Lucille Shaw

Following a 26-year traditional marriage, the parties disputed spousal support and property equalization.

The court found the applicant had a strong claim for both compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support due to her role as a stay-at-home parent.

The court imputed a minimum wage income to the applicant starting in 2022.

The court held that the applicant was entitled to share in the respondent's significant post-separation income increases, including Restricted Stock Units, as her contributions during the marriage laid the foundation for his later success.

The court fixed spousal support at $12,000 per month for 2024 when the respondent's income exceeded $350,000.

The court dismissed the respondent's late claim for retroactive support adjustments.

The applicant was ordered to pay occupation rent of $1,500 per month from May 2023.

The court ordered the parties' pensions to be equalized rather than divided at source, and allowed the deduction of notional disposition costs for a rental property.

The offender was convicted of sexual interference against his daughter, who was between the ages of 4 and 13 during the offences.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the offender's position of trust, the duration of the abuse, and the profound harm caused to the victim, against mitigating factors such as harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and family support.

Applying the principles from Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, sentencing the offender to 7.5 years in custody, reduced to 6 years and 2.5 months after credit for pre-sentence custody.

A 20-year prohibition order under s. 161 of the Criminal Code was also imposed.

The appellant insurer appealed a preliminary arbitral ruling in a statutory accident benefits priority dispute under s. 268 of the Insurance Act and O. Reg. 283/95.

The central issue was whether the 90-day notice requirement in s. 3 was automatically suspended by O. Reg. 73/20 during the COVID-19 emergency period.

The court held, on a purposive interpretation of the emergency regulation, that the notice requirement functioned as a limitation period for that temporary regime and was therefore automatically stayed.

The arbitral dismissal of the priority claim was set aside on that basis, while the court noted that if this interpretation were wrong, deference would support the arbitrator's discretionary findings under s. 2.

The Applicant husband brought a motion for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and to sever the divorce from corollary relief.

The Respondent wife sought exclusive possession of her bedroom and a schedule for common areas.

The parties lived in the home with the husband's parents, who were added as respondents.

Both parties alleged abusive and harassing conduct by the other.

The court found insufficient evidence of violence or safety concerns to justify excluding either party from the home, noting that orders for exclusive possession should not be made lightly on contested affidavit evidence.

The court also declined to sever the divorce, as doing so could prejudice the wife's trust claim to the property.

Both motions were dismissed with no costs awarded.

The accused was tried without a jury on one count of sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and one count of sexual interference contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

The allegations involved multiple incidents of sexual assault occurring between January 1, 2016 and January 9, 2024, perpetrated by the accused against his daughter while she was sleeping.

The complainant testified that the accused would enter her bedroom while intoxicated and touch her breasts, buttocks, and vagina.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court found the complainant to be a credible and reliable witness and rejected the accused's evidence as not credible due to material inconsistencies regarding his alcohol consumption, evasiveness, and implausible precision in recalling details.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts.

The applicant sought interim spousal and child support from the respondent in a common law relationship that lasted approximately 16 years.

The respondent's parents and brother brought a summary judgment motion for possession of the matrimonial home.

The court granted the summary judgment motion for possession, finding that the applicant had no possessory rights as a common law spouse and no valid constructive trust claim.

The court imputed income to the respondent based on gifts and housing benefits provided by his parents and ordered that interim spousal support commence upon the applicant's vacation of the property.

The court deferred determination of the quantum of support and child support pending further submissions.

The appellant landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board review decision that declined to set aside an initial order finding she issued a bad faith N12 eviction notice.

The appellant argued she was denied procedural fairness because she did not receive notice of the initial hearing, as it was sent to an incorrect mailing address and to her email's spam folder.

The Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence showing the LTB relied on an outdated lease, but ultimately dismissed the appeal.

The court held that the LTB's finding that the appellant failed to exercise due diligence by not monitoring her email, which she had authorized for service, was a question of mixed fact and law outside the court's appellate jurisdiction.

The plaintiff, Flexpark Inc., moved for summary judgment to enforce a matured second mortgage and obtain possession of the defendant's property.

The defendant opposed the motion, claiming the mortgage was unconscionable under the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act and that she had been subjected to duress and undue influence.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding unconscionability or duress, noting the defendant was an experienced borrower represented by independent counsel.

However, the court disallowed a lender's fee of $18,750 due to the lack of a prior agreement, reducing the principal owing to $356,250.

Ultimately, the court granted summary judgment for the reduced principal amount plus interest and costs, and declared the plaintiff entitled to possession.

The court considered a motion by the defendants for production of video and audio recordings from the plaintiffs’ in-home camera system in a medical malpractice action.

The court found that while such recordings may be relevant to the issues in dispute, the plaintiffs’ privacy interests in their home are paramount and outweigh the need for production.

The motion for production was dismissed.

On a summary judgment motion arising from a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by an intoxicated nightclub patron, the court held there was a genuine issue requiring a trial on whether the corporate nightclub operator overserved alcohol and thereby incurred commercial host liability under s. 39 of the Liquor Licence Act and the common law.

However, the court dismissed the claims against the related property owner and the individual directors, finding no tenable basis to pierce the corporate veil, no evidence connecting the property owner to the nightclub's operation, and no personal duty of care on the directors to ensure adequate insurance.

The court also held that the directors' insurance-related personal negligence claim was statute-barred.

Claims for disgorgement based on waiver of tort could not stand as an independent cause of action, subject only to any remedy the trial judge might consider against the nightclub operator if liability is proven.

The applicant father sought the return of his son to Mexico under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, alleging wrongful retention by the respondent mother in Ontario.

The respondent opposed, claiming a grave risk of harm under Article 13(b) due to the applicant's alleged abusive conduct and the inadequacy of the Mexican justice system.

The court found that the Article 13(b) exception did not apply, as the alleged domestic violence was dated and not severe enough to meet the high threshold, and the Mexican legal system was deemed capable of protecting the child and mother.

The father's application was granted, ordering the child's return to Mexico with specified undertakings.

The applicants sought to exclude evidence (firearms, ammunition, etc.) seized from their vehicle, arguing violations of their Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)).

The court found that the warrantless search of the vehicle and occupants violated ss. 8 and 9 due to the Crown's failure to prove reasonable grounds based on unreliable officer testimony regarding cannabis residue observations.

However, the court found no breach of s. 10(a) or 10(b), deeming the delays in informing of detention reasons and rights to counsel justifiable for officer safety and operational requirements.

Applying the Grant test under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court balanced the seriousness of the state conduct, the impact on Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Despite the s. 8 and 9 breaches, which were not found to be wilful or deliberate, the court concluded that the strong societal interest in prosecuting serious firearm offences outweighed the breaches, and therefore, the evidence would not be excluded.

The defendants, a lawyer and his law firm, brought an interpleader motion seeking to pay disputed funds held in their trust account into court.

The funds arose from the sale of a property by the plaintiff corporation, 2823373 Ontario Inc., whose director, Diane Salman, was also a plaintiff.

A dispute arose among the corporation's shareholders regarding the release of these funds.

The plaintiffs opposed the interpleader motion, arguing the funds should be released to the corporation.

The court found that Ms. Salman, on behalf of the corporation, had initially instructed the defendants to hold the funds in trust, but later instructed their release.

The court denied the interpleader motion, concluding that the defendants were not neutral stakeholders and had a beneficial interest in the funds due to the lawyer's involvement as a director of the majority shareholder and the source of investment funds.

The court also declined to invoke its inherent jurisdiction to order the funds into court.

Consequently, the defendants were ordered to release the disputed funds to 2823373 Ontario Inc.

The offender, a 68-year-old first-time offender, was convicted by a jury of importing 8.365 kg of cocaine into Canada.

The Crown sought a sentence of seven years, while the defence sought a net sentence of 38.6 to 45.3 months, arguing for enhanced credit due to harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and the offender's age and health.

The court determined that the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody should be treated as a mitigating factor (a Duncan credit) rather than a mathematical deduction.

Balancing the aggravating factors of the large quantity of drugs and profit motive against the mitigating factors of age, health, and harsh custody conditions, the court imposed a sentence of seven years, less 653 days of Summers credit, resulting in a net sentence of 62.5 months.

Terrel Edwards was charged with eight offences, including assault and threats against his former girlfriend and five firearm-related offences.

The court, sitting without a jury, found Mr. Edwards guilty of the five firearm offences, rejecting his defence as fabricated due to inconsistencies and implausibility.

However, the court acquitted him of the assault and threatening charges, finding reasonable doubt due to concerns with the complainant's testimony regarding those specific incidents, including inconsistencies and a perceived attempt to minimize her own actions and emotions.

The defendant, Samuel Osei-Tutu, was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine (2.8899 kg) and was before the court for sentencing.

The Crown sought a seven-year sentence, while the defence proposed 4.5 years (net 4 years) due to mitigating factors.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the quantity and commercial nature of the drug, and mitigating factors including the defendant's lack of a criminal record, strong community support, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court also considered the impact of anti-Black racism on sentencing, as per R. v. Morris.

A sentence of 5.5 years (net 5 years after pre-trial credit) was imposed, along with ancillary orders.

This is a sentencing decision for S.D.C., who was found guilty of sexual assault and sexual interference involving his 7-year-old daughter.

The sexual assault conviction was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's young age, the offender's position of trust, and the victim's vulnerability, and mitigating factors such as the offender's work history and commitment to parenting.

Emphasizing the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in R. v. Friesen regarding the gravity of child sexual offences, the court rejected the defence's reliance on older precedents.

The offender was sentenced to two years less a day of detention, followed by three years of probation, along with various ancillary orders including DNA, firearms prohibition, non-communication, SOIRA registration, and a 5-year s. 161 prohibition.

Following a nine-day jury trial where no damages were awarded to the plaintiffs for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, the court ruled on the threshold issue and costs.

The jury found the accident did not cause or contribute to the plaintiffs' ongoing pain and impairments.

The court, granting the defendants' motion, determined that the plaintiffs' claims for non-pecuniary loss were barred under section 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act, as their injuries did not meet the "permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function" exception.

The court emphasized that the jury's finding on causation was binding.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis, totaling $111,614.65, despite the plaintiffs' adverse cost policy and financial hardship claims, due to their failure to make an offer to settle.

Nitish Verma was convicted by a jury of importing 13.739 kg of opium.

The Crown sought a nine-year sentence, while the defence argued for seven years, citing mitigating factors such as the offender's lack of criminal record, positive community contributions, and strong support network.

The court considered sentencing principles, including general deterrence and denunciation, and the less addictive nature of opium compared to other Schedule I substances.

Despite the large quantity of drugs and profit motive being aggravating factors, the court found the offender to be a courier, not a principal, and noted his high rehabilitative prospects.

A sentence of seven years was imposed, along with a DNA order, a 10-year firearms prohibition, and a forfeiture order.

The Crown prosecuted historical sexual offence allegations said to have occurred approximately 20 to 22 years earlier when the complainant was between four and six years old.

The court found the complainant sincere and generally credible, but not sufficiently reliable to ground convictions beyond a reasonable doubt, given material inconsistencies, the evolving nature of her memory, significant new disclosures at trial, and the implausibility of one alleged car incident.

The court also found the brother's evidence did not amount to material confirmatory evidence.

Applying the criminal standard of proof and caution regarding trauma, delayed disclosure, and myths about sexual assault reporting, the court acquitted on both counts.