial review of these decisions.

The Divisional Court held that the Minister's funding decisions under the Child and Family Services Act are statutory and subject to judicial review.

The court found that the Ministry breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide criteria, reasons, or an opportunity to be heard.

The decisions were quashed and referred back to the Minister for reconsideration.

The applicants sought judicial review of the government's alleged failure to allocate adequate resources to fund treatment for autistic children, raising both administrative and constitutional arguments under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court declined to hear the constitutional arguments on a piecemeal basis, noting that a fuller record was being developed in related litigation (Wynberg and Deskin).

The court adjourned the constitutional issues pending the outcome of those cases and proceeded to hear only the administrative law issues.

The defendants, commercial trucking companies, were charged under s. 84.1 of the Highway Traffic Act after wheels separated from their vehicles on a highway.

The offence is one of absolute liability, expressly precluding the defence of due diligence, but carries no risk of imprisonment.

The defendants argued that the creation of an absolute liability offence violated their rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 11(d) does not prevent the legislature from eliminating a common law defence.

Furthermore, the court found no violation of s. 7, concluding that the diminished stigma attached to a regulatory offence and the absence of imprisonment do not trigger the security of the person guarantee.

The Crown's appeal was allowed and the defendant's appeal was dismissed.

The Ontario Divisional Court issued a decision on costs following an appeal.

Costs were fixed at $8,000 plus GST, awarded to the appellant, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, and payable by the respondent, Dr. Darren Payne.

No costs were awarded against the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board that required the College's Registration Committee to issue a certificate of registration to the respondent doctor.

The Registration Committee had previously refused the application on the basis that the respondent was ungovernable due to past disciplinary issues in Quebec.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board erred in law by failing to show deference to the specialized expertise of the Registration Committee regarding the respondent's qualifications and ethical fitness to practice medicine.

The matter was remitted back to the Registration Committee for further consideration in light of new evidence.

Dr. Krop, a practitioner of environmental medicine, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario finding him guilty of professional misconduct for failing to maintain the standard of practice.

The appellant argued that the investigation was improper, the Committee lacked jurisdiction, the prosecution was for an improper purpose, the wrong standard of practice test was applied, there was a reasonable apprehension of bias, and the prosecution was an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the Committee correctly applied the test for standard of practice and that the appellant's diagnostic and treatment techniques lacked scientific validity and fell below the standard of practice.

The applicant physician sought judicial review to quash an interim order by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario that restricted his medical practice.

The applicant argued the College failed to prosecute the discipline matter expeditiously as required by section 37 of the Health Professions Procedural Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the scheduled hearing dates complied with the statutory requirement to expedite the matter, though the court noted the desirability of continuous hearings.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons appealed a Divisional Court decision that set aside a Discipline Committee's finding of professional misconduct against a physician for sexual impropriety.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Divisional Court that the Committee misapprehended crucial evidence regarding the complainants' credibility and potential collusion.

However, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part to order a rehearing, noting the record contained evidence capable of supporting a misconduct finding, and to strike the Divisional Court's order that the College pay the costs of the initial Committee hearing.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for importing cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and also appealed a five-year penitentiary sentence.

He argued errors in the restriction of cross-examination on voluntariness, Crown cross-examination concerning omissions in his statement, jury instructions regarding an admitted lie to police, and the denial of a Corbett application.

The court held that the Corbett ruling disclosed no error in principle and that, even assuming error on the remaining grounds, no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred given the strength of the circumstantial case and the improbability of the defence evidence.

The conviction appeal and sentence appeal were both dismissed.

The appellants challenged robbery and firearms convictions arising from a violent home invasion robbery involving multiple victims, police surveillance, intercepted communications, and a getaway vehicle stop.

The Court of Appeal rejected all conviction grounds, holding that any errors in the Corbett rulings, party liability instruction, identification charge, co-conspirator instruction, and post-offence conduct instruction either did not occur or caused no prejudice.

The court found the evidence against both appellants strong, including surveillance, wiretap evidence, and surrounding circumstantial evidence.

On sentence, however, the court found unwarranted disparity with a co-accused’s sentence and held that one appellant should have received enhanced credit for pretrial custody.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the sentences were reduced to 11 years and 10 years respectively.

The appellant challenged his conviction on two grounds: the admission of expert evidence from a police detective and an alleged misapprehension of another police officer's evidence.

The court declined to articulate a general rule on admissibility, holding that such determinations must be made case by case under the governing appellate framework.

Because defence counsel had not objected at trial, there was no record to assess relevance or necessity, and the expert evidence did not appear to have unduly influenced the result.

The court also found no misapprehension of the officer's evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissing his appeal from an extradition judge's order committing him for surrender and dismissing his application for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering his surrender.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the court below, finding that the surrender did not infringe the appellant's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.