Randy Schwartz

The appellants were convicted of numerous fraud-related offences arising from a widespread credit and debit card skimming scheme operated through a storefront business.

Three of the appellants were also convicted of participating in and committing offences for the benefit of a criminal organization.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of wiretap evidence, the finding that they constituted a criminal organization, and various individual convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the wiretap authorization was properly granted and the group met the statutory definition of a criminal organization.

The sentence appeals of the two principal offenders were dismissed, while the sentences of the two lesser offenders were varied in part.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, administering a noxious substance, and failing to provide the necessaries of life in relation to her two-year-old son.

At trial, the Crown relied on expert evidence from the Motherisk Program regarding hair testing to prove the child had ingested cocaine over a 14-month period.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence challenging the methodology and validity of the hair testing.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it credible and potentially decisive.

The convictions related to cocaine ingestion were quashed and a new trial was ordered, but the order was stayed because the appellant had already served her sentence.

The appeal from the fracture-related convictions was abandoned.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of arson.

The accused, while highly intoxicated, left a pan of oil on a stove, causing a fire that destroyed his ex-girlfriend's house.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding that arson was a specific intent offence in these circumstances and that the accused's intoxication raised a reasonable doubt about his intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The majority held that arson under s. 434 is an offence requiring subjective intent or recklessness, making it akin to a specific intent offence where evidence of intoxication is relevant.

Although the trial judge erred in treating the classification of the offence as a question of fact, the error did not affect the outcome.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings that prevented a fourth trial of the respondent for first degree murder.

The respondent's first trial resulted in a conviction that was overturned on appeal, and his second and third trials ended in hung juries.

At the second and third trials, the judge excluded evidence that a 911 call containing details known only to the killer had been traced to a payphone near the respondent's workplace.

The Court of Appeal held that the 911-trace evidence should have been admitted under the principled approach to hearsay, as it met the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability.

Because the Crown was denied a full opportunity to present its case due to the erroneous exclusion of this highly probative evidence, the Court found that a fourth trial would not constitute an abuse of process.

The stay was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a former senior officer and director of a publicly held waste management firm, appealed his convictions for fraud over $5,000 and his sentence of eight years' imprisonment, a US $17.9 million restitution order, and a US $15.5 million fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The convictions arose from his undisclosed involvement in copper trading transactions that diverted millions of dollars from his employer to companies he controlled.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions on the duty to disclose, responses to jury questions, or the overall balance of the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court affirming the fitness of the sentence and the appropriateness of the restitution and fine orders, subject only to a clarification that restitution payments would be credited against the fine to prevent double recovery.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm and kidnapping, applied for an extension of time to appeal and for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown consented to the time extension but opposed the appointment of counsel.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding that the applicant lacked the means to retain counsel and could not effectively present his complex appeal, which included arguable grounds regarding after-the-fact conduct, Vetrovec warnings, and prior inconsistent statements.

The court referred the matter to Legal Aid Ontario, ordering that if legal aid is refused, counsel be appointed with fees paid by the Attorney General.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and failing to consider the defence of mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly treated the case as a credibility contest between diametrically opposed accounts.

The court held that the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence was reasonable and that the defence of mistaken belief in consent did not arise on the facts.

The applicant, a police officer convicted of assault and sexual assault, sought leave to appeal his summary conviction on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The applicant argued that the trial judge erred in characterizing the delay, particularly the period associated with the trial judge's delay in providing reasons for conviction.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of institutional delay and concluded that the appeal lacked both general significance to the administration of justice and strong merits.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for robbery with a firearm and use of a firearm during the commission of an offence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant and the Crown that the conviction under s. 85(1)(a) was statute-barred because its wording specifically excludes a s. 344 offence.

The court set aside the s. 85(1)(a) conviction and entered an acquittal.

The court also agreed that the concurrent sentence for the s. 85(1)(a) offence was illegal.

However, the court upheld the eight-year sentence for robbery with a firearm, which was based on a joint submission, dismissing the sentence appeal.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment and failing to comply with a recognizance, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing his conditional discharge.

He argued the Board erred in finding he posed a significant threat to public safety and in failing to order a Community Treatment Order (CTO) instead.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably relied on psychiatric evidence that the appellant would stop his medication and become a threat if absolutely discharged.

The Court also noted the Board lacked jurisdiction to order a CTO, as only a physician can issue one under the Mental Health Act.

The appellant was arrested for armed robbery.

Incident to his arrest, police conducted a pat-down search and seized his unlocked cellphone, briefly examining its contents and finding incriminating photos and a text message.

At the police station, the appellant was left alone for five hours before being interviewed, during which time he confessed.

The trial judge admitted the cellphone evidence, finding the search was a lawful search incident to arrest, and admitted the confession under s. 24(2) of the Charter despite an inadvertent breach of the appellant's right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, declining to carve out a cellphone exception to the common law doctrine of search incident to arrest.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his convictions and 30-day sentence for assault and sexual assault committed during a roadside stop.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay, misapprehended evidence, and provided after-the-fact justification for the convictions by releasing reasons five months later.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable error in the delay calculation or credibility findings, and no evidence rebutting the presumption that the reasons reflected the trial judge's actual reasoning.

The sentence appeal was granted in part, upholding the 30-day jail term but varying it to be served intermittently on weekends.

On a Crown appeal in a criminal matter, the Court addressed whether prior compelled civil discovery testimony could be used to cross-examine an accused at trial without violating s. 13 of the Charter.

A majority held that only prior testimony that is itself incriminating engages the constitutional protection, and that non-incriminating prior statements used solely for impeachment do not trigger s. 13.

The majority restored the conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and set aside the order for a new trial.

A dissenting minority would have barred the cross-examination, finding that compelled prior testimony assisting the prosecution in any way should remain protected.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was fully aware of and took account of the relevant factors, and found no error in the sentence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence excessive and held that the trial judge erred by relying on unsworn, uncontested statements from the appellant's father regarding the appellant's need for drug treatment.

The appeal was allowed, and a sentence in the terms of the joint submission was substituted.

The appellant appealed his first degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by admitting evidence of two loaded handguns seized from him that were unconnected to the murder, and by instructing the jury that this evidence could confirm the testimony of a Vetrovec witness (a jailhouse informant).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the firearms evidence was relevant to the appellant's knowledge of the murder weapons and properly admitted with a limiting instruction.

The Court also held the evidence was capable of confirming the informant's testimony, as it was independent and increased confidence in the witness's reliability.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from allegations by a child complainant at a family cottage gathering.

The court rejected arguments that the trial judge misapprehended photographic evidence and improperly admitted narrative evidence from a family witness, holding that the impugned evidence was either innocuous or properly confined against prejudicial use.

Although the appellant was improperly excluded from the courtroom during a portion of cross-examination contrary to s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code, the court found no prejudice and applied the s. 686(1)(b)(iv) proviso.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for illegal possession of handguns and breach of recognizance, arguing that the search warrant executed at his residence violated his section 8 Charter rights.

The warrant was based on an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip and was executed in the middle of the night.

The Court of Appeal held that the police had sufficiently corroborated the anonymous tip, including the appellant's criminal record and biographical details, to justify the warrant.

The Court also found the nighttime search reasonable given the risk to public safety and the presence of other occupants in the home.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with the abduction and murder of an eight-year-old child, brought a pre-trial Charter application alleging unreasonable search and seizure regarding several search warrants.

The court upheld the validity of the warrants and the search of the applicant's vehicle and residence, allowing the Crown to admit physical evidence.

However, the court found that the warrantless forensic search of the applicant's laptop and cell phone, which had been seized from the vehicle, violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the digital evidence under s. 24(2), noting the high privacy interest in personal computers and the marginal probative value of the evidence sought to be admitted.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondents, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a breach of section 8 of the Charter and excluding evidence under section 24(2).

The trial judge had excised misleading information from the Information to Obtain (ITO) and concluded the remaining facts could not support the search warrant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that even after removing the misstatements, there remained sufficient reliable evidence connecting the respondents and the searched premises to the robbery to justify issuing the warrant.

A new trial was ordered.