Randy Schwartz

The appellant appealed his concurrent life sentences for two counts of counselling to commit murder.

While incarcerated for offences against his ex-wife, the appellant attempted to hire an undercover police officer to kill his ex-wife and her boyfriend.

The trial judge imposed a life sentence based on the appellant's future dangerousness, despite the Crown not bringing a dangerous offender application.

The Court of Appeal found the life sentence disproportionate and outside the range for similar offences, citing R. v. Goyette.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the life sentence, designated the appellant a long-term offender, and imposed a 16-year determinate sentence less pre-sentence custody, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The Court also varied a non-communication order to allow contact with the appellant's adult daughter upon her written consent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of counselling to commit murder against his ex-wife and her boyfriend.

While incarcerated, the appellant agreed to pay an undercover police officer to kill the intended victims.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in admitting an audiotape of a telephone conversation under s. 24(2) of the Charter, admitting his police interview under ss. 10(a) and (b), instructing the jury, and dismissing his entrapment motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's Charter rulings, jury instructions, or conclusion that the police acted on reasonable suspicion without inducing the offence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences, arguing that the search warrant for his residence violated s. 8 of the Charter.

He contended that the Information to Obtain (ITO) relied on an uncorroborated tip from a confidential informant and lacked a sufficient nexus to his residence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that a sufficient nexus existed, as police observed the appellant engage in drug transactions immediately after leaving his apartment.

The court also agreed that the ITO was not misleading and the informant's tip was sufficiently compelling.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for several offences related to two retail store robberies.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification, admitting a photograph found on his cell phone during a search incident to arrest, and instructing the jury that simple robbery was an included offence to armed robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate, the cursory cell phone search lawful to determine ownership, and no miscarriage of justice regarding the included offence instruction.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the Crown's cross-examination was improper and that the trial judge's Vetrovec warning was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged that aspects of the cross-examination were improper but concluded they did not create a miscarriage of justice in the totality of the circumstances.

The court also found the Vetrovec warning adequate, noting that while additional points could have been included, they were not essential.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his 15-year sentence for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 15-year sentence, finding it fit for a brutal aggravated homicide and noting the sentencing judge made no errors regarding parity or the appellant's role.

However, the Court found the sentencing judge erred in granting only 1.22 days of credit for pre-trial custody based on a lack of pre-charge programming.

The Court increased the pre-trial custody credit to the standard 2-for-1 ratio, reducing the remaining sentence to eight years and six months.

The appellant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related weapons offences following a home invasion, and was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that his sentence offended the parity principle because his co-accused received a 5-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the disparity was justified by the co-accused's early guilty plea and the appellant's extensive criminal record for violent offences.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board denying him an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that the hospital report and the treating psychiatrist's testimony provided a reasonable basis for the Board to conclude that the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety, particularly to the victim of the index offence and his own family.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was acquitted of first-degree murder after the trial judge excluded expert and lay evidence regarding the meaning of a teardrop tattoo the accused obtained after the murder.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in excluding the sociologist's expert evidence by applying the Daubert factors, which are suited for scientific evidence, to non-scientific specialized knowledge.

The trial judge also erred in excluding the lay evidence of gang members regarding the tattoo's meaning within their culture.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant telecommunications company sought an exemption from two production orders requiring it to produce call data records for criminal investigations, arguing that compliance without compensation was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Criminal Code production order scheme does not permit a judge to order compensation for compliance.

A judge can only consider the financial aspect of compliance when deciding whether to grant an exemption on the basis that the financial burden is unreasonable.

The Court found that the appellant had not established that the cost of compliance was unreasonable in this case, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, who was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury, appealed his sentence of two years less a day incarceration and three years probation.

He was sentenced as an adult but ordered to serve his sentence in a youth facility.

The appellant argued the sentence was unfit, the trial judge failed to consider his immaturity under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, erred in treating psychiatric evidence, and failed to give enhanced credit for three years of pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding the adult sentence was fit and balanced.

The respondents were charged with fraud related to the issuance of alleged native status cards.

They applied for state-funded counsel to raise a constitutional challenge based on their aboriginal heritage, without first applying to Legal Aid.

The trial judge ordered the Crown to fund the defence and pay costs of the application.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the funding and costs orders, holding that under R. v. Rowbotham, defendants must apply to Legal Aid or demonstrate futility before seeking a funding order.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation, arguing the trial judge failed to consider whether he could be safely controlled in the community through supervision rather than treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered both treatability and supervision, and reasonably concluded there was no realistic prospect of managing the risk in the community.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of stolen property.

He raised issues regarding the voluntariness of his statement to police, a warrantless search, trial judge interference, the jury charge on recent possession, and the trial judge's answer to a jury question about a missing witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge that undermined the fairness of the trial.

Leave to appeal the conditional sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed as there was no error in principle.

The appellant appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that ordered a new trial after the trial judge erroneously directed an acquittal based on the Crown's failure to adduce evidence of arrest.

The appellant conceded the trial judge's error but argued the evidence could not justify a conviction.

The Court of Appeal held that the officer's evidence could support a conviction for care and control, and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on a youthful first-time offender who pleaded guilty to three armed robberies and dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle by the trial judge.

The Court deferred to the trial judge's balancing of general deterrence and denunciation against significant mitigating factors, including the respondent's strict bail compliance for three and a half years and his successful rehabilitation efforts.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that stayed proceedings against the respondent for domestic assault due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that while the appeal judge erred by factoring personal opinions about domestic assault into the analysis, the stay was justified based on the trial judge's strong findings of actual prejudice and institutional delay bordering on the constitutionally unacceptable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the stay but allowed the appeal with respect to costs, finding no basis for the costs order against the Crown.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing he did not have care and control of the vehicle.

The trial judge applied the law from R. v. Toews and found a real risk that the extremely impaired appellant could have woken up and driven the vehicle.

The summary conviction appeal court judge upheld this finding as not unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the trial judge refused an adjournment.

A subpoenaed witness had left the courthouse.

The Court of Appeal held that the refusal to allow the adjournment was arbitrary and calculated to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant filed a notice of abandonment for his sentence appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.