Stuart Konyer

The appellants were convicted of numerous fraud-related offences arising from a widespread credit and debit card skimming scheme operated through a storefront business.

Three of the appellants were also convicted of participating in and committing offences for the benefit of a criminal organization.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of wiretap evidence, the finding that they constituted a criminal organization, and various individual convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the wiretap authorization was properly granted and the group met the statutory definition of a criminal organization.

The sentence appeals of the two principal offenders were dismissed, while the sentences of the two lesser offenders were varied in part.

A 26-year-old Inuit street person with severe alcohol and drug addiction was convicted of nine offences including assault, mischief, and breaching court orders.

He faced a mandatory victim surcharge of $900 ($100 per offence) under section 737 of the Criminal Code.

Living on social assistance with a monthly income of $250, the accused challenged the constitutionality of the victim surcharge provision, arguing it violated section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found that the victim surcharge constitutes punishment and that imposing it on an indigent offender in these circumstances would be grossly disproportionate, both as applied to the accused and in reasonable hypothetical cases.

The court declared section 737 of no force or effect.

Multiple accused brought directed verdict motions in a jury trial alleging fraud and conspiracy involving the takeover of ING Direct customer bank accounts using confidential customer information.

The court reviewed the legal requirements for conspiracy, emphasizing the need for proof of an agreement and a shared unlawful objective, which may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.

The court held that there was some evidence capable of supporting an inference of conspiratorial agreement for certain counts, including evidence that one accused obtained confidential banking information and that another used that information to access accounts and transfer funds.

The motions for directed verdicts were dismissed for several accused because the evidence could permit a properly instructed jury to infer participation in the conspiracy or fraud.

However, one accused obtained a directed verdict of acquittal on a specific fraud count due to insufficient evidence linking him to the fraudulent transfer of funds.

The accused was charged with impaired driving by drug, dangerous driving, and breach of an undertaking.

The accused admitted to the actus reus of both impaired and dangerous driving but raised the defence of involuntary intoxication, claiming he did not knowingly consume Clonazepam.

The court found that while involuntary intoxication can undermine the mens rea for impaired driving and modify the objective standard for dangerous driving, the accused failed to raise a reasonable doubt about voluntary consumption.

The court found the accused's testimony unreliable due to significant memory gaps and credibility concerns, and noted that evidence of powdery residue in the accused's nostrils was consistent with voluntary drug ingestion.

The court convicted on all three counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He conceded the trial judge correctly stated the law but argued the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence to sustain the conclusion based on the circumstances leading up to a phone call and the clear language the appellant used with an undercover officer.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant was already serving an eight-year penitentiary term, had a substantial prior record, and the offence was serious and related to a police officer doing his job.

The appellants appealed their convictions for a home invasion motivated by a mistaken belief about a marijuana grow operation.

The Crown's case relied on K.G.B. statements from two accomplices who recanted at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the verdicts reasonable and upholding the trial judge's decision to take judicial notice of the general location and movement of cell phones based on cell tower signals without expert evidence.

However, the sentence appeal for one appellant was allowed, reducing his sentence from 10 years to 8 years due to his younger age, lesser criminal record, and the parity principle.

The young person pleaded guilty to aggravated assault following a swarming incident where the victim was repeatedly stabbed with a box cutter.

The youth court judge imposed a sentence of two years' probation.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the probation sentence demonstrably unfit given the seriousness of the violent offence, the young person's role as the ringleader, and the devastating impact on the victim.

The sentence was varied to a nine-month custody and supervision order followed by six months' probation.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits, including weekly income benefits and housekeeping expenses, following a 1991 motor vehicle accident.

The insurer terminated benefits in 1994.

The arbitrator found the applicant lacked credibility due to contradictory statements made to the Workers' Compensation Board, the insurer, and her doctors regarding the cause of her disability.

The arbitrator concluded that the applicant failed to establish she was disabled as a result of chronic pain caused by the accident, and that her cognitive impairment was more likely due to prescription drug dependency than a traumatic brain injury.

The claims for benefits were dismissed, but the applicant was awarded 75% of her reasonable legal fees and all disbursements.