Christine Mainville

The appellants were convicted of numerous fraud-related offences arising from a widespread credit and debit card skimming scheme operated through a storefront business.

Three of the appellants were also convicted of participating in and committing offences for the benefit of a criminal organization.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of wiretap evidence, the finding that they constituted a criminal organization, and various individual convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the wiretap authorization was properly granted and the group met the statutory definition of a criminal organization.

The sentence appeals of the two principal offenders were dismissed, while the sentences of the two lesser offenders were varied in part.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months for break and enter, arguing the trial judge should have imposed consecutive sentences of less than six months each to preserve his right to appeal a removal order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was aware of the immigration consequences and the sentence was reasonable given the severity of the offences and the appellant's record.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and arson-related offences after his hardware store was destroyed in a fire set by co-conspirators to collect insurance proceeds.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning regarding colluding witnesses, improperly admitted hearsay statements under the co-conspirator exception, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his 12-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, and held the verdict was reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit given the appellant's high degree of moral blameworthiness.

Police obtained broad “tower dump” production orders requiring telecommunications providers to disclose subscriber information for thousands of mobile devices connected to multiple cell towers during specified time periods.

The providers brought Charter applications challenging the orders and seeking to quash them or obtain exemptions.

The police then applied to revoke the production orders under the Criminal Code to replace them with narrower orders.

The court held that revocation applications may proceed ex parte and revoked the original orders, but exercised its discretion to hear the telecommunications companies’ Charter applications even if they were rendered moot because of the broader public importance of privacy concerns relating to tower dump production orders.

The applicant, a Justice of the Peace, sought judicial review of a decision by the Justices of the Peace Review Council regarding his inappropriate conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application primarily due to an unexplained 18-month delay in bringing the proceeding.

The court also considered the merits, finding no procedural unfairness in the complaint or investigation process, and rejecting the applicant's claim of ineffective counsel, noting there is no right to effective counsel in civil proceedings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences, arguing that the warrantless search of his vehicle's trunk violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The police stopped the vehicle, and after the driver failed a roadside screening test, the vehicle was to be towed.

The appellant's nervous demeanor and dissociation from the vehicle led police to search the trunk, where they found a handgun.

The Court of Appeal assumed a s. 8 breach but applied the Grant framework, concluding that the firearm was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to the officers' good faith, the reduced expectation of privacy in an impounded vehicle, and society's interest in adjudicating serious gun offences.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder by a jury.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting the preliminary inquiry testimony of a co-accused who refused to testify at trial, failing to properly instruct the jury on the evidence, and improperly answering a jury question.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to properly exercise his discretion under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, failed to relate the evidence to the issues in his jury charge, and provided a procedurally and substantively flawed response to a jury question.