Richard Adam Fedorowicz

The accused was charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after stabbing her former friend during an altercation.

The incident followed a series of escalating disputes over social media and text messages, culminating in the victim and her friends attending the accused's home armed with weapons and making threats.

The accused, believing the victim was armed with a knife, stabbed the victim during a physical confrontation in the parking lot.

The court found that the Crown failed to disprove the elements of self-defence under s. 34 of the Criminal Code, concluding that the accused reasonably believed she was being attacked, acted for a defensive purpose, and responded reasonably in the circumstances.

The accused was acquitted.

The offender was found guilty of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after crossing the centre line at high speed and causing a head-on collision that resulted in catastrophic injuries to another driver.

The offender had been experiencing significant sleep deficits and fell asleep at the wheel.

The Crown sought a one-year custodial sentence, while the offender sought an 18-month conditional sentence order.

The court found that a conditional sentence would not adequately address the need for deterrence and denunciation, given the offender's choice to drive while severely sleep-deprived.

The offender was sentenced to one year in jail and a three-year driving prohibition.

The accused were stopped for a traffic violation.

An officer smelled marijuana and observed an empty cannabis packet, prompting a vehicle search under the Cannabis Control Act that yielded a loaded handgun and drugs.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of their rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the search, rendering the search and subsequent detentions unlawful.

The court also found violations of the accused's rights to be informed of the reasons for their detention and to retain counsel without delay.

Given the severity and multiplicity of the breaches, the court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant, convicted of voyeurism, publishing child pornography, and criminal harassment involving a minor, sought bail pending his conviction appeal.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous but argued detention was necessary in the public interest to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The motion judge found the grounds of appeal to be weak but granted bail, noting the applicant had been on house arrest for three years without breaches, posed no public safety risk, and risked serving most of his 30-month sentence before the appeal could be heard.

The applicants sought to exclude evidence (firearms, ammunition, etc.) seized from their vehicle, arguing violations of their Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)).

The court found that the warrantless search of the vehicle and occupants violated ss. 8 and 9 due to the Crown's failure to prove reasonable grounds based on unreliable officer testimony regarding cannabis residue observations.

However, the court found no breach of s. 10(a) or 10(b), deeming the delays in informing of detention reasons and rights to counsel justifiable for officer safety and operational requirements.

Applying the Grant test under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court balanced the seriousness of the state conduct, the impact on Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Despite the s. 8 and 9 breaches, which were not found to be wilful or deliberate, the court concluded that the strong societal interest in prosecuting serious firearm offences outweighed the breaches, and therefore, the evidence would not be excluded.

The defendant, Daniel Lopez-Carter, was charged with being an accessory after the fact to murder.

The Crown alleged he assisted the perpetrator by disposing of the getaway vehicle (a stolen black Ford F150 pickup truck) the day after the murder.

The defence argued the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the Crown's theory in its opening address was too specific.

The court found the defendant guilty, concluding that he knew of the murder, was involved in disposing of the vehicle (either by driving it or a support vehicle), and did so with the purpose of assisting the perpetrator to escape justice.

The court rejected the defence's "stealth particulars motion" argument, affirming that the Crown's opening address does not bind the prosecution to specific means if the essential elements are proven and no unfairness results.

K.W., a young person, pleaded guilty to robbery (stealing while armed with an offensive weapon or imitation thereof) under s.343(d) of the Criminal Code.

The court determined the appropriate sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The Crown sought a custody and supervision order followed by probation, while the defence argued for a probation order.

The court considered the serious nature of the offence, K.W.'s traumatic upbringing in a refugee camp, his undiagnosed Mild Intellectual Disability, and his efforts towards rehabilitation.

The court found that while the "custody gate" was open due to the violent nature of the offence (psychological harm), actual custody was not warranted.

A 5-month deferred custody and supervision order, followed by a 2-year probation order, a 5-year mandatory weapons prohibition, and a DNA order was imposed, balancing accountability, rehabilitation, reintegration, restraint, denunciation, and specific deterrence.

The appellant, Cory Whiston, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, challenging the admissibility of text messages.

The issues raised were the prosecution's multiple attempts to admit the text messages and their alleged use as prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretion to allow subsequent motions for evidence, especially when the evidentiary landscape changed (citing *R. v. Langan*).

The Court also clarified that the appellant's own statements in the texts were admissible as party admissions, not subject to the rules governing prior consistent statements (citing *R. v. Schneider*).

The appellant, Justin Thombs, appealed his convictions for five counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking and two counts of possession of property obtained by crime.

The Crown conceded one count of possession of proceeds (cash).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal for drug trafficking and the remaining property obtained by crime count (stolen license plate), finding no error in the trial judge's discretion to refuse a mid-trial Charter application, her assessment of plain view evidence, or her consideration of inferences.

The court entered an acquittal for the conceded cash count and refused leave to appeal sentence.

Vilroy Edwards pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic in a firearm and careless use of a firearm.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the dangerous nature of the sawed-off semi-automatic rifle, the accused's intricate involvement in arranging the sale and advising on its use, and the discharge of the firearm in a residential area.

Mitigating factors included his first offender status, young age at the time of the offence, guilty plea, acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and successful compliance with strict bail conditions.

The court also considered his difficult upbringing and the principle of restraint for young Black offenders.

The Crown sought a four-year sentence, while the defence sought sixteen months.

The court imposed a total sentence of 912 days (approximately 2.5 years) for firearms trafficking and 18 months concurrent for careless use, after crediting 338 days for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

Ancillary orders included a 10-year weapons prohibition and a DNA sample order.

The appellant, Wojciech Kuleczka, appealed a Justice of the Peace's decision to impose a one-year weapons prohibition and forfeit seized firearms under s. 117.05 of the Criminal Code.

The original decision was based on concerns about the appellant's mental stability, specifically detailed hallucinations he experienced, which led to high-risk police responses.

The appellant argued the Justice unreasonably inferred risk from his mental health history and misapprehended evidence from his doctors.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Justice's conclusion reasonable given the unexplained nature of the hallucinations and the potential for recurrence, which raised legitimate public safety concerns despite the appellant's lack of prior violence or misuse of firearms.

The appellant, Farhad Feizi, appealed his conviction for opium importation, arguing that evidence from a controlled delivery and search should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The challenge stemmed from inaccurate address information in the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the general warrant.

The trial judge allowed the Crown to amplify the ITO, finding the errors were made in good faith and were minor/technical.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, affirming that amplification is permissible for minor, good-faith errors, even if they relate to essential components of a search warrant application, and that appellate deference is owed to such findings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude intercepted communications obtained under a Part VI wiretap authorization issued during a large‑scale police investigation into alleged fraud and violence within the Greater Toronto Area tow‑truck industry.

They argued the authorization was facially invalid, that the Information to Obtain failed to establish reasonable grounds, that the affiant made material omissions and misrepresentations, and that confidential informant summaries were inadequate.

The court conducted both facial and sub‑facial review of the ITO, including amplification based on cross‑examination of the affiant.

It held that any drafting defects could be addressed through severance and that the ITO, viewed holistically, established a credibly‑based probability that a criminal organization associated with the Paramount Group engaged in fraud and violence.

The court also found no deliberate misconduct by the affiant and ruled the judicial summaries provided a meaningful basis to challenge informant evidence.

The applicants, charged with offences related to a tow truck turf war, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain (ITO) that supported a wiretap authorization.

The applicants argued that the affiant made material omissions and misrepresentations regarding witness statements and other evidence.

The court applied the Garofoli test and granted leave to cross-examine the affiant on three specific topics where omissions or misstatements could potentially undermine the preconditions for the authorization, while denying leave on other topics that merely challenged reasonable inferences drawn by the affiant.

The applicant sought judicial review in the form of certiorari to quash an order granting the Crown access to her youth records.

The Crown sought the records because the applicant was proposed as a surety for an adult accused in a serious criminal matter.

The reviewing court found that the application justice, who had previously presided over the adult accused's preliminary inquiry, denied the applicant natural justice by relying on his own assessment of the strength of the Crown's case from that inquiry without giving the applicant notice or an opportunity to make submissions.

The court quashed the order, concluding that the result would not necessarily have been the same had a fair hearing been afforded.

The appellant, convicted of serious offences, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred in holding she had no jurisdiction to allow the appellant to withdraw an earlier undertaking to plead guilty.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant and the Crown's concession, finding that a trial judge does have jurisdiction to permit an accused to withdraw an undertaking or admission when the interests of justice dictate.

As the Crown did not oppose the withdrawal, the appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The offender pleaded guilty to robbery simpliciter of a marijuana dispensary.

He had an extensive criminal record starting as a youth, but this was his first penitentiary sentence.

The Crown sought 3.5 years concurrent, while the defence sought two years less a day concurrent.

The court imposed a global sentence of 3 years (36 months) concurrent to his existing sentence, and granted 9 months of credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions due to the COVID-19 pandemic, leaving 27 months to serve.

The applicant brought a motion to stay his criminal charges, arguing that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The total delay was approximately 40 months.

The court deducted periods of defence delay and delay caused by the discrete exceptional event of the COVID-19 pandemic, bringing the net delay below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found that the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceedings, and the application was dismissed.

Akwasi Edusei and Tavoy Brown were sentenced for convenience store robberies.

Edusei was convicted of two robberies, disguise with intent, and possession of stolen property.

Brown was convicted of possession of stolen property and breach of court orders.

The court considered Edusei's extensive criminal record, the vulnerability of convenience store victims, and masked robberies as aggravating factors, with youth as the sole mitigating factor.

Brown's sentence was based on a joint submission.

Edusei received a global sentence of four years, with credit for pretrial custody including enhanced credit for lockdown conditions.

Brown received a 90-day concurrent sentence, largely covered by pretrial custody.

Two accused were charged with multiple offences related to an illegal online gaming and betting operation, as well as serious firearm offences.

The Crown opposed their release on both secondary and tertiary grounds under section 515 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the charges were serious and involved firearms, the proposed release plans with responsible sureties and strict house arrest conditions adequately addressed public safety concerns.

The court granted bail to both accused, emphasizing that detention is the exception and release the rule, and that the strength of the proposed supervision plan is a relevant factor in the tertiary ground analysis.