Richard Adam Fedorowicz

The applicants sought to exclude evidence (firearms, ammunition, etc.) seized from their vehicle, arguing violations of their Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)).

The court found that the warrantless search of the vehicle and occupants violated ss. 8 and 9 due to the Crown's failure to prove reasonable grounds based on unreliable officer testimony regarding cannabis residue observations.

However, the court found no breach of s. 10(a) or 10(b), deeming the delays in informing of detention reasons and rights to counsel justifiable for officer safety and operational requirements.

Applying the Grant test under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court balanced the seriousness of the state conduct, the impact on Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Despite the s. 8 and 9 breaches, which were not found to be wilful or deliberate, the court concluded that the strong societal interest in prosecuting serious firearm offences outweighed the breaches, and therefore, the evidence would not be excluded.

The defendant, Daniel Lopez-Carter, was charged with being an accessory after the fact to murder.

The Crown alleged he assisted the perpetrator by disposing of the getaway vehicle (a stolen black Ford F150 pickup truck) the day after the murder.

The defence argued the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the Crown's theory in its opening address was too specific.

The court found the defendant guilty, concluding that he knew of the murder, was involved in disposing of the vehicle (either by driving it or a support vehicle), and did so with the purpose of assisting the perpetrator to escape justice.

The court rejected the defence's "stealth particulars motion" argument, affirming that the Crown's opening address does not bind the prosecution to specific means if the essential elements are proven and no unfairness results.

K.W., a young person, pleaded guilty to robbery (stealing while armed with an offensive weapon or imitation thereof) under s.343(d) of the Criminal Code.

The court determined the appropriate sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The Crown sought a custody and supervision order followed by probation, while the defence argued for a probation order.

The court considered the serious nature of the offence, K.W.'s traumatic upbringing in a refugee camp, his undiagnosed Mild Intellectual Disability, and his efforts towards rehabilitation.

The court found that while the "custody gate" was open due to the violent nature of the offence (psychological harm), actual custody was not warranted.

A 5-month deferred custody and supervision order, followed by a 2-year probation order, a 5-year mandatory weapons prohibition, and a DNA order was imposed, balancing accountability, rehabilitation, reintegration, restraint, denunciation, and specific deterrence.

The appellant, Cory Whiston, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, challenging the admissibility of text messages.

The issues raised were the prosecution's multiple attempts to admit the text messages and their alleged use as prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretion to allow subsequent motions for evidence, especially when the evidentiary landscape changed (citing *R. v. Langan*).

The Court also clarified that the appellant's own statements in the texts were admissible as party admissions, not subject to the rules governing prior consistent statements (citing *R. v. Schneider*).

The appellant, Justin Thombs, appealed his convictions for five counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking and two counts of possession of property obtained by crime.

The Crown conceded one count of possession of proceeds (cash).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal for drug trafficking and the remaining property obtained by crime count (stolen license plate), finding no error in the trial judge's discretion to refuse a mid-trial Charter application, her assessment of plain view evidence, or her consideration of inferences.

The court entered an acquittal for the conceded cash count and refused leave to appeal sentence.

Vilroy Edwards pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic in a firearm and careless use of a firearm.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the dangerous nature of the sawed-off semi-automatic rifle, the accused's intricate involvement in arranging the sale and advising on its use, and the discharge of the firearm in a residential area.

Mitigating factors included his first offender status, young age at the time of the offence, guilty plea, acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and successful compliance with strict bail conditions.

The court also considered his difficult upbringing and the principle of restraint for young Black offenders.

The Crown sought a four-year sentence, while the defence sought sixteen months.

The court imposed a total sentence of 912 days (approximately 2.5 years) for firearms trafficking and 18 months concurrent for careless use, after crediting 338 days for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

Ancillary orders included a 10-year weapons prohibition and a DNA sample order.

The appellant, Wojciech Kuleczka, appealed a Justice of the Peace's decision to impose a one-year weapons prohibition and forfeit seized firearms under s. 117.05 of the Criminal Code.

The original decision was based on concerns about the appellant's mental stability, specifically detailed hallucinations he experienced, which led to high-risk police responses.

The appellant argued the Justice unreasonably inferred risk from his mental health history and misapprehended evidence from his doctors.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Justice's conclusion reasonable given the unexplained nature of the hallucinations and the potential for recurrence, which raised legitimate public safety concerns despite the appellant's lack of prior violence or misuse of firearms.

The appellant, Farhad Feizi, appealed his conviction for opium importation, arguing that evidence from a controlled delivery and search should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The challenge stemmed from inaccurate address information in the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the general warrant.

The trial judge allowed the Crown to amplify the ITO, finding the errors were made in good faith and were minor/technical.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, affirming that amplification is permissible for minor, good-faith errors, even if they relate to essential components of a search warrant application, and that appellate deference is owed to such findings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of serious offences, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred in holding she had no jurisdiction to allow the appellant to withdraw an earlier undertaking to plead guilty.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant and the Crown's concession, finding that a trial judge does have jurisdiction to permit an accused to withdraw an undertaking or admission when the interests of justice dictate.

As the Crown did not oppose the withdrawal, the appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

Akwasi Edusei and Tavoy Brown were sentenced for convenience store robberies.

Edusei was convicted of two robberies, disguise with intent, and possession of stolen property.

Brown was convicted of possession of stolen property and breach of court orders.

The court considered Edusei's extensive criminal record, the vulnerability of convenience store victims, and masked robberies as aggravating factors, with youth as the sole mitigating factor.

Brown's sentence was based on a joint submission.

Edusei received a global sentence of four years, with credit for pretrial custody including enhanced credit for lockdown conditions.

Brown received a 90-day concurrent sentence, largely covered by pretrial custody.

The Crown applied for certiorari to set aside a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge two respondents, Justin McGregor and Herve Kalonji, on various drug trafficking and criminal organization charges.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, affirming the narrow scope of jurisdictional review for preliminary inquiry decisions.

The court reiterated that such decisions are reviewable only for jurisdictional errors (e.g., failing to consider all evidence, impermissible weighing), not for errors of law or sufficiency of evidence.

The judge found that the preliminary inquiry judge properly exercised her jurisdiction in concluding there was insufficient evidence for committal, despite some potential errors in her reasoning regarding the evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood following a traffic stop on Highway 401.

The defence challenged the reasonableness of the officer's grounds for demanding breath samples, the admissibility of observations made during the roadside investigation, and whether the breath tests were conducted as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of circumstances including poor driving, inability to focus, slow movements, and admission of alcohol consumption.

The court rejected the Charter violation argument, found the roadside observations admissible for proving impairment, and determined the tests were conducted as soon as practicable.

The accused was convicted on both charges.

The Crown brought a motion to admit two out-of-court hearsay statements during a trial on an assault charge arising from a domestic dispute.

The statements consisted of a 911 recording and police notebook statements.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay exceptions, examining both necessity and threshold reliability.

The complainant claimed memory loss regarding the events.

The court found that the Crown met its burden on both prongs of the test and admitted both the 911 tape and the police notebook statements for the truth of their contents.

The defendant was charged with drug and firearm-related offences following a search warrant executed at his residence.

The defendant brought a Charter s. 8 motion challenging the validity of the search warrant on the grounds that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was legally deficient and that the search violated his right to privacy.

The court found that the affiant made material misstatements and omissions in the ITO, including mischaracterizing a witness as a confidential informant, failing to disclose relevant information about the witness's credibility and relationship with the defendant, and providing incomplete information about the defendant's criminal record.

The court determined that paragraphs containing information from the mischaracterized witness must be excised from the ITO.

After excision, the remaining information from the legitimate confidential informant was insufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the search warrant.

Additionally, the court found that there was no evidentiary foundation to believe the firearm would be found at the defendant's residence.

The search warrant was set aside as improvidently issued, and the evidence seized was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.