Rick Visca

The appellant, Guled Mohamed, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He raised three grounds: the trial judge erred in finding he lacked standing to challenge the search warrant, erred in inferring guilt from circumstantial evidence, and rendered an unreasonable verdict due to insufficient evidence of his knowledge of the cocaine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings on standing, the application of circumstantial evidence, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The court clarified that a trial judge is not bound to accept the Crown's theory on standing if the accused presents contradictory evidence, and reiterated the standard for assessing circumstantial evidence and unreasonable verdicts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possessing proceeds of crime and his 26-month sentence.

He argued the verdict was inconsistent with his acquittal for possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and that the trial judge erred in her circumstantial evidence analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence of knowledge and control over the cash was compelling, unlike the evidence regarding the cocaine.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge properly considered the collateral immigration consequences but correctly concluded that a sentence under six months would not adequately address the gravity of the offence.

This is an appeal from conviction where the appellant argued the Crown breached confidential informant privilege by disclosing information to a co-accused.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by applying an overly narrow standard for determining a privilege breach, emphasizing that any information that *might tend* to identify an informant is protected.

The Crown's failure to protect this near-absolute privilege, despite repeated warnings, constituted an abuse of process.

The convictions were set aside, and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The appellant, a truck driver, appealed his convictions for importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking, following a retrial.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, with the central issue being the appellant's knowledge of the drugs found in his trailer.

The trial judge, sitting alone, rejected the appellant's testimony and concluded that knowledge was the only reasonable inference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable, the trial judge's application of circumstantial evidence principles correct (including considering inferences from lack of evidence), and no material misapprehension of evidence that led to a miscarriage of justice.

This addendum clarifies the payment deadline for fines imposed in the main appeal decision (2021 ONCA 665).

The respondent requested clarification, and the court ordered that the fines be paid within seven days of the release of this addendum.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that reduced fines and eliminated a custodial sentence for environmental offences under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA).

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellate judge that the sentencing judge erred in principle by comparing the case to one involving deliberate environmental harm, thus upholding the elimination of the custodial sentence for the individual respondent.

However, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the reduction of fines, finding no error in the original sentencing judge's imposition of separate fines for each count, and restored the original fines for both the corporate and individual respondents.

The appellant, convicted of importing and possessing heroin, appealed her convictions, alleging two errors in the trial judge's jury instructions.

First, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly invited propensity reasoning by summarizing the Crown's position that the appellant was a person who would break the law for money, despite an earlier caution against such reasoning.

The Court of Appeal found this instruction related to the appellant's credibility and did not constitute reversible error.

Second, the appellant challenged the trial judge's answer to a jury question clarifying "negligence/recklessness or being wilfully blind." The Court found the judge's definition of wilful blindness accurate and her explanation of negligence and recklessness adequate for the jury to distinguish the concepts.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of serious offences, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred in holding she had no jurisdiction to allow the appellant to withdraw an earlier undertaking to plead guilty.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant and the Crown's concession, finding that a trial judge does have jurisdiction to permit an accused to withdraw an undertaking or admission when the interests of justice dictate.

As the Crown did not oppose the withdrawal, the appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice for possession of fentanyl.

The trial judge had imposed consecutive sentences of two years and six years for possession of fentanyl, with both counts relating to drugs found in two different places in the appellant's residence on the same day.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by providing no explanation for making these sentences consecutive when they involved possession of the same drug in the same place on the same day.

The court altered the sentence by making the sentences concurrent.

The Crown conceded that a victim surcharge of $1,200 must be set aside.

The accused, Justin Hung, applied to reopen his trial and declare a mistrial after being found guilty of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

Post-conviction analysis revealed significant inaccuracies in the Agreed Statement of Facts (ASF) regarding the quantity and value of methamphetamine.

The original ASF stated 700.65 grams of methamphetamine (worth up to $46,800), but the actual amount was 15.54 grams (worth potentially much less, depending on market factors).

The court found that the incorrect high value of the drugs played a role in its initial assessment of the accused's credibility and the inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.

Given that the fresh evidence could reasonably have affected the trial's outcome, the court allowed the application to reopen the case, set aside the finding of guilt, and declared a mistrial to ensure fairness and avoid any appearance of bias in re-evaluating credibility.

The appellant was charged with drug trafficking offences after police executed a search warrant for his residence based on information from an untested confidential informant.

The police obtained the warrant with minimal corroboration of the informant's tip and without full disclosure of the informant's criminal record.

The trial judge found the search and arrest violated the appellant's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 but admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding the police acted in good faith.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in characterizing the police conduct as good faith and in failing to properly weigh the Grant factors.

The court held that negligent investigation and preparation of the information to obtain warrant, combined with misleading language regarding the informant's credibility, constituted serious Charter breaches that required exclusion of the evidence.

Appeal from a conviction and sentence imposed by Justice Randall W. Lalande of the Ontario Court of Justice on November 2016 and January 4, 2017, respectively.

The matter was adjourned to February 15 for full argument on the merits, with one hour allocated for the appeal.

The defendants, Gerald Lougheed Jr. and Patricia Sorbara, were charged with corruptly promising employment or appointment to Andrew Olivier to induce him to withdraw his candidacy or refrain from becoming a candidate in the Sudbury by-election, contrary to section 96.1(e) of the Election Act.

Sorbara was also charged with agreeing to employ two of Glenn Thibeault's staff to induce Thibeault to become a candidate.

Following a directed verdict application at the end of the Crown's case, the court found that Olivier was not a "candidate" under the Election Act as he was only seeking the Liberal Party nomination, not running in an election to the Legislative Assembly.

The court also found that once Thibeault committed to running, it became impossible for Olivier to become the Liberal candidate, and therefore the defendants could not be convicted of inducing him to refrain from becoming one.

Regarding the Thibeault count, the court found that the agreement to employ campaign staff did not constitute bribery as defined in the Act and did not offend the Act's purpose of ensuring fair elections.

Directed verdicts of acquittal were entered for both defendants on all counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction on one count of conspiracy to possess heroin for the purposes of trafficking and his sentence of 12 years imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal addressed three grounds of appeal: an erroneous instruction on the conspiracy count, an erroneous Vetrovec instruction regarding a witness who testified under an immunity agreement, and inadequate guidance on assessing the witness's inconsistent statements.

The court found that while the trial judge misspoke on one aspect of the conspiracy instruction, the error did not warrant a new trial as the real issue—whether the appellant was a member of the conspiracy—was clearly explained to the jury.

The Vetrovec instruction and guidance on inconsistent statements were found to be satisfactory.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the trial judge imposed a sentence well within the appropriate range, considering the appellant's personal and family circumstances.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted at jury trial of importing and conspiracy to import heroin, and of possession of and conspiracy to possess heroin for the purposes of trafficking.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on multiple grounds, including the failure to instruct on frailties of voice identification, the adequacy of the Vetrovec instruction regarding a key Crown witness, the absence of a special instruction regarding co-accused testimony, the failure to provide a remedial instruction on the right to silence, and the trial judge's failure to address inflammatory comments made by co-counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the convictions and the sentence of 16 years imprisonment.

The appellant was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking arising from a reverse sting operation conducted by the RCMP in August 1997.

The appellant was initially acquitted in 2000, but the Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

At the retrial in 2014, the appellant sought a stay of proceedings based on abuse of process, alleging that the lead investigator deliberately misled his superiors and withheld disclosure.

The trial judge rejected these allegations and convicted the appellant.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, and dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 10 years 10 months imprisonment and delayed parole eligibility were fit.

The offender was sentenced following convictions for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

Evidence established that the offender had operated a large-scale marijuana trafficking enterprise for approximately fourteen years, distributing significant quantities and accumulating substantial illicit proceeds.

The sentencing court treated the offender’s admissions of long-term trafficking as aggravating circumstances under s.725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code and emphasized denunciation and general deterrence given the scale and organized nature of the operation.

Charter breaches identified during pre‑trial proceedings were found to be technical and did not justify sentence reduction.

The court imposed a penitentiary sentence, consecutive terms for the offences, a substantial fine to strip illicit gains, and a victim surcharge.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his residence and located 505 grams of cocaine hidden in a Kleenex tissue box.

The Crown relied primarily on circumstantial evidence to establish knowledge and control, including the accused’s admitted involvement in marijuana trafficking, drug paraphernalia found in the residence, and his association with a known cocaine trafficker.

The accused testified that he had no knowledge of the cocaine and suggested that a third party with access to the residence may have hidden it there shortly before the search.

The court rejected aspects of the accused’s credibility regarding the extent of his drug trafficking but found that the possibility that the third party concealed the cocaine in the residence raised a reasonable doubt about the accused’s knowledge.

As knowledge was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the essential element of possession was not established.

The accused brought a s. 8 Charter application challenging the manner in which police executed a search warrant at his residence using a dynamic entry.

The accused argued that the failure to comply with the knock notice rule and the alleged ransacking of the home rendered the search unreasonable and required exclusion of cocaine discovered during the search.

The court reviewed the governing principles from recent jurisprudence concerning dynamic entries and exigent circumstances.

It held that police had reasonable grounds to conduct a dynamic entry based on risks of destruction of cocaine and the possible presence of firearms connected to the drug investigation.

The court further found insufficient evidence that the search itself was conducted in an unreasonably destructive or disorderly manner.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, sought leave to adduce third party suspect evidence suggesting another individual was responsible for the drugs discovered during execution of a search warrant.

The proposed evidence connected the third party to cocaine trafficking and placed him at the residence shortly before police located the drugs, along with evidence of suspicious driving, possession of a large sum of cash, and cocaine discovered at his own residence.

Applying the governing test from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court held that the accused met the evidentiary burden of demonstrating a sufficient connection between the third party and the offence.

The evidence was capable of supporting a reasonable inference that the third party deposited the cocaine at the residence to avoid police detection.

Concerns about the strength of the inference or competing explanations were matters for the trier of fact rather than the threshold admissibility stage.