Christine Mainville

The appellant was convicted of gross indecency against his sister and appealed the conviction.

The appeal raised five issues, all concerning the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability of the appellant and the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's conclusions.

The court reiterated the high deference owed to trial judges' credibility findings and affirmed that the judge correctly applied principles regarding witness demeanor and the theory of recent fabrication.

The appellant, convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and failing to stop at an accident, appealed her convictions and sentence.

The central issue at trial was the defence of necessity, claiming she drove due to fear for her safety.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to elicit evidence of the appellant's pre-trial silence regarding the alleged attack and by drawing an adverse inference from that silence, thereby breaching her right to silence.

The court held that the right to silence cannot be used to incriminate an accused or impeach credibility, and that suggesting a defence is a "recent fabrication" due to pre-trial silence undermines this right.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged breach of his Charter right under section 11(b) to be tried within a reasonable time.

The trial was scheduled to conclude on January 8, 2021, which would be 18 months and 7 days from the commencement of proceedings on July 1, 2019, exceeding the presumptive 18-month ceiling established in Jordan.

The applicant demonstrated no defence delay and made sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay, particularly regarding the complainant's unavailability due to high school examinations, which was foreseeable given the nature of the charges.

The court found the Crown fell short of its obligations to anticipate scheduling problems and take reasonable steps to avoid them.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The appellant, David Réal Arsenault, appealed his conviction for marijuana production and possession for trafficking, and his sentence.

He raised two grounds: the trial judge's failure to assist him as a self-represented litigant and to rule on a constitutional motion regarding a search warrant, and the violation of his linguistic rights by forcing him to proceed without French-speaking counsel.

The Crown conceded the first ground, agreeing to a new trial and undertaking to seek a stay of proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on this basis, quashing the conviction and ordering a new trial.

Regarding the linguistic rights argument, the Court found that the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment was a reasonable exercise of discretion, as the appellant had not demonstrated sufficient diligence in securing French-speaking counsel over a six-year period.

The Court also found the appellant's new evidence on this point to lack credibility.

The Attorney General of Canada sought an adjournment of a judicial review application regarding a surrender order to Romania dated March 4, 2019.

The applicant had been in custody in Canada since October 31, 2016, and was subject to a three-year sentence in Romania with credit for time served.

The court granted the adjournment to permit the Minister of Justice to reconsider the surrender decision in light of alleged violations of the Extradition Act, directing reconsideration to occur as soon as possible.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal negligence causing death under s. 219(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found the appellant negligent in failing to conduct a thorough daily inspection of his semi-trailer, resulting in a dual wheel detaching and striking a vehicle, fatally injuring the occupant.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in applying the legal standard for criminal negligence, and (2) the trial judge erred in using the appellant's prior compelled testimony in violation of s. 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal accepted the second ground, finding the trial judge improperly used the appellant's prior incriminating testimony to undermine his credibility and reject his defence at trial.

The applicant, a lawyer charged with attempting to obstruct justice and perjury, sought production of third-party records held by the Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC).

The charges arose from her alleged representations about possessing a video recording of a police officer stealing money during a search.

The applicant sought records from three PPSC counsel.

The court applied the first stage of the O'Connor test and found that the records of two PPSC counsel were likely relevant to the charges, ordering them produced for judicial inspection.

The application for records from the third counsel was dismissed without prejudice.

Appeal from a conviction and sentence imposed by Justice Randall W. Lalande of the Ontario Court of Justice on November 2016 and January 4, 2017, respectively.

The matter was adjourned to February 15 for full argument on the merits, with one hour allocated for the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences arising from incidents alleged to have occurred 33 years prior, when the appellant was 14 years old and babysat the complainant, who was nearly 6 years old at the time.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on acceptance of the complainant's evidence over the appellant's denial.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying the principle from R. v. J.J.R.D. by failing to provide a "considered and reasoned" analysis of the complainant's evidence.

Although the trial judge identified the need for confirmatory evidence, he failed to identify any independent evidence supporting the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

Derrick Harvey, an American citizen, appealed his 2011 guilty pleas for assault and failing to comply with a recognizance, which subsequently led to his permanent residence application being refused due to criminality.

He argued his plea was not informed as his trial counsel failed to advise him of the significant immigration consequences.

The Superior Court of Justice, on summary conviction appeal, found that Harvey's plea was not informed because he was unaware of the critical ramifications, specifically the distinction between border entry and criminal inadmissibility for permanent residence.

The court emphasized that a plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, including collateral consequences.

It was not necessary to find counsel ineffective.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea set aside, and a new trial ordered, with the decision to re-prosecute left to the Crown.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breaking and entering into a dwelling house contrary to s. 348(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on fingerprint evidence linking him to a theft of over $4,000 from a condominium unit where he worked as a concierge.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the reliability of the fingerprint evidence; (2) a violation of s. 11(b) Charter rights regarding trial delay; and (3) a violation of s. 7 Charter rights regarding the failure to preserve video evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds and upheld the conviction.

The appellants pleaded guilty to marijuana production under section 7(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and received the mandatory minimum sentence of nine months imprisonment.

The appellants appealed on the grounds that their guilty pleas were not informed due to ineffective assistance of counsel and language barriers.

The police brief summarizing the facts was in English only, not shared with the appellants, and contained admissions that would establish aggravating factors triggering the mandatory minimum sentence.

The appellants were not adequately informed of these consequences.

The court found that the appellants' guilty pleas were uninformed and that they suffered prejudice, as they would not have pleaded guilty had they been aware of the relevant facts and sentencing consequences.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a young woman (A.Y.) and sentenced to two years less one day.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on the ground that the trial judge improperly used the complainant's prior consistent statement—an anonymous email sent to police the morning after the alleged assault—as corroboration of her trial testimony.

The trial judge had explicitly stated that the email was "corroboration of her evidence." The Court of Appeal held that while the email was admissible for limited purposes (to rebut the defence theory regarding motive and to assess the complainant's credibility through her conduct), it could not be used as corroboration in the legal sense because it was not from an independent source and could not confirm the veracity of the complainant's testimony unless improperly used for the truth of its contents or by treating consistency as confirmatory.

The court found the trial judge erred in law and allowed the appeal, quashing the conviction and ordering a new trial.

Police obtained broad “tower dump” production orders requiring telecommunications providers to disclose subscriber information for thousands of mobile devices connected to multiple cell towers during specified time periods.

The providers brought Charter applications challenging the orders and seeking to quash them or obtain exemptions.

The police then applied to revoke the production orders under the Criminal Code to replace them with narrower orders.

The court held that revocation applications may proceed ex parte and revoked the original orders, but exercised its discretion to hear the telecommunications companies’ Charter applications even if they were rendered moot because of the broader public importance of privacy concerns relating to tower dump production orders.