Randy Schwartz

The appellant appealed a total sentence of two years and three months.

She argued the sentence was ambiguous and improperly disparate compared to her co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no ambiguity and noting that the disparity was justified because the appellant was convicted of additional serious offences, including breaching court orders while on bail.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was justified in noting the difference between the two accused persons, specifically the use of a weapon while prohibited, and increasing the sentence on that account.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for historical sexual offences arising from alleged genital touching during karate stretching demonstrations involving former students.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed serious legal error by failing to properly analyze the effect of possible collusion and inadvertent tainting caused by an organizing witness's extensive involvement and repeated meetings among complainants.

The court also found that the trial judge improperly reversed the burden of proof, scrutinized defence evidence more harshly than Crown evidence, relied excessively on demeanour, and misapprehended significant parts of the record.

Although the verdict was not found unreasonable, the convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed an 18-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent following a conviction for sexual assault involving an attempted intercourse with a developmentally handicapped woman.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent did not represent a danger to the public to be unreasonable, given the circumstances of the offence and the respondent's lengthy criminal record.

The Court granted leave to appeal, varied the sentence to 3.5 months of incarceration, and imposed a 10-year weapons prohibition under section 109 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed a two-year sentence imposed on the respondent for multiple serious and sophisticated frauds committed while on parole for similar offences.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle by discounting specific deterrence and held the original sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The appeal was allowed, and a fit sentence of five years was substituted, reduced to 43 months after accounting for pre-trial custody.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and discharging a firearm with intent to wound after shooting the complainant in the neck.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge failed to give a limiting instruction on his post-offence conduct and failed to properly instruct the jury on the defence of accident.

He also appealed his 8-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the post-offence conduct was relevant to intent and the jury instructions were adequate given the lack of evidence supporting an accident.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence fell within the acceptable range.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against his step-daughter.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on reasonable doubt and seeking to introduce fresh evidence of post-trial statements by the complainant and her mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions complied with W.(D.) and Lifchus, and the proposed fresh evidence was not credible, reliable, or capable of affecting the verdict.

The appellant appealed a custodial sentence imposed after a guilty plea to historical indecent assaults against a young male.

Applying the conditional sentence framework from Proulx, the court considered both the risk of reoffending and the gravity of potential harm, together with the extent to which strict community conditions could reduce any danger.

Fresh psychiatric and psychological evidence, coupled with lengthy compliance on bail under house arrest and sustained treatment participation, demonstrated that the appellant had become a low risk to reoffend and was suitable for management in the community.

The court held that rehabilitation remained a primary sentencing objective in this type of case where it was realistically achievable, allowed the appeal, and substituted a further two-month conditional sentence plus probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction and six-month custodial sentence for an offence involving a young teenager.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly weighed the probative value against the unfair prejudice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle given the breach of trust involved.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to discrepancies in the victim's description, specifically the failure to notice a cleft chin.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the circumstantial evidence implicated the appellant and the victim's description was similar to the appellant's appearance.

The court concluded that the failure to notice a cleft chin was not an exculpatory dissimilarity and the verdict was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break, enter and theft, and attempted break and enter, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found a reasonable basis for the convictions based on the evidence, including a telephone found at the scene.

However, the Crown conceded that the sentence imposed fell outside the appropriate range.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, but leave to appeal the sentence was granted and the sentence was reduced to eighteen months concurrent on each count.

The appellant was convicted of welfare fraud for failing to disclose a loan from his cousin used to make car payments.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider his subjective understanding of the disclosure requirements, given his lack of commercial sophistication and language barriers.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge improperly merged the actus reus and mens rea analyses and failed to determine if the appellant knowingly failed to disclose the loan.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

The sole issue was whether the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code could be invoked to uphold the conviction.

The Court agreed with the majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal that the proviso properly applied and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and uttering threats, as well as his sentences.

He argued the trial judge committed a Coutts error, improperly relied on battered wife syndrome to explain delayed disclosure, and improperly used nurses' notes as corroboration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments or use of evidence.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal in part, reducing the sentence for sexual assault to three years due to an ambiguity in the trial judge's sentencing reasons.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal following conviction after jury trial on multiple serious offences arising from conduct against a single complainant, and after imposition of a seven-year penitentiary sentence.

The court accepted that the appeal was not frivolous, but found the applicant failed to establish that he would surrender into custody, relying on prior use of false identification, a past failure to appear for trial in another jurisdiction, an obstruction conviction, and the prospect of substantial additional incarceration on outstanding charges.

Applying the public interest analysis under s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code, the court held that enforceability outweighed reviewability given the seriousness of the offences, the length of sentence, concerns about interference with pending matters, and the absence of strong appeal grounds on the record before the chambers judge.

Bail pending appeal was denied.

The Crown appealed sentence after failing to disclose, at first instance, a breach of recognizance bearing directly on the offender's ongoing danger to young children.

The Court of Appeal accepted the fresh evidence, held that the six-month conditional sentence was unfit, and emphasized denunciation and deterrence as the paramount sentencing principles in light of sexual abuse of a young victim, breach of trust, invasive conduct, and serious impact on the victim.

Although guilty plea and disclosure of a second incident were mitigating factors, they did not displace the need for custody.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and a four-month custodial sentence was imposed effective immediately.

The Crown sought leave to appeal on a question of law alone from a summary conviction appeal judgment in a sexual assault prosecution involving a child complainant.

The proposed issue was whether the appeal judge erred in law in analyzing the trial judge’s self-instruction on the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal held the issue was confined to the particular facts and language used at trial and declined to grant leave.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application to revoke bail pending appeal and obtain a warrant for arrest after the accused committed further offences while on release, including indictable offences.

The respondent argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the recognizance in force at the time of the alleged breaches had been superseded by a later release order.

The court rejected that interpretation of s. 525(5) of the Criminal Code and held that a superseded recognizance does not deprive the court of jurisdiction where the appeal remains pending and the release continues to be governed by court order.

The court found the statutory criteria met and revoked bail without prejudice to a fresh release application based on new evidence.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his young niece.

The complainant disclosed the assaults several years later, and her testimony was uncorroborated.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, and the majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, with one judge dissenting on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge was entitled to believe the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant and that the verdict was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The Crown appealed an order directing that a young person charged with first degree murder be tried in youth court.

Applying the transfer framework under s. 16 of the Young Offenders Act, the court held that the inquiry required an assessment of whether public protection and rehabilitation could likely be reconciled within the youth court disposition regime.

Despite the gravity of the alleged planned and deliberate murder and the respondent's age, the evidence supported findings that the respondent did not suffer from a conduct disorder, had shown positive institutional adjustment, and had realistic rehabilitative prospects within the available 10-year secure disposition.

The appeal was dismissed and the youth court order was confirmed.