Randy Schwartz

Four co-accused appealed convictions arising from a large-scale police investigation into criminal gang activity in Toronto (Project Battery and Project Rx).

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of wiretap authorizations and general warrants, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The key issues involved: (1) material non-disclosure regarding the use of a Mobile Device Identifier (MDI); (2) warrantless police entries into common areas of condominium buildings; and (3) warrantless installation of hidden surveillance cameras in condominium hallways.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions but found that the warrantless installation of hidden cameras violated section 8 rights.

However, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants' convictions were dismissed except for a one-year sentence reduction for one appellant due to the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence regarding drug quantities.

Four accused were convicted of drug trafficking offences committed for the benefit of a criminal organization (the Five Point Generals), conspiracy to traffic controlled substances, and firearms offences following a three-month jury trial based largely on intercepted communications.

The appellants challenged their convictions on five grounds: jury selection procedures, cross-examination limitations of the Crown's expert witness, exclusion of defence expert evidence, admission of extrinsic misconduct evidence, and alleged imbalance in the jury charge.

They also appealed their sentences, primarily challenging the credit awarded for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and three of four sentence appeals, allowing only Shane Evans' sentence appeal based on inadequate credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and possessing proceeds of crime for allegedly misappropriating $530,788 from her former employer between 2007 and 2012 through unauthorized cheques, fraudulent payroll entries, and unauthorized credit card charges.

She appealed on three grounds: (1) the application judge erred in denying her Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel; (2) the trial was rendered unfair by Crown misconduct; and (3) the trial judge erred in refusing to hear her Charter s. 11(b) application on procedural grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first two grounds but allowed the appeal on the third ground, finding the trial judge's refusal to hear the s. 11(b) application was unreasonable.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in the stabbing death of a landlord.

The victim was stabbed 29 times and, while dying, made pointing gestures toward the appellant Nurse before expiring.

The appellants appealed on two grounds: (1) the admissibility of the victim's gestures as hearsay evidence, and (2) the lawfulness of a second forensic analysis of deleted BlackBerry Messenger chats conducted with updated software one year after the initial analysis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the gestures admissible under the dying declaration and spontaneous utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule, and that the second analysis of previously extracted data did not constitute a fresh search requiring new authorization.

The applicant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to six months' imprisonment followed by eighteen months' probation.

He appealed his conviction on grounds including misapplication of the law concerning reasonable steps in ascertaining consent and insufficient reasons for judgment.

The motion judge found the appeal was not frivolous and granted bail pending appeal, noting the short sentence made the appeal vulnerable to becoming moot.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder of a drug dealer who was found dead with blunt force trauma to the head and multiple stab wounds.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence including the appellant's connection to the deceased, knowledge of his residence, financial motive, threatening text messages, cell phone evidence, and possession of the deceased's stolen belongings.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: exclusion of alternate suspect evidence, admission of threatening text messages, and failure to leave manslaughter as a lesser included offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted at trial of being an accessory after the fact to murder, obstructing police, and public mischief.

She appealed only the accessory conviction.

The trial judge found that the Crown had failed to prove that Joshua Barreira, the alleged principal, was guilty of murder.

However, rather than acquitting the appellant, the trial judge convicted her on the basis that she had assisted Chad Davidson (the actual shooter) by serving as a witness to his wedding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the conviction was based on a theory of liability that fell outside the scope of the indictment, which was limited to the appellant's conduct in relation to Joshua Barreira.

The court entered an acquittal.

Appeal from convictions for possession of a firearm while prohibited and possession of a firearm without a licence.

The appellant was prohibited from possessing firearms under a lifetime order.

While on parole, he told his girlfriend his gun was at a firearms dealer in a nearby town.

Police discovered a high-powered rifle for sale under his name at the store.

The appellant testified he had no control over the firearm and that it was being sold on behalf of his brother-in-law to secure a loan.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence and convicted him.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his approach to the failure of the defence to call certain witnesses, including reversing the burden of proof by requiring corroborating evidence and making improper inferences about witnesses refusing to lie for the appellant.

A police detective constable was convicted of one count of perjury and two counts of attempting to obstruct justice after a trial before a Superior Court judge sitting without a jury.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The convictions arose from the appellant's participation in a scheme to plant a firearm in a suspect's residence through a confidential informer, and his subsequent submission of an Information to Obtain a search warrant that contained false statements, material omissions, and misleading information about the origins and circumstances of the firearm.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's explanations for the omissions and inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge's credibility findings were supported by evidence, the inferences drawn were reasonable, and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

The sentence of five years imprisonment on each count, served concurrently, was upheld as appropriate given the serious nature of the offences and the appellant's position of trust as a police officer.

The accused appealed convictions for firearms and drug trafficking offences, challenging production orders used to obtain historical text messages from a telecommunications provider.

The Court held the accused had standing under s. 8 of the Charter because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the electronic conversation records.

The majority concluded that seizure of already sent and received messages from provider storage was lawfully authorized by the production order regime and did not require a Part VI wiretap authorization.

A dissent would have treated acquisition of those messages as requiring Part VI authorization and would have excluded the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court allowed the accused’s appeal and held that, on the totality of circumstances, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages recovered from the recipient’s phone, giving him standing to challenge the search under section 8.

With standing conceded, the warrantless search was unreasonable, and the text-message evidence was excluded under section 24(2) because admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Without that evidence the convictions could not stand, and the curative proviso did not apply.

Appeal from a first degree murder conviction arising from the death of a victim who was strangled and subsequently subjected to post-mortem sexual interference.

The appellant challenged the admission of confessions made during a "Mr. Big" undercover operation, the validity of a one-party consent wiretap authorization, and the first degree murder conviction based on section 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court upheld the conviction, finding that the Mr. Big statements were admissible under the Hart test, the wiretap authorization was properly issued, and the evidence supported a finding that the murder and sexual assault formed a single continuous transaction despite the post-mortem nature of some sexual acts.

The Court held that arson under s. 434 of the Criminal Code is a general intent offence, so self-induced intoxication short of automatism is unavailable as a defence.

The trial judge’s reliance on intoxication materially affected the acquittal, so the acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his convictions and 30-day sentence for assault and sexual assault committed during a roadside stop.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay, misapprehended evidence, and provided after-the-fact justification for the convictions by releasing reasons five months later.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable error in the delay calculation or credibility findings, and no evidence rebutting the presumption that the reasons reflected the trial judge's actual reasoning.

The sentence appeal was granted in part, upholding the 30-day jail term but varying it to be served intermittently on weekends.

On a Crown appeal in a criminal matter, the Court addressed whether prior compelled civil discovery testimony could be used to cross-examine an accused at trial without violating s. 13 of the Charter.

A majority held that only prior testimony that is itself incriminating engages the constitutional protection, and that non-incriminating prior statements used solely for impeachment do not trigger s. 13.

The majority restored the conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and set aside the order for a new trial.

A dissenting minority would have barred the cross-examination, finding that compelled prior testimony assisting the prosecution in any way should remain protected.

The applicant, charged with the abduction and murder of an eight-year-old child, brought a pre-trial Charter application alleging unreasonable search and seizure regarding several search warrants.

The court upheld the validity of the warrants and the search of the applicant's vehicle and residence, allowing the Crown to admit physical evidence.

However, the court found that the warrantless forensic search of the applicant's laptop and cell phone, which had been seized from the vehicle, violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the digital evidence under s. 24(2), noting the high privacy interest in personal computers and the marginal probative value of the evidence sought to be admitted.