Scott Leslie Wheildon

The appellant, Lalendra Desilva, appealed his convictions for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding reasonable grounds for his arrest, the lawfulness of subsequent searches, and in assessing breaches of his Charter right to counsel (sections 8, 9, and 10(b)).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding of reasonable grounds for arrest and the lawfulness of the searches.

While the Court found an additional breach of the appellant's right to counsel due to a one-hour delay in facilitating access, it concluded that, applying the Grant test, the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, given the seriousness of the crime and the minimal impact of the breach on the appellant's protected interests.

The appellant, Latoya Ceballo, appealed her conviction for importing cocaine, arguing that the trial judge erred in denying her Charter application to exclude evidence.

Ceballo contended she was detained during a secondary customs inspection without being promptly advised of her Charter rights (ss. 10(a), 10(b)).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that Ceballo was not detained prior to admitting possession of cocaine.

The court reiterated that routine border inspections, including ion scans and questioning about travel, do not constitute detention.

It found no error in the trial judge's assessment that the Border Services Officer's actions were not intrusive enough, nor was there a sufficiently strong particularized suspicion or subjective decision to engage in an intrusive investigation to trigger detention.

The court also found no material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

A Gardiner hearing determined that the accused believed he possessed only cocaine, not fentanyl.

The court found the accused was not wilfully blind to the nature of the substance.

The accused, a young first-time adult offender with strong family support and early guilty plea, was sentenced to two years imprisonment: fifteen months for cocaine trafficking and nine months consecutive for fentanyl trafficking, with ancillary orders including DNA databank sample, weapons prohibition, and forfeiture.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's finding that there were reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant for wilful obstruction of a peace officer, arguing that his refusal to answer police questions should not have been considered and that video evidence did not support active resistance during a pat-down search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge's consideration of the appellant's conduct (stiffening and pulling away) was part of a larger context, and her findings of active resistance and reasonable officer actions for safety were supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for importing heroin and conspiracy to import heroin.

At the hearing, the appellant abandoned the conviction appeal.

The sentence appeal concerned a 15-year custodial sentence (less credit for 200 days presentence custody) imposed for conspiracy to import heroin and a concurrent 12-year sentence for the substantive importation count.

The sentencing judge found the appellant was part of a broad ongoing conspiracy to import heroin on multiple occasions between October 2010 and March 2011, involving the importation of 2.5 kilograms of heroin valued between $200,000 and $750,600.

The appellant played a significant role well beyond that of a courier, recruiting and organizing multiple couriers to travel to African countries to facilitate importations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in law or principle and concluding the sentence was fit.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and marihuana, conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances, and participating in a criminal organization.

The principal issue on appeal concerned the admissibility of communications found on a Blackberry seized from a co-accused.

The trial judge had ruled the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Marakah, the Crown conceded the appellant had standing and that the seizure violated his Charter section 8 rights.

The appellate court applied the Marakah framework and determined the evidence must be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the serious breach of privacy rights and substantial impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

An aboriginal first-time offender was sentenced for trafficking in marijuana over 3 kg, possession of marijuana over 3 kg for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of cannabis resin for the purpose of trafficking.

The offender operated a marijuana dispensary and later supplied other dispensaries during a period of uncertain law enforcement.

The court imposed a 45-day intermittent sentence, considering the evolving social attitudes toward marijuana, the offender's benevolent intentions, his aboriginal status and family background, his lack of prior record, and his strong rehabilitation prospects since arrest.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence for drug importation.

The appellant challenged the jury selection process as unrepresentative, argued he was prejudiced by the jury's lack of knowledge of his custodial status during trial, and contended the police failed to properly investigate matters raised in his defence.

The Court of Appeal rejected all grounds of appeal regarding conviction.

The appellant also argued his 13-year sentence (less 2 years 3 months pre-sentence custody credit) for importing 1.98 kg of street-ready heroin was unduly harsh.

The court found no error in the trial judge's sentencing determination and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The accused, O’Neil Harriott, was convicted by a jury of weapons trafficking (offer to transfer a handgun) and cocaine trafficking (offer to sell 2 ounces of cocaine), but acquitted on three counts of actual cocaine trafficking based on a duress defence.

The defence brought a constitutional challenge to the three-year mandatory minimum sentence for weapons trafficking under section 99(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated section 12 of the Charter.

The court found the mandatory minimum grossly disproportionate, both in the accused's specific circumstances (a hollow offer to sell a gun with no intent or ability to provide it, under duress) and in reasonable hypothetical scenarios (e.g., licensing infractions).

The mandatory minimum was declared of no force or effect.

The court then sentenced the accused to a suspended sentence on the cocaine trafficking charge and 6 months less a day consecutive on the weapons trafficking charge, along with three years' probation and a lifetime weapons prohibition, considering mitigating factors such as duress, limited record, and pre-sentence custody.

The applicant sought to exclude eyewitness identification evidence of a police officer in a criminal case involving drug possession and trafficking.

The officer identified the applicant as a passenger in a vehicle stop, initially based on a single MTO photograph and later confirmed upon arrest.

The court conducted a voir dire to assess the admissibility of this evidence, considering its reliability, the officer's flawed note-keeping, and the presence of confirmatory evidence from other sources, including the driver's testimony.

The application was dismissed, with the court ruling that the evidence was admissible, subject to proper jury instructions on its frailties and weight.