Stuart Konyer

A 26-year-old Inuit street person with severe alcohol and drug addiction was convicted of nine offences including assault, mischief, and breaching court orders.

He faced a mandatory victim surcharge of $900 ($100 per offence) under section 737 of the Criminal Code.

Living on social assistance with a monthly income of $250, the accused challenged the constitutionality of the victim surcharge provision, arguing it violated section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found that the victim surcharge constitutes punishment and that imposing it on an indigent offender in these circumstances would be grossly disproportionate, both as applied to the accused and in reasonable hypothetical cases.

The court declared section 737 of no force or effect.

Multiple accused brought directed verdict motions in a jury trial alleging fraud and conspiracy involving the takeover of ING Direct customer bank accounts using confidential customer information.

The court reviewed the legal requirements for conspiracy, emphasizing the need for proof of an agreement and a shared unlawful objective, which may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.

The court held that there was some evidence capable of supporting an inference of conspiratorial agreement for certain counts, including evidence that one accused obtained confidential banking information and that another used that information to access accounts and transfer funds.

The motions for directed verdicts were dismissed for several accused because the evidence could permit a properly instructed jury to infer participation in the conspiracy or fraud.

However, one accused obtained a directed verdict of acquittal on a specific fraud count due to insufficient evidence linking him to the fraudulent transfer of funds.

The accused was charged with impaired driving by drug, dangerous driving, and breach of an undertaking.

The accused admitted to the actus reus of both impaired and dangerous driving but raised the defence of involuntary intoxication, claiming he did not knowingly consume Clonazepam.

The court found that while involuntary intoxication can undermine the mens rea for impaired driving and modify the objective standard for dangerous driving, the accused failed to raise a reasonable doubt about voluntary consumption.

The court found the accused's testimony unreliable due to significant memory gaps and credibility concerns, and noted that evidence of powdery residue in the accused's nostrils was consistent with voluntary drug ingestion.

The court convicted on all three counts.