Stephanie Henderson

K.W., a young person, pleaded guilty to robbery (stealing while armed with an offensive weapon or imitation thereof) under s.343(d) of the Criminal Code.

The court determined the appropriate sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The Crown sought a custody and supervision order followed by probation, while the defence argued for a probation order.

The court considered the serious nature of the offence, K.W.'s traumatic upbringing in a refugee camp, his undiagnosed Mild Intellectual Disability, and his efforts towards rehabilitation.

The court found that while the "custody gate" was open due to the violent nature of the offence (psychological harm), actual custody was not warranted.

A 5-month deferred custody and supervision order, followed by a 2-year probation order, a 5-year mandatory weapons prohibition, and a DNA order was imposed, balancing accountability, rehabilitation, reintegration, restraint, denunciation, and specific deterrence.

The accused, charged with arson and four counts of attempted murder, sought a bail review after being denied bail.

The accused proposed a new plan of supervision involving 24/7 house arrest with two sureties, which constituted a material change in circumstances from his previous situation of living in a homeless shelter.

The court found the proposed plan mitigated the secondary ground concerns and that detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice under the tertiary ground.

The bail review was granted and the accused was released on strict conditions.

Sentencing for possession of a small quantity of crack cocaine after the accused was acquitted of several firearms and assault police charges.

The court considered the proportionality principle under ss. 718 and 718.1 of the Criminal Code and weighed aggravating factors including the harmful nature of crack cocaine and the admitted intention to sell the drug.

Mitigating factors included the accused’s youth, lack of criminal record, family support, strict compliance with bail conditions, and time spent in pre-trial custody on related matters.

Applying the criteria for a discharge under s. 730(1), the court concluded that avoiding a conviction would be in the accused’s interest and not contrary to the public interest.

A conditional discharge with one year of probation and abstention from controlled substances was imposed.

The accused sought exclusion of firearm and drug evidence alleging breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter following a police encounter and subsequent arrest.

Police had responded to a complaint of an assault and attempted to question a group of men outside a business when the accused fled.

Officers observed suspicious behaviour while the accused ran, including holding one arm in a manner suggesting concealment of a weapon, which led to pursuit and arrest after the accused confronted an officer with a firearm.

The court held that the initial interaction did not amount to a detention and therefore did not engage Charter protections.

The accused’s flight created reasonable suspicion justifying police pursuit and detention.

The arrest and subsequent strip search were lawful and the evidence was admitted.

During a jury trial for aggravated assault and weapons offences, the accused young person brought an application to exclude his adult criminal record, which consisted of a single conviction for first degree murder.

The defence had vigorously cross-examined the primary Crown witness on his extensive criminal record.

The court applied the Corbett framework and dismissed the application, finding that the probative value of the murder conviction on the accused's credibility outweighed its prejudicial effect, and that excluding it would create a serious imbalance given the attack on the Crown witness's credibility.

The Crown applied for certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash a preliminary inquiry ruling that discharged the accused on a charge of first degree murder while committing one accused on second degree murder and the other on accessory after the fact.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by weighing evidence, preferring defence-favourable inferences, and failing to consider the evidence as a whole under s. 548(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court found the preliminary inquiry judge improperly assessed competing inferences and failed to recognize that the circumstantial evidence was capable of supporting planning and deliberation.

Evidence including the shooter’s approach, the execution-style killing, the presence of a getaway driver, and post-offence conduct could reasonably support committal for first degree murder.

The discharge order was quashed and the matter remitted with directions to commit both accused for trial on first degree murder.