Alexander Victor Hrybinsky

The appellant, David Holden, appealed his conviction for fraud over $5,000 and money laundering, and his 12-year sentence, in relation to a multi-million dollar Ponzi scheme.

The conviction appeal argued the trial judge impermissibly inferred guilt from fabricated evidence.

The sentence appeal challenged the application of aggravating factors and sought a reduction due to COVID-19 incarceration conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning regarding the conviction and upholding the sentence as fit given the extensive aggravating circumstances, including the large scale of the fraud, its devastating impact on victims, and the appellant's history of similar offenses.

Jason Nassr, convicted of extortion, criminal harassment, and child pornography offenses, and sentenced to a conditional sentence, sought an order for publicly funded counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code to assist with his appeal against conviction and sentence.

The Crown conceded two of the three test elements (arguable grounds and inability to self-represent effectively) but questioned the means test due to a pending Legal Aid appeal.

The court found the applicant lacked means, had arguable grounds (specifically regarding the trial judge's jurisdiction to hear an abuse of process application post-verdict), and could not effectively represent himself.

The application for publicly funded counsel was granted.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, which were based on communications intercepted under judicial authorization.

At trial, a Garofoli motion challenging the authorization's validity due to redacted affidavits and inadequate summaries was dismissed, leading to conviction.

Subsequently, in two other prosecutions arising from the same investigation, the Crown conceded that further disclosure was necessary for the accused to make full answer and defence, which they could not provide without compromising confidential informants, resulting in stays of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal admitted evidence from these subsequent proceedings, finding it in the interest of justice.

Given the Crown's concessions in related cases, the court determined that fairness required the appellant's prosecution also be stayed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of attempt murder, aggravated assault, uttering threats, and failure to comply with probation, as well as his 13-year sentence.

The appeal raised issues concerning the trial judge's assessment of intent (capacity vs. actual intent), the admissibility of opinion evidence regarding credibility and demeanour, the alleged misapprehension of evidence concerning the appellant's intoxication and state of mind, and the use of the appellant's out-of-court statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against both conviction and sentence, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's reasoning or findings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and assault causing bodily harm, and his sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, as the court found no error in the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the complainant.

The sentence appeal was allowed because the original sentence for sexual assault exceeded the statutory maximum of 10 years.

The net sentence was varied to six years, 10 months, and two days.

The appellant, convicted of serious offences, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred in holding she had no jurisdiction to allow the appellant to withdraw an earlier undertaking to plead guilty.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant and the Crown's concession, finding that a trial judge does have jurisdiction to permit an accused to withdraw an undertaking or admission when the interests of justice dictate.

As the Crown did not oppose the withdrawal, the appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Richard Korecki, appealed his convictions for 14 personal injury offences against his former domestic partner, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of similar acts involving a former domestic partner.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had correctly applied the governing test for similar act evidence, balancing its probative value against its prejudicial effect, and that her conclusion was not unreasonable.

The appeal from sentence was not pursued and was dismissed as abandoned.

An appeal of an Ontario Review Board disposition maintaining a detention order for an individual found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge but the Board continued the detention order at the Southwest Centre for Forensic Mental Health Care, finding the appellant presented a significant threat to public safety due to lack of insight into his condition, poor medication compliance without supervision, and substance abuse issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was supported by evidence and represented the least onerous and least restrictive disposition appropriate in the circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of three firearms-related offences arising from his possession of a loaded .45 calibre handgun discovered during a dynamic nighttime search of his home.

The search warrant was issued via telewarrant and targeted the appellant's son.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the application of the Garofoli step six procedure, the reasonableness of the dynamic entry execution, and sought exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his sentence of 21 months' imprisonment and 2 years' probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, and uttering threats, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The complainant testified that she would not have consented to sexual intercourse three weeks after giving birth.

However, a sexual assault questionnaire completed at the hospital on the day of the alleged assault indicated that the complainant had reported consensual intercourse two days prior to the assault.

Trial counsel failed to notice this answer in the questionnaire and did not bring a section 276 application to cross-examine the complainant on this prior sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel's failure to attempt a section 276 application constituted ineffective representation that undermined the reliability of the verdict and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted at trial of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death, and was sentenced to six years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's factual findings regarding impairment and whether the operation constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent operator.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge's conclusions were rooted in adequate evidentiary foundation and entitled to deference.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed as the six-year term fell within the appropriate range for similar offences.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition maintaining a detention order for his care.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for assault, forcible confinement, and criminal harassment.

The Board accepted a joint submission from the appellant's counsel and physician to continue detention with increased community passes.

The appellant argued the Board erred in accepting the joint submission without properly discharging its inquisitorial duty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board was entitled to rely on the joint submission and had conducted its own inquiry concluding the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.