Shaun Nakatsuru

A 17-year-old youth was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting a taxi driver multiple times without apparent motive, and of firearm offences related to a shooting incident three weeks prior.

The Crown sought an adult sentence.

The sentencing judge applied the two-stage test under s. 72(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act as clarified by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. I.M. and R. v. S.B. At stage one, the judge found the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the offender's intellectual disability in the mild range, complex trauma, disadvantaged background, impulsivity, and demonstrated capacity for rehabilitation while in custody.

At stage two, the judge imposed the maximum youth sentence of seven years custody followed by conditional supervision under an Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision order, with concurrent one-year sentences for the firearm offences.

A 16-year-old youth pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after shooting and partially paralyzing a victim in downtown Toronto.

The Crown sought an adult sentence of 8-10 years, while the defence sought a youth sentence with time served.

The court applied the two-stage test under s. 72(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

At stage one, the court found the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was not rebutted beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the youth's significant trauma, intergenerational Indigenous trauma, impulsive nature of the offence, substance abuse issues, and remarkable rehabilitation progress during 3 years 9.5 months of pre-trial custody.

At stage two, the court found a youth sentence would hold the youth accountable.

The court imposed a two-year probation order with intensive conditions including the Intensive Support and Supervision Program (ISSP), curfew, counselling, community service, and ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario's determination that the modified version of GotSkill, an electronic terminal game, remains a game of mixed chance and skill under section 197(1) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant had modified the game following the 2019 Court of Appeal decision in Play for Fun Studios Inc. v. Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario), which found the original version to be a game of mixed chance and skill.

The court upheld the Registrar's decision, finding that despite modifications allowing players to view the next five potential wins, the game continues to involve a systematic resort to chance by inducing players to wager money in hopes of uncovering valuable prizes in future rounds.

The Toronto Revolver Club sought declarations that the Chief Firearms Officer of Ontario lacks authority to conduct warrantless inspections of shooting ranges and to impose conditions on shooting range approvals.

The court found that while the first issue presented no live controversy, the CFO has no authority to attach conditions to shooting range approvals under the Firearms Act.

The court applied statutory interpretation principles, finding that the Act and Regulations do not expressly grant such power and that the power is not practically necessary to achieve Parliament's public safety objectives, as the CFO retains broad revocation authority.

An appeal from an arbitrator's decision in a long-running dispute between law firms regarding a Professional Services Agreement.

The appellants challenged the arbitrator's handling of a solicitor-client privilege objection to spreadsheets and her refusal to remove respondents' counsel who received the allegedly privileged documents.

The court upheld the arbitrator's decision to dismiss the privilege motion while reserving the right to reconsider the issue after further evidence, and upheld the decision not to remove counsel.

The court found the arbitrator acted within her discretion and applied the law reasonably to the circumstances.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the commercial landlord, 1660841 Ontario Ltd., against the tenant, 2259778 Ontario Inc., for breach of lease obligations.

The court found no genuine issue for trial on either liability or damages, awarding the landlord $68,043.52 in damages and $5,000 in costs, plus pre- and post-judgment interest.

The decision applies the Supreme Court’s guidance in Hryniak v. Mauldin regarding summary judgment and the use of fact-finding powers under Rule 20.

The appellant, Serena Wall, appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) order terminating her tenancy for non-payment of rent and arrears, raising issues of repair, maintenance, and procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence but found no error of law or procedural unfairness in the LTB’s decision, and dismissed the appeal.

Ashley Keenan, facing extradition to the United States for murder, brought a motion for extensive disclosure from various Canadian and foreign authorities.

The court, acting as a case management judge, emphasized the limited role of an extradition judge and the narrower scope of disclosure required for an extradition hearing compared to a trial.

The motion was largely dismissed, with the exception of disclosure related to Ms. Keenan's interactions with Toronto Police Service officers upon her surrender, specifically concerning the accuracy of her statements and potential Charter violations regarding her right to counsel.

The court found no air of reality to other broad disclosure requests or allegations of abuse capable of supporting a stay of proceedings.

Delroy Desmond sought a stay of charges (firearm trafficking, possession) under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 40 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court.

The court found that while there were periods of defence unavailability, the primary cause of the delay pushing the case over the limit was the Crown's inadvertent disclosure of an unredacted Information to Obtain (ITO) revealing a confidential source.

This necessitated defence counsel's withdrawal and a new trial date.

The court ruled this was not an exceptional circumstance excusing the Crown, as it was within Crown control and avoidable.

Consequently, the s. 11(b) right was violated, and a stay of proceedings was ordered.

The accused, I.T., a young Black youth charged with second-degree murder, brought a Corbett application to exclude or sanitize parts of his youth record for the purpose of assessing his credibility if he were to testify.

The court considered the traditional Corbett factors (nature, remoteness, similarity of convictions, and attack on Crown witness credibility) and, significantly, extended the consideration of systemic anti-Black racism, drawing on principles from R. v. King and R. v. Morris.

The application was allowed in part: a conviction for assault peace officer was excluded, firearm possession convictions were sanitized to "possession of a restricted weapon" and "possession of a restricted weapon contrary to a prohibition order", and a robbery conviction was substituted with "assault and theft".

The court found that these modifications balanced the probative value of the record against the heightened prejudicial effect due to racial stereotypes and the risk of improper propensity reasoning.

This is a pre-trial ruling in a murder trial concerning the admissibility of two types of evidence: lay recognition opinion testimony (video and voice) and prior discreditable conduct of the accused.

The court admitted the recognition evidence from two youth detention center staff members, finding they had sufficient familiarity with the accused to offer valuable identifying information, including unique mannerisms and gait.

The court also admitted evidence of the accused's prior possession and discharge of the alleged murder weapon three weeks before the killing, and possession of another handgun three days before, balancing its high probative value for identity and means/opportunity against its moral prejudice.

The court imposed limitations on how the relationship evidence between the accused and the staff witnesses could be presented to mitigate prejudice related to the accused's detention history.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States, brought a motion for directions seeking to close case management hearings in an extradition case to the public and impose a publication ban.

The applicant argued that rules governing judicial pre-trial and case supervision conferences, which mandate confidentiality, should apply.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that as a case management judge, its role was akin to a trial judge exercising trial management powers, which are generally open to the public, and that the open court principle was not displaced.

This criminal trial addressed whether four adapted flare pen launchers and associated ammunition found in the defendant's possession constituted "firearms" under s. 2 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown and defence presented expert testimony regarding the devices' capability to cause serious bodily injury or death and whether they qualified as "barrelled weapons." The court, preferring the defence expert's more experienced opinion, found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the devices were capable of causing serious bodily injury or death, primarily due to the absence of velocity testing and physical indicators of significant energy loss during firing.

Consequently, the devices were not classified as firearms, and the defendant was acquitted of the firearm-related charges.

The applicant, Ramone Campbell, sought to exclude evidence in his trial for robbery and sexual assault, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that police violated the applicant's reasonable expectation of privacy by obtaining cellphone subscriber information and pinging data without judicial authorization or exigent circumstances, and further violated his right to counsel by delaying the advisement and questioning him before he had the opportunity to consult counsel.

These violations led to an invalid search warrant for his room.

Applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that the serious and deliberate nature of the police misconduct, coupled with the significant impact on the applicant's privacy and right to counsel, outweighed society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.

Consequently, the court granted the application, excluding clothing, a cellphone, and an imitation firearm found in the applicant's room.

The defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of fentanyl trafficking and one count of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence.

The court considered the aggravating factors, including the dangerous nature of fentanyl and the quantity involved, alongside significant mitigating factors such as the defendant's guilty plea, youth, and the impact of systemic anti-Black racism (Morris factors).

The lengthy period under restrictive bail conditions was also a substantial mitigating factor.

Despite the strong mitigating circumstances, the court determined that the severity of the offences, particularly fentanyl trafficking, necessitated a penitentiary sentence to uphold principles of general deterrence and denunciation.

A conditional sentence was deemed inappropriate.

The court imposed a sentence of 29 months, reduced to 28 months and 19 days after credit for pre-trial custody, with concurrent sentences for the trafficking counts.

The defendant, Damen Smith, faced charges including drug trafficking, possession for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and firearm offences.

The charges stemmed from a police surveillance operation, a vehicle takedown, and subsequent searches of a Nissan Rogue and an apartment.

The court relied heavily on wiretap intercepts and circumstantial evidence.

The defendant was found guilty of drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime related to the vehicle.

However, the court found reasonable doubt regarding the firearm charges due to poor police handling of evidence and the presence of other occupants, and also found reasonable doubt for the drug and proceeds charges related to the apartment due to insufficient evidence of the defendant's primary residence and the presence of another individual.

The defendant, Shamal Searchwell-Beals, subpoenaed D.C. Graham for a Charter application.

D.C. Graham sought to be excused from testifying under s. 700(2) of the Criminal Code due to medical grounds (PTSD).

The court applied a modified four-part test from R. v. N.S., considering whether the witness's health would be seriously jeopardized, if excusing them would risk trial fairness, if accommodation was possible, and if salutary effects of testifying outweighed deleterious effects.

The court found D.C. Graham's health would be seriously jeopardized, excusing him would risk trial fairness for the defendant, but no effective accommodation was possible.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the salutary effects of compelling testimony did not outweigh the deleterious effects on the witness's health, especially given the potential unreliability of his testimony and the existence of alternative evidence.

D.C. Graham was excused from testifying.

This sentencing decision concerns Peter Stewart, who pleaded guilty to possessing fentanyl and a loaded prohibited handgun.

The Crown sought a jail sentence of three to four years, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the loaded firearm and the dangerous combination of guns and drugs, alongside numerous mitigating factors.

Key mitigating factors included an early guilty plea, first-offender status, strong family support, consistent employment, and compliance with strict bail conditions for over four years.

Crucially, the court gave significant weight to an Enhanced Pre-Sentence Report (EPSR) detailing systemic anti-Black racism, poverty, and community violence that diminished the offender's moral blameworthiness and contributed to his choices.

Applying principles from R. v. Morris and R. v. Proulx, the court determined that a penitentiary sentence was not required and imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, minus credit for pre-trial custody, followed by two years of probation, with strict house arrest conditions.

The defendant, Irby Lemus, was convicted of sexual interference and making and distributing child pornography involving a 14-year-old victim who became pregnant.

The court, after independently finding facts regarding the extent of the sexual interference and the defendant's knowledge of the victim's age, proceeded to sentencing.

The Crown sought 12-15 years, while the defence sought a stay or conditional sentence.

The court determined a base sentence of five years and six months, emphasizing deterrence and denunciation, and considering aggravating factors such as the victim's vulnerability, the intimate nature of the illegal relationship, the resulting pregnancy, and the duration of the abuse.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's lack of a criminal record, pro-social life, family support, and the collateral consequence of separation from his children.

A significant 18-month reduction was applied to the sentence due to a serious s. 7 Charter breach by the Crown, who deliberately failed to disclose material information during a bail review, misleading the court and attempting to interfere with the defendant's parental rights.