Alexander Victor Hrybinsky

The appellant pleaded guilty to defrauding his employer of over $2.3 million and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and ordered to pay $1.3 million in restitution.

After serving his sentence, he appealed the restitution orders, arguing inability to pay and that the orders hindered his ability to obtain a record suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant's failure to explain where the stolen funds went, his breach of trust, and his choice to prioritize significant discretionary spending over making restitution payments.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his self-defence claim and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the force used was unreasonable was supported by the accepted evidence of an independent witness.

The court also rejected the ineffective assistance claim, concluding that trial counsel's approach was reasonable and the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice or professional incompetence.

The appellant, a former senior officer and director of a publicly held waste management firm, appealed his convictions for fraud over $5,000 and his sentence of eight years' imprisonment, a US $17.9 million restitution order, and a US $15.5 million fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The convictions arose from his undisclosed involvement in copper trading transactions that diverted millions of dollars from his employer to companies he controlled.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions on the duty to disclose, responses to jury questions, or the overall balance of the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court affirming the fitness of the sentence and the appropriateness of the restitution and fine orders, subject only to a clarification that restitution payments would be credited against the fine to prevent double recovery.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder.

During the investigation, an undercover police officer posed as an Obeah spiritual advisor and obtained incriminating statements from two of the appellants.

The appellants appealed, arguing that the undercover operation violated their Charter rights to freedom of religion and equality, constituted a 'dirty trick', and that the statements were protected by common law religious privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the appellants' participation was motivated by a desire to obstruct the justice system rather than sincere religious belief, and that the police conduct did not shock the conscience of the community.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decisions regarding an in camera hearing and the refusal to sever the trial of the third co-accused.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He provided satisfactory proof that he is a full status Métis.

The Court of Appeal varied his probation order by deleting the condition requiring him to abstain from owning, possessing, or carrying weapons as defined in the Criminal Code.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by stating he was throwing all sentencing principles out the window except for separating the offender from society.

The Court allowed the appeal and imposed a global sentence of 10 years, taking into account the offender's egregious record, the seriousness of the offence involving two young people, and prior sentences for similar offences.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of three years' imprisonment for multiple drug and firearms offences, arguing it was unfit after his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm was overturned on a previous appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that the combination of drugs and guns is a serious aggravating factor and the three-year sentence remained fit and appropriate to achieve denunciation and deterrence.

The court also upheld the 30-day concurrent sentence for breaching a recognizance condition prohibiting cellphone possession.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sought to introduce fresh evidence from himself and another individual.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's evidence was always available and that trial counsel made a tactical decision not to call the other witness.

The court held that the proposed fresh evidence failed to meet both the due diligence and cogency requirements.

The appellant appealed an 18-month custodial sentence for fraud against an elderly victim.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the appellant had been alcohol-free for 6.5 years and had made significant restitution, leaving a balance of approximately $35,000.

The victim supported a conditional sentence requiring full restitution.

The Court allowed the appeal, finding that while the original sentence was fit, the unusual circumstances and fresh evidence warranted a conditional sentence of two years less a day followed by three years of probation to facilitate full restitution.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and firearms offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the validity of the search warrant and the trial judge's findings regarding possession of the drugs and the capability of the ammunition.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court held that possession of an unloaded firearm with readily accessible ammunition is not an included offence of possession of a loaded firearm, and since the Crown particularized a loaded firearm but proved an unloaded one with accessible ammunition, the conviction could not stand.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault convictions, seeking to introduce fresh evidence consisting of a death certificate for the complainant's younger brother.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence under the Palmer test, finding it was determinative of a factual issue regarding the timing of the alleged offences.

The evidence raised a real question as to whether the appellant committed the assaults as an adult or a juvenile.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, having been convicted of fraud and having had his conviction appeal dismissed by the Court of Appeal, applied for bail pending his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court found that while the applicant would surrender into custody and his leave application was assumed not to be frivolous, his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court held that at this stage of the proceedings, the principle of enforceability of the sentence takes precedence over the principle of reviewability, especially given the tenuous nature of a leave application to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The appellants, former executives of Livent, appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale commercial frauds involving the falsification of financial statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge's reasons were adequate, the verdicts were reasonable, and the trial judge properly assessed the credibility of unsavoury accomplice witnesses.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the penitentiary terms because the Crown failed to prove the actual amount of financial loss or that the company's bankruptcy was caused solely by the fraud.

The appellant, who was hearing impaired, was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault.

He consistently denied the allegations and wished to proceed to trial.

On the first day of trial, his counsel entered a plea of not guilty but informed the court the appellant would not dispute the allegations.

The Crown read the allegations, no evidence was called, and the trial judge entered a conviction without conducting a plea inquiry.

The Court of Appeal found that this procedure was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea and that the failure to conduct a plea inquiry, combined with trial counsel's pervasive lack of preparation and failure to follow instructions, resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm and uttering a threat against an intoxicated person in custody.

At trial, the parties agreed that a crucial portion of an audio surveillance recording was inaudible, and the appellant testified to what he had said.

During deliberations, the trial judge re-listened to the recording, concluded the appellant had said something materially different, and used this finding to reject his credibility and convict him without reopening the trial.

The Court of Appeal held that this denied the appellant the opportunity to make full answer and defence, constituting a denial of natural justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a finding of not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder.

He argued that the trial judge improperly reversed the onus of proof and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly required the Crown to prove the NCR status on a balance of probabilities and that the reasons adequately explained the reliance on unchallenged expert evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for fraud related to shareholder loans.

He argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons by failing to explain why his testimony was disbelieved and failing to identify confirmatory evidence for Vetrovec witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant knew of his company's dire financial condition implicitly rejected his denials, which was supported by forensic and witness evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was not manifestly unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing he was denied a fair trial because he was unrepresented and the trial judge failed to adequately assist him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had chosen to proceed without counsel rather than delay the trial further, and that the trial judge's assistance was adequate and did not result in an unfair trial.

The accused was convicted of sexual offences and sought an extension of time to appeal his conviction several years later.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, but a three-judge panel subsequently granted it.

The Crown applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, challenging the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to overturn a single judge's decision.

The Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the leave application under section 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act, overruling previous jurisprudence to the contrary.

However, the Court dismissed the application, finding that it raised no question of sufficient importance to warrant granting leave.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault, and his 10-year sentence, following a stabbing incident.

He argued the trial judge erred regarding evidence of his right to silence, prior consistent statements, and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal found that while the Crown made minor errors regarding the right to silence and prior statements, they caused no substantial prejudice and the curative proviso applied.

The court stayed the aggravated assault conviction under the Kienapple principle but otherwise dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals.